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Executive Summary 
The Irish health care system is under severe budgetary pressure. Pharmaceutical 
expenditure is no exception. During the 2000s Ireland experienced one of the 
highest annual growth rates in pharmaceutical expenditure of any OECD country. In 
2009 Ireland spent more on pharmaceuticals per capita than any other OECD 
country (with the exception of the US, Canada and Greece).  
 
The onset of the financial crisis has seen a number of austerity budgets, which will 
continue to at least 2015. Public expenditure is being tightened. Households, whose 
incomes are being squeezed, are likely to be asked to make greater out-of-pocket 
contributions  towards pharmaceuticals. Budget  2012, for example, raises the 
monthly threshold for the Drugs Payment Scheme by €12 to €132 and retains the 
50c charge per prescription item for medical card patients, which was introduced in 
October 2010. 
 
One way of alleviating the pressure on government and household budgets arising 
from expenditure on pharmaceutical products is to address the following questions: 
•  Can the pharmaceutical delivery system be improved?  
•  Can better value for money be achieved?  
The purpose of this report is to examine these issues, by analysing policy in relation 
to the major participants in the pharmaceutical delivery system including the 
manufacturer, wholesaler, pharmacist, prescriber and the Health Service Executive 
(HSE). 
 
In designing ways of achieving better value for money, the proposals in this report 
are based on evolution, rather than revolution. In part this approach has been driven 
by the observation that variation within health care systems is much greater than 
between them. Thus by reforming the current model of pharmaceutical delivery, 
better value for money can be realised, while at the same time the costs and 
unintended consequences of large changes can be prevented. This minimises the 
chances that there will be an adverse impact on security of supply. 
 
In Ireland much valuable research has already been conducted and policy reform 
introduced. The prices of new pharmaceuticals and those that no longer have patent 
protection have been significantly reduced. Wholesale mark-ups have been halved. 
Pharmacist mark-ups have been reduced for the State schemes, although the extent 
to which this has influenced the cash paying patient is unclear. Nevertheless, despite viii | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
these undoubted improvements more can and should be done. Relatively little 
attention has been devoted to the demand side in terms of, for example, examining 
the role of prescribers. 
 
Prices of new pharmaceuticals, subject to patent protection, could be reduced 
further by setting the ex-factory price with reference to the lowest priced 
comparator Member State. An examination of data for the last number of years 
suggests that prices would decline by 20 to 25 per cent if such an approach were 
adopted. Measures should also be taken to ensure that when a new pharmaceutical 
is introduced it does not displace, for particular uses, equally effective but lower 
priced alternatives. It should be confined to those indications for which it provides 
value for money. Economic evaluation of new interventions is crucial in this regard. 
Risk-sharing arrangements between the HSE and individual pharmaceutical firms are 
proposed to address this issue. 
 
Parallel imports of new products – pharmaceuticals that are imported to Ireland 
from another Member State where the price is lower and without the authorisation 
of the patent owner – is legal.  Indeed, it is an imperative of the EU single market. 
These lower price parallel imports are important, in some instances accounting for as 
much as 20 to 25 per cent of the sales of leading new pharmaceuticals in Ireland. 
However, consistent with experience in other Member States, these lower prices are 
not reflected – except to a small degree – in either the price that the HSE or the cash 
paying patient is charged. This needs to change if expenditure is to be reduced and 
value for money obtained. The HSE and the cash paying patient should share in the 
benefits of lower price parallel imports. It is proposed that, initially at least, the 
difference between the price of the parallel imported product and the price charged 
by the patent owner in Ireland should be shared 50:50 between the parallel importer 
and the HSE/cash paying patient. 
 
Once patent protection for a pharmaceutical expires, in particular for high volume 
products, generic competitors supply interchangeable products at a lower price.  This 
increased competition should benefit both the HSE and the cash paying patient. 
These benefits are likely to increase as a series of blockbuster pharmaceuticals lose 
patent protection in the near future. However, at the moment there are barriers 
that prevent full realisation of the benefits from competition. A series of proposals 
are made to correct this situation. Interchangeability will be determined by an 
expert body, such as the Irish Medicines Board. For high volume interchangeable 
pharmaceuticals the price should be set by competitive tendering. The HSE and the 
cash paying patient should only pay the lowest price for an interchangeable product. 
For higher priced interchangeable products – typically the brand name – to be paid 
for by the HSE the prescriber should specify the reason and write in their own hand Executive Summary | ix 
‘no substitution’ on the prescription. This will provide useful feedback to the HSE and 
the agency charged with determining interchangeability. These ideas, it is 
anticipated, will inform the debate concerning forthcoming legislation on reference 
pricing and generic substitution. 
 
The wholesale function is an important bridge between the manufacturer and the 
pharmacist. The evidence suggests that there is vigorous competition between the 
three full-line wholesalers. The market appears to work well. While it is the case that 
the current recession and HSE policy moves have placed wholesalers under financial 
pressure, this is insufficient reason to change the wholesalers' current business 
model. Many other sectors are experiencing falling profits and demand. However, 
there are some issues that might raise concerns over the Direct to Pharmacy (DTP) 
distribution model. Under this model the brand name manufacturer sets the quality 
standards for the wholesale function (e.g. frequency of deliveries) and pays the 
distributor a fixed distribution fee. DTP has limited but rising penetration in Ireland. 
Nevertheless, we recommend that the HSE actively monitor the importance and 
service levels offered by DTP brand name manufacturers. If the service levels fall 
below acceptable levels to the HSE, then minimum quality standards should be set. 
 
The pharmacy market is marked by a lack of information available to patients on not 
only pharmaceutical prices, mark-ups and dispensing fees, but also the services 
supplied by pharmacists. These services have been expanding with the 
administration of the seasonal influenza vaccine and the dispensing of emergency 
hormonal contraception. In other professions such as dentistry and medicine in 
Ireland, as well as pharmacy in other jurisdictions, patients are provided with 
information that assists them in deciding which provider to choose. The same should 
apply for pharmacy in Ireland. Dispensing fees, services offered and mark-ups should 
be posted in pharmacies, and pharmacists should have the option of using media to 
disseminate such information. New forms of retailing such as the internet should – 
under the appropriate regulatory conditions – be considered by the HSE, perhaps on 
a trial basis. The result should be a more competitive, efficient and vibrant pharmacy 
sector that is more responsive to patient preferences and needs. 
 
The prescriber, typically the family doctor, acts on the patient’s behalf in making 
decisions concerning the appropriate course of treatment in addressing the patient’s 
condition. This may involve selection of a pharmaceutical. The report suggests that 
in writing a prescription that the international non-proprietary name – atorvastatin, 
rather than Liptor, fluoxetine rather than Prozac – be used by the prescriber. In other 
words, the prescriber selects a particular pharmaceutical rather than a particular 
supplier or brand. There are likely to be exceptions, as discussed in the report, such 
as that referred to above in the discussion of no-substitution prescriptions. Proposals x | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
are also made concerning the development of protocols and clinical guidelines so 
that the quality of prescribing will be improved. At the present time the HSE is 
providing tools whereby prescribers can compare their prescribing patterns for 
selected products with their peers. These proposals take the debate a stage further. 
 
As with any set of recommendations, resource costs are an issue, particularly in a 
time of fiscal austerity. However, because the proposed changes are incremental 
and build on what has already gone before, the costs of implementation are likely to 
be minimal. The agreements between the State and the pharmaceutical firms are 
due to expire in 2012; the legislation to implement reference pricing and generic 
substitution is expected to be introduced in 2012. Many of the measures to liberalise 
pharmacy could be accommodated  within the existing legislative framework. 
However, other policy changes may require legislation, but a considerable amount 
can be achieved by refining current policy. 
 
While these recommendations and proposals are likely to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the pharmaceutical market, they are not likely to be the last word. 
Apart from the fact that new problems may arise or that the report may have 
inadequately specified a problem, the participants in the pharmaceutical delivery 
system are likely to react to the proposals in ways that prevent the intended 
outcome of a particular recommendation. Hence the Health Service Executive and 
the Department of Health need to maintain constant vigilance of the system and, 
where appropriate, to take action to achieve publicly stated and agreed objectives. 
 
The recommendations contained in this report are designed to ensure that taxpayers 
get better value for money from the €1.9 billion public pharmaceutical budget, but 
also that the cash paying patients benefits too. They are also designed to ensure that 
patients, irrespective of whether or not the State pays for the pharmaceutical, 






1.1  BACKGROUND 
The Irish health care system, like many others, is under severe pressure. Demand is 
rising as the population increases and ages and expectations change, while new 
health technologies, treatments and procedures are constantly coming to market.
1 
Yet, at the same time, the ability to pay for health care is constrained for 
households, firms and government by the recession, which puts a squeeze on 
household incomes, firm balance sheets and government budgets. Not surprisingly, 
the mismatch between demand and ability to pay leads to pressures for better value 
for money and greater efficiencies in the provision of health care. This applies to all 
aspects of health care from the overall structure of health care delivery to individual 
services such as cancer treatment or the location of accident and emergency 
centres.
2   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1   For a discussion of the drivers of demand see, for example, Normand (2011), who argues that too much attention has been 
given to ageing as a driver. 
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The demand-led, publicly-funded, General Medical Services (GMS, i.e. medical card) 
and Community Drug Schemes (CDS) are among the fastest growing components of 
publicly-funded health care in Ireland.
3 Indeed, the growth rate has exceeded the 
overall rate of growth of public health care expenditure with the result that the 
share of public health  care expenditure accounted for by expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals and payments to community pharmacists has increased from 10.1 
per cent to 13.6 per cent between 2000 and 2009, respectively (Brick and Nolan, 
2010).
4 Furthermore, the indications are that on unchanged policies both the volume 
and value of the schemes will continue to grow – the number of prescriptions grew 
by a factor of between 1.39 to 1.85 from 2006 to 2020 (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 97). 
 
In view of both its importance and rapid growth rate the provision of 
pharmaceuticals under the GMS and CDS has been the subject of a series of reports 
and polices to reduce the cost of pharmaceuticals.
5 These reports and policies have 
to a large extent concentrated on the supply side – lowering the ex-factory price, 
reducing wholesalers' and pharmacists' mark-ups - rather than the demand side – 
influencing prescribers' and patients' behaviour – in seeking to create cost savings 
and greater efficiencies. Building on this earlier research and policy change, this 
report not only looks at the supply side but also at the behaviour of prescribers.  
 
We do not analyse the behaviour of patients in this report. While patient demand is 
to a large extent dependent on the decisions of the prescriber, a key determinant of 
their behaviour is also the current structure of entitlements to public health services, 
an issue that is outside the scope of this report. Previous reports have examined this 
issue in greater detail (e.g. Ruane, 2010), highlighting the many anomalies that 
characterise the current system. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The mandate and scope of the report is outlined 
in Section 1.2. The research methodology is set out in Section 1.3, while Section 1.4 
explains the terminology and other conventions used in the report. Finally, Section 
1.5 outlines the structure of the report.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
3  While Bennett et al. (2009) include the GMS in the CDS, we follow the practice adopted by the Department of Health of 
referring to the GMS and CDS separately (Brick et al., 2010). Using this definition of the CDS the three main components of 
the CDS are the Drug Payment (DP), Long Term Illness (LTI) and High Tech Drugs (HTD) schemes. See Chapter 2 for further 
details. 
4   Per capita expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Ireland exceeded the OECD average in 2009, and was exceeded only by the 
US, Canada and Greece. In addition, the annual rate of growth in per capita expenditure over the period 2000-2009 was 
approximately 9 per cent, second only to Greece (Borowitz et al., 2011, p. 48). For further discussion on these trends see 
Chapter 2. 
5   For details see Annexe A. Introduction | 3 
1.2  MANDATE AND SCOPE OF REPORT 
The report was commissioned by the Health Service Executive (HSE), the terms of 
reference for which are reproduced in Annexe B. The overall objective of the report 
is to set out the roadmap for reforming the delivery of pharmaceuticals to the 
patient "...within a framework that guarantees security of supply and value for 
money." Furthermore the report will "provide guidance as to how the HSE can lead 
in fashioning the new institutional and market arrangements". 
 
The discussion is concerned primarily with the State-funded GMS and CDS. These 
schemes account for the majority of pharmaceutical expenditure in the State and 
influence the pricing and other facets of pharmaceutical delivery in the hospital 
sector and the cash sector at the retail level. Thus it is important to take into account 
these sectors and the interaction with the public community sector. 
 
In seeking better value for money, while at the same time ensuring security of 
supply, the approach used was to first gain a thorough understanding of the current 
model for the delivery of pharmaceuticals from the manufacturer through to the 
prescriber and the patient. Next the problems and shortcomings of the current 
system were identified. In many instances the earlier reports referred to above 
provide an excellent point of departure. Attention then turns to possible solutions 
and the development of a roadmap for reform. 
 
In seeking to improve the current model of pharmaceutical delivery, so as to achieve 
better value for money while ensuring security of supply, it is likely to be necessary 
to consider changing the rules or parameters that currently govern the behaviour of 
the key existing and possible future participants in the current model.
6 At one 
extreme the current model can be improved with minor tinkering, at the other, 
radical change. Thus the report will not provide one best purpose model, but rather 
a menu of different models or options. To some extent the issue revolves around the 
question of timing. Some of the minor changes may be introduced relatively quickly 
– quick wins – while others will take longer – new legislation may be needed, fresh 
procurement arrangements and so on. 
 
The approach used here is to consider the current model employed in Ireland, and 
then gradually change more and more of the rules, except those desired for reasons 
of safety. Arguably, the more the rules of the current model are changed or varied 
the better the outcome. This reflects the fact that as more of the rules are changed 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
6   By rules we mean the current arrangements that govern the current model. Some of these rules are laws and regulations; in 
other instances they are agreements between the HSE and representative bodies involved in pharmacy and the supply of 
pharmaceuticals; and in others the reimbursement formula set by the HSE. 4 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
the opportunity set of choices increases and hence the probability of designing a 
better model. Revising more and more of the rules implies the possibility of a larger 
shift from the status quo. However, given the unprecedented austerity situation that 
Ireland finds itself in, it is difficult to think of a more powerful driver for moving to an 
improved pharmaceutical delivery model, even if it involves radical change. 
 
1.3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Three main research tools are used in this report. First, desk research which draws 
on the extensive literature on getting better value for money in pharmaceutical 
delivery was undertaken.
7 Attention is paid to both the literature concerning Ireland 
and other jurisdictions. This reflects the fact that many of the same problems occur 
in the delivery of pharmaceuticals across a number of different jurisdictions. Thus 
there is an opportunity to learn from this experience in designing policy for Ireland. 
 
Nevertheless, great care needs to be taken in applying the models of other 
jurisdictions to Ireland. These models reflect different histories, institutions, policy 
preferences, problems and other factors. It may not be possible to select and 
apply/adapt successfully one aspect of these models without, at the same time, also 
taking into account a series of related policy initiatives. Nevertheless, if cognisance 
of these differences is taken, valuable lessons can be learnt. Furthermore, to the 
extent that aspects of a model have been shown to work successfully in other 
jurisdictions, this makes it much more likely that it will work well in Ireland. 
 
Second, we engaged with those responsible for the delivery of pharmaceuticals to 
the patient in both Ireland and elsewhere, including Northern Ireland, New Zealand 
and Ontario, the largest Canadian province. Attention is devoted to both existing 
participants  –  regulators, manufacturers, parallel importers, wholesalers, 
pharmacists, medical practitioners
8, purchasers, patients – and future possible 
participants – supermarkets, other retail outlets and internet providers.
9 Annexe C 
provides a listing of the various stakeholders (e.g. regulators, industry representative 
bodies and pharmaceutical reimbursement agencies) with whom discussions took 
place. Typically, we met with representatives of these institutions, although on 
occasion a conference call was the only practical method of communication (e.g. the 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency of New Zealand, or PHARMAC). In some 
instances formal written  submissions were also made. The report has been 
immeasurably strengthened by these meetings and the engagement of those 
concerned. It has resulted in insights into the way in which the pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
7  The list of references in the report provides an indication of the literature consulted. 
8   Throughout this report, we use the term medical practitioners to refer to doctors (GPs, hospital consultants). 
9  Of course the future and existing participants may overlap. For example, pharmacies may, if allowed, provide internet 
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delivery model functions and also enabled the interviews to be used as a sounding 
board in the development of proposed changes to the current model. 
 
Third, data provided by the HSE and others, including wholesalers, were analysed. 
The data can be used both to inform the description of the current model of 
pharmaceutical delivery and identify the magnitude of possible problems and 
resulting solutions. For example, it was often stated by market participants that 
parallel imports accounted for a large percentage of the sales of high volume single 
source in-patent pharmaceuticals. However, in the absence of reliable data it is 
difficult to gauge the extent and durability of parallel imports and hence whether it 
is worth considering policy reforms in this area. HSE data can determine whether 
parallel imports are an ice cube, accounting for a trivial market share, or an iceberg, 
accounting for a substantial market share. 
 
1.4  TERMINOLOGY AND OTHER CONVENTIONS 
There is a certain amount of discretion in the terminology used to characterise the 
pharmaceutical delivery system. Thus some decisions over terminology have to be 
made for the purposes of clarifying the exposition. We have adopted the following 
conventions. First, in general pharmaceuticals are used as opposed to the more 
general term drugs or medicines. By pharmaceuticals we in general refer to those 
products covered by the GMS and CDS which are by and large only available on 
prescription, although there are some over-the-counter (OTC) preparations.
10 The 
terms drug is used on occasion where it is specifically named by the HSE and others. 
 
Second, an issue arises as to whether or not the term patient or consumer should be 
used. The use of the term consumer implies a well informed individual making 
decisions with respect to pharmaceutical necessity and choice, while the term 
patient implies a principle agent relationship between the prescriber and the 
individual based on asymmetric information.
11 Put in these terms it is clear that the 
term patient is a better characterisation of how the process of pharmaceutical 
choice is made. Nevertheless, this should not take away from the fact that patients 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
10   There is, of course, of the issue of the dividing line between prescription and OTC products. A prescription pharmaceutical is 
defined by the Irish Medicines Board (IMB) as those "...which require medical supervision and [are] available only with a 
doctor's or dentist's prescription and dispensed through pharmacies." In contrast, an OTC product is defined as those 
"...medicines [that] are available without a prescription and are usually for milder conditions and short-term use. While 
some of these products are available on general sale in retail outlets, others can only be purchased in pharmacies." It is 
beyond the scope of this report to comment on the implications of where the dividing line should be drawn. However, 
simply reclassifying products as OTC rather than prescription and hence excluding the product from reimbursement under 
either the GMS or CDS may not result in large savings if patients request medical practitioners to prescribe more expensive 
prescription-only products. The definitions are taken from the IMB's website: www.imb.ie (accessed 8 December 2011). 
11  Information asymmetry is discussed further in Chapter 2 in reference to the rationale for government intervention in the 
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are becoming increasingly well informed in health matters with a whole range of 
resources available on which to rely, often easily accessed through the internet. 
 
Third, pharmaceuticals on the market for the purposes of this report can be divided 
into two broad categories: single source in-patent products, and multiple source off-
patent products (Table 1.1). Single source in-patent products are brand name 
pharmaceuticals  (sometimes also referred to as proprietary pharmaceuticals) 
without a generic equivalent. These are new products with patent protection, often 
new chemical entities (NCEs), which  are  typically  marketed by the large 
multinational firms that are responsible for the vast majority of research and 
development (R&D) in the pharmaceutical industry. Multiple source off-patent 
pharmaceuticals comprise brand name products that have a generic equivalent (i.e. 
which are no longer subject to patent protection). Generic pharmaceuticals refer to 
products that are the same active ingredient, strength and dosage form
12 as the 
proprietary product. Generic pharmaceuticals enter the market once the brand 
name product no longer has patent protection. Generic pharmaceuticals can be 
either branded or unbranded. Parallel imports are identical to the proprietary 
product except that they may be packaged differently and may not carry the original 
manufacturer's warranty. These parallel imports into Ireland are in-patent 
pharmaceuticals from another EU Member State. Such imports are undertaken 
without the authorisation of the patent owner, by specialist firms taking advantage 
of arbitrage opportunities due to price differences between Member States.
13 
 
TABLE 1.1  Classification of Pharmaceuticals 
 
Single source in-patent  1.  Brand name or proprietary pharmaceutical without a generic equivalent 
Multiple source off-patent  2.  Brand name or proprietary pharmaceutical with a generic equivalent 
3.  Branded generics (i.e. generic pharmaceuticals that use a brand name) 
4.  Unbranded generics use the international non-proprietary name (INN) 
 
Note: Parallel imports are usually single source in-patent pharmaceuticals. 
 
Fourth, instead of referring to European Union Member States, reference will be 
made to Member States. EU-15
14 will refer to those Member States that formed the 
EU prior to enlargement in 2004 and 2007. Enlargement added 12 new Member 
States, constituting the present EU-27.
15   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
12   Dosage form refers to the method of administration of the pharmaceutical: capsule, tablet, liquid etc. 
13  Off-patent pharmaceuticals may also be subject to parallel imports. However, in this report attention is focused on imports 
of the in-patent pharmaceuticals. 
14   Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
15   Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary joined in 2004; Bulgaria 
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Fifth, the term 'personal communication' refers to instances in which information 
(unpublished) was received from the various individuals/organisations that we met 
with during the preparation of this report. 
 
Sixth, the report relates to events as of December 2011. 
 
1.5  OUTLINE OF REPORT 
The report is divided into eight Chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 set the scene. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the main trends in pharmaceutical consumption in Ireland 
and presents an overview of the pharmaceutical pricing, reimbursement and 
delivery system, while Chapter 3 explores in more depth the two objectives of the 
pharmaceutical delivery system that we are concerned with, securing value for 
money while ensuring security of supply. The remaining five chapters explore ways 
in which these objectives can be achieved. 
 
The setting of the ex-factory price of pharmaceuticals is the subject of Chapter 4. For 
this purpose pricing options are presented for three categories: single source in-
patent pharmaceuticals; parallel imports; and multiple source off-patent 
pharmaceuticals. Next attention turns to the pricing of the services of the wholesaler 
in Chapter 5, before the issue of the role and pricing of the services of the 
pharmacist is addressed in Chapter 6. Demand for pharmaceuticals is mediated 
through the prescriber, the subject of Chapter 7. The roadmap for reform brings 
together all the various strands of the discussion in Chapter 8, together with the 
twenty-three recommendations made in the report. The roadmap provides the HSE 
and government with a set of options for policy which will inform the renewal of 
agreements with the proprietary and generic manufacturers in 2012.
16 
 
We have adopted a fairly conventional approach to considering alternative proposals 
for obtaining better value for money and security of supply from the pharmaceutical 
delivery system, from the ex-factory price through to the pricing of the pharmacy 
services, before attention turns to the prescriber. However, demand and supply 
measures are considered together and not, as appears from the outline, separately. 
For example, in considering generic pricing, issues such as generic substitution by the 
pharmacist and the use of tenders are considered, one of which is demand side, the 
other supply side (Kanavos et al., 2011, Table 1, p. 35). In other words, the report 
concentrates on the best way of obtaining value for money and security of supply 
with respect to a particular issue, irrespective of whether the best policy approach is 
supply or demand side or a combination of the two. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Irish Pharmaceutical Market 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, total expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Ireland amounted to €2.2 billion.
1 
By far the largest component of total expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Ireland is 
public expenditure on pharmaceuticals  (administered by the Primary Care 
Reimbursement Service, PCRS), which amounted to €1.9 billion in 2010.
2 Public 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals was one of the fastest growing components of 
public health expenditure over the period 2000 to 2010. It increased by 158.5 per 
cent in real terms and accounted for 12.9 per cent of total public health expenditure 
in 2010 (up from 10.1 per cent in 2000).
3 Per capita expenditure on pharmaceuticals 
in Ireland exceeded the OECD average in 2009, and was exceeded only by the US, 
Canada and Greece. In addition, the annual rate of growth in per capita expenditure 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  In 2007, it was estimated that approximately 85 per cent of expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Ireland related to state 
expenditure on the General Medical Service (GMS) Scheme and Community Drugs Schemes (CDS) (Barry et al., 2008). 
Applying the same split to 2010 expenditure on pharmaceuticals under the GMS and CDS results in a total spend of 
approximately €2.2 billion in 2010. 
2  HSE, personal communication, 1 September 2011. 
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over the period 2000-2009 was approximately 9 per cent, second only to Greece 
(Borowitz et al., 2011).
4 Numerous reports have highlighted concerns over the 
sustainability of pharmaceutical expenditure in Ireland, and have proposed a 
number of policy changes.
5 In recent years, the government has introduced a 
number of reforms to the pricing and reimbursement regimes, and the decline in 
public pharmaceutical expenditure from 2009 to 2010 in part reflects these efforts.  
 
In this context, ensuring value for money in pharmaceutical expenditure (both public 
and private) is a key policy concern, as is ensuring security of supply.
6 Governments 
and international agencies intervene in a number of ways to achieve these 
objectives, from the provision of patent protection, the regulation of pharmaceutical 
licensing and marketing procedures, the regulation of the behaviour of the various 
actors in the market (manufacturers, wholesalers, prescribers, pharmacists and 
patients), and the control of pricing and reimbursement decisions. Here we are 
primarily concerned with policy in relation to the aspects of the Irish pharmaceutical 
market that are largely under the control of the Health Service Executive (HSE) and 
Department of Health (DoH); in particular, the decisions on pricing and 
reimbursement. 
 
In this chapter, we examine the current arrangements in relation to the pricing and 
reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in Ireland, while also reviewing policy in relation 
to the behaviour of those active in the supply chain (manufacturers, wholesalers and 
pharmacists), prescribers and patients. Section 2.2 outlines the rationale for 
government intervention in the pharmaceutical sector, detailing the various forms of 
market failure that characterise the sector. Section 2.3 provides an overview of 
recent trends in pharmaceutical expenditure in Ireland, as well as the key role played 
by the State in the financing of pharmaceuticals in Ireland. Section 2.4 provides a 
brief overview of the pricing and reimbursement procedures in Ireland and the 
delivery structure (Chapters 4-7 discuss these issues in greater detail). Section 2.5 
concludes this chapter.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
4  Undertaking cross-country comparisons of pharmaceutical expenditure is difficult, due to differences in the types of 
pharmaceuticals consumed, the quantities of pharmaceuticals consumed and the different prices between countries. These 
factors are in turn influenced by the demographic composition of the population, lifestyles and behaviours of patients, 
prescription behaviour of medical practitioners, existence of public insurance, share of prescription and OTC 
pharmaceuticals, level of self-care, level of generic entry, level of parallel trade, government regulation, level of in-country 
pharmaceutical production, incidence rate of diseases (e.g. cancer), intensity of care and use of technology, etc. (ECORYS 
Research and Consulting, 2009). 
5  For details see Annexe A. 
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2.2  GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET 
2.2.1  Rationale for Government Intervention 
Government intervention in the pharmaceutical market is motivated by the 
presence of a number of potential market failures, such as the absence of 
competition, the presence of externalities, information asymmetry and uncertainty. 
Governments also intervene for reasons of equity (i.e. to ensure that those on low 
incomes or in poor health are not denied access to appropriate health care due to 
cost). Government intervention in the pharmaceutical market can take numerous 
forms including the provision of information, regulation of conduct, financing and 
direct provision of services.  
 
2.2.1.1  Absence of Competition 
If pharmaceutical manufacturers were to sell products at the marginal cost of 
production and distribution, they would be unable to recoup the cost of R&D and 
would thus have no incentive to develop new innovative products that would 
potentially benefit public health.
7 In the absence of patent protection legislation 
which allows firms to recoup the large fixed costs of R&D, output would be lower 
than the socially optimal level due to the possibility of free riding behaviour on the 
part of competitors. The provision of patent protection is the main form of 
government intervention to deal with this market failure. A common European 
patent system is still under development; currently, patents may be filed with 
national patent offices or with the European Patent Office (EPO). In the latter case, 
national validation in each country is still necessary (ECORYS Research and 
Consulting, 2009). 
 
However, high initial investment in the form of R&D expenditure can also act as a 
barrier to entry for new firms and thus reduce competition.
8 There are, therefore, 
concerns about potential abuse of market power by pharmaceutical firms. This has 
led to two responses. First, regulation of the pricing and reimbursement regime (e.g. 
setting the ex-factory price, promoting the use of generic products, restricting the 
list of publicly reimbursable items, etc.) is designed to stimulate competition and 
limit market power directly.
9 However, it is important that in setting the regulatory 
framework security of supply is not put at risk, an issue discussed in Chapter 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
7  The evidence suggests that patents are particularly important in the development of pharmaceuticals because of the 
necessity to address current and emerging health problems, and the long life cycle of products (including long development 
periods). The exclusivity periods granted through patent law provide incentives to originator companies to continue 
innovating. The pharmaceutical industry is one of the main users of the patent system (European Commission, 2009, p. 9). 
8  A study of originator companies by the European Commission over the period 2000-2007 found that they spent on average 
17 per cent of their turnover generated at global level on R&D for new or improved prescription pharmaceuticals (European 
Commission, 2009, p. 7). 
9  Of course in designing these measures to encourage competition cognisance has to be taken of the fact that the patient 
does not always pay for the pharmaceutical and that the choice of pharmaceutical treatment is a decision of the medical 
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Second, competition policy is enforced at the EU level through merger control and 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).
10 A sector inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry was 
published in 2009 (European Commission, 2009). The inquiry was concerned that 
generic entry was being delayed, inter alia, due to the practices of the brand name 
firms.
11 Subsequently, the European Commission instituted a number of antitrust 
proceedings in the pharmaceutical sector. The most recent case, in October 2011, 
concerned allegations that an agreement between two firms had hindered the 
introduction of a generic version of fentanyl in the Netherlands.
12 
 
2.2.1.2  Externalities 
Pharmaceutical markets are also characterised by the presence of externalities, both 
positive and negative. Externalties imply that private costs or benefits are out of line 
with social costs or benefits. For example, for a positive externality, the private 
benefits of the activity are less than the social benefits (vaccinations for infectious 
diseases confer wider benefits on society in addition to the private benefit to the 
individual). The standard solution is to offer a subsidy in the case of products that 
produce positive externalities to encourage their consumption (Bennett et al., 1997). 
Negative externalities can be addressed using a range of measures such as taxes that 
aim to offset the externality and legal measures that assign liability for harm caused 
by products. 
 
2.2.1.3  Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a feature not only of pharmaceutical markets, but also of 
the health sector more generally. In the pharmaceutical market, the asymmetry 
operates on a number of different levels. The patient often knows less than the 
prescriber or dispenser, and, in turn, prescribers and dispensers must depend (at 
least partially) on the manufacturer for information about the effects of the product. 
The former often gives rise to the phenomenon of supplier-induced demand, 
whereby the provider, acting as an agent for the patient, is able to stimulate 
demand. This is particularly relevant when the provider is paid on a fee-for-service 
basis (as opposed to capitation or salary). Similarly, manufacturers may exert undue 
influence on prescribers and dispensers via marketing and sales promotion activities. 
This may lead to the prescribing of recently-introduced brand name pharmaceuticals 
in place of generics or less expensive older pharmaceuticals that may be just as 
effective. The presence of asymmetric information justifies a role for government in 
improving patients'  information, regulating the licensing and marketing of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
10  Cases have been brought on, for example, attempts to restrict parallel trade (see O'Donoghue and Macnab, 2009 for a 
discussion). 
11  For a discussion of these issues in a US context see FTC (2010, 2011). 
12  The two firms were Johnson and Johnson and the generic branches of Novartis. For details see European Commission 
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pharmaceuticals and regulating the behaviour of prescribers and other medical 
practitioners. 
 
2.2.1.4  Uncertainty 
Healthcare markets are also characterised by uncertainty, i.e. lack of information 
about the future. Illhealth is inherently unpredictable, both in terms of financial 
costs and physical and emotional suffering. This necessitates a role for insurance in 
offering the patient protection against uncertainty. Moral hazard behaviour, where 
an individual's behaviour is affected by their insurance status, may arise in the form 
of excessive utilisation of pharmaceuticals on the part of the patient. User fees, 
which aim to make patients more aware of the resource implications of their 
decisions, are often used to temper the moral hazard effects of free or heavily 
subsidised health care. However, the degree to which user fees are effective in 
changing behaviour has been questioned, and there are well-documented adverse 
impacts on access. In particular, user fees have been observed to have a dissuasive 
impact on both necessary and unnecessary health-care utilisation and in terms of 
pharmaceuticals, are at risk of "...impairing access to needed medicines in addition 
to those that are less effective or unnecessary" (OECD, 2008, p. 139).
13 
 
However, user fees, as well as acting as a source of revenue when the costs of 
administration are low, can act as a useful policy tool where the objective is to 
discourage all use of a product. For example, where the government is seeking to 
discourage consumption of brand name pharmaceuticals when a generic is available, 
a user fee on the brand name product can be an effective policy tool.
14 
 
2.2.1.5  Equity 
Apart from efficiency concerns, the desire to ensure that health care should be 
distributed equitably across the population motivates government intervention in 
health care.  Many governments attempt  to smooth out differences in health 
outcomes that are not related to need factors such as age, gender or health status, 
but rather to socioeconomic characteristics such as income, area of residence, level 
of education, etc. They do so primarily by intervening in the financing of healthcare 
services, offering free or subsidised services to those on low incomes or in 
particularly vulnerable situations (e.g. those with particular health conditions).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
13  In addition in the US, Kaiser Permanente found that an increase in pharmaceutical cost-sharing led to patients skipping their 
blood pressure and other essential medications, an increase in hospital costs and a spike in mortality (Mongan, 2009). 
14  This issue is discussed further in Chapter 4. 14 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
2.2.2  Scope of Government Intervention 
In this report, we are concerned primarily with policy in relation to the pricing and 
reimbursement of pharmaceuticals, rather than patent protection, enforcement of 
competition and marketing authorisation policies (as they are often also influenced 
by the behaviour of international agencies). The regulation of both pricing and 
reimbursement is exercised through a wide variety of policy instruments that may 
affect either the supply side for pharmaceutical production or the demand side for 
consumption of pharmaceutical products, or both. Typical supply side measures 
include regulation of product price, control of expenditures, industry regulation, and 
product reimbursement. Demand side measures include policies aiming to influence 
behaviour by prescribers, pharmacists and patients (ECORYS Research and 
Consulting, 2009). Such intervention can be justified on grounds of absence of 
competition, externalities, information asymmetry, and uncertainty. 
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that while government intervention to correct 
market failures is an accepted feature of modern economies, government failure 
may itself harm efficiency or equity. In particular, regulatory capture by vested 
interests may result in regulations that lead to an inefficient level of output and the 
creation of additional incomes for providers, e.g. the restrictions on pharmacy 
locations which existed prior to the revocation of the Health (Community Pharmacy 
Contractor Agreement) Regulations, 1996 (SI 152 of 1996) in 2002 (Gorecki, 2011). 
 
2.3  THE IRISH PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET 
2.3.1  Eligibility for Pharmaceutical Schemes 
State assistance towards the cost of pharmaceuticals is available under a number of 
different schemes. The General Medical Services (GMS, or medical card) Scheme 
provides free public health care (including GP care and prescription pharmaceuticals) 
to those who satisfy an income means test. In April 2011, over 1.6 million individuals 
had a medical card, accounting for 36.2 per cent of the population. A further 2.6 per 
cent of the population are eligible for free GP services (but not prescription 
pharmaceuticals) under the GMS Scheme (and are known as GP Visit card holders) 
(CSO, 2011; HSE, 2011b). 
 
Non-medical card holders can avail of State assistance towards the cost of 
prescribed pharmaceuticals under a number of Community Drugs Schemes (CDS). 
The three largest (in expenditure terms) are the Drugs Payment (DP), Long Term 
Illness (LTI) and High Tech Drug (HTD) schemes. All those ineligible for a medical card 
are eligible for the DP Scheme, whereby the State pays the full cost of prescription 
pharmaceuticals and certain appliances above a monthly threshold of €120 per 
family (increasing to €132 from January 2012). Individuals who suffer from one or The Irish Pharmaceutical Market | 15 
more of a schedule of long-term illnesses are entitled to obtain, without charge and 
irrespective of income, necessary pharmaceuticals and appliances under the LTI 
Scheme (Table 2.1). High tech drugs are generally only prescribed or initiated in 
hospitals and include items such as anti-rejection drugs for transplant patients or 
medicines used in conjunction with chemotherapy or growth hormones (PCRS, 
2010). Table 2.1 outlines the main schemes under which individuals are entitled to 
receive free or subsidised prescription pharmaceuticals in Ireland. 
 
TABLE 2.1  Primary Care Reimbursement Services Schemes, Eligibility for Free or Subsidised Pharmaceuticals, 
  2011 
 
Scheme/Payment  Description 
General Medical 
Services (GMS) 
Persons who are unable without undue hardship to arrange general practitioner (GP) medical and 
surgical services for themselves and their dependants receive free General Medical Services. Drugs, 
medicines and appliances supplied under the Scheme are provided through retail pharmacies. In most 
cases the doctor gives a completed prescription form to a person, who takes it to any pharmacy that has 
an agreement with the HSE to dispense GMS prescription forms. In rural areas the GP may dispense for 
those persons who opt to have their medicines dispensed by him/her. 
Drugs Payment (DP)  Under the Drugs Payment Scheme persons who are ordinarily resident in the State and who do not 
qualify for GMS can benefit if their spend on approved drugs, medicines and appliances for themselves or 
their family exceeds a monthly threshold (€120 per month from January 2010; rising to €132 per month 
from January 2012). 
High Tech Drugs (HTD)  High Tech Drugs are generally prescribed or initiated in hospitals, and include items such as anti-rejection 
drugs for transplant patients or medicines used in conjunction with chemotherapy or growth hormones. 
The medicines are purchased by the HSE and supplied through community pharmacies for which 
pharmacists are paid a patient care fee. Patients receive these pharmaceuticals on the basis of their 
eligibility under the DP or GMS schemes, i.e. HTD are supplied without charge to GMS patients (HTD are 
not subject to the 50c prescription fee), and to DP patients above the monthly threshold. 
Long Term Illness 
Scheme (LTI)
a 
On approval by HSE, persons who suffer from one or more of a schedule of long-term illnesses are 
entitled to obtain, without charge and irrespective of income, necessary drugs, medicines and appliances 
under the LTI scheme. 
Methadone Treatment 
Scheme (MT) 
Methadone is prescribed and dispensed by doctors and pharmacists for approved clients under the 
Methadone Treatment Scheme. Capitation fees payable to participating doctors and community 
pharmacists and claims by pharmacies for the ingredient cost of the Methadone dispensed and the 
associated dispensing fees are processed and paid by the PCRS. 
European Economic 
Area (EEA) 
Residents from one of the other States of the European Economic Area, with established eligibility, who 
require emergency GP services while on a temporary visit to the State are entitled to receive from a GP a 
GMS prescription form for necessary medication and to have such medication dispensed in a pharmacy 
that has entered into an agreement with the HSE within the State. Students, posted workers and their 
dependants are entitled to full services on presentation of a valid form E128. 
Health (Amendment) 
Act 1996 Scheme 
(HAA) 
Under the Health (Amendment) Act 1996, certain health services are made available without charge to 
persons who have contracted Hepatitis C directly or indirectly from the use of Human Immunoglobulin – 
Anti D or the receipt within the State of another blood product or blood transfusion. 
Dental Treatment 
Services Scheme (DTS) 
Under the Dental Treatment Services Scheme, GMS eligible adults have access to a range of treatments 
and clinical procedures, comprised of Routine Treatments and Full Upper and Lower Dentures. Routine 




A National Primary Childhood Immunisation Scheme provides for immunisation of the total child 
population, with the aim of eliminating, as far as possible, such conditions as Diphtheria, Polio, Measles, 
Mumps, Rubella and Meningococcal C Meningitis. 
Immunisations for 
certain GMS Eligible 
Persons 
Agreement was reached between the Department of Health and Children and the Irish Medical 
Organisation on fee rates to be applied to certain immunisations for GMS eligible persons. The 
immunisations encompassed by the agreement are: – Pneumococcal, Influenza, Hepatitis B and the 
combined Pneumococcal/Influenza. The HSE facilitated claiming for any of these immunisations by 
extending the range of codes for 'Special Items of Service'. 
 
Notes:  a  Acute Leukaemia, Mental Handicap, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Illness (in a person under 16), Cystic Fibrosis, Multiple Sclerosis, 
Diabetes Insipidus, Muscular Dystrophies, Diabetes Mellitus, Parkinsonism, Epilepsy, Phenylketonuria, Haemophilia, Spina 
Bifida, Hydrocephalus, Conditions arising from the use of Thalidomide. 
Source:    Adapted from PCRS (2010). 16 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
2.3.2  Total Expenditure 
Individuals receive prescription pharmaceuticals from two main sources in Ireland: 
community pharmacies and hospitals.
15  In 2010, total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals in Ireland amounted to €2.2 billion.
16 In 2007, it was estimated that 
85 per cent of total pharmaceutical expenditure in Ireland was accounted for by 
public pharmaceutical expenditure by the PCRS (Barry et al., 2008; Barry et al., 
2010). While the majority of pharmaceutical expenditure relates to expenditure in 
the community (Table 2.2), a significant proportion of this expenditure derives from 
prescriptions that are initiated in hospital.
17 Therefore, prescribing practices in the 
hospital sector have potentially important impacts on the types of pharmaceuticals 
consumed in the community sector, and by extension, total pharmaceutical 
expenditure. 
 
The State is the main source of pharmaceutical financing in Ireland, with the PCRS 
administering the various State schemes that provide assistance towards the cost of 
pharmaceuticals in the community, and the HSE largely funding the purchase of 
hospital pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical products dispensed in the community 
that are not reimbursed by the PCRS. Figures on private expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals are harder and sometimes impossible to source, but comprise out-
of-pocket or cash payments by individuals, as well as pharmaceutical expenditure in 
private hospitals (which is often reimbursed by private health insurance plans).
18 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
15  In 2009, 117 GPs were permitted to dispense pharmaceuticals. In rural areas where a GP has a centre of practice 3 miles or 
more from the nearest community pharmacy the GP dispenses for persons served from that centre who opt to be 
dispensed to. The GP is paid a dispensing fee for each such person. The GP's pharmaceutical requirements are obtained on 
a 'stock order' from a community pharmacy, approved in advance by the HSE (PCRS, 2010). 
16  For details see Section 2.1. 
17  Feely et al. (1999) estimated that approximately 38 per cent of GMS prescriptions in the late 1990s were initiated by 
hospital doctors. 
18  The provision of pharmaceuticals to private patients in public hospitals is financed by the public hospital (St James's 
Hospital, personal communication, 1 July 2011).
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Expenditure by private hospitals (not reimbursed by private health insurance) 





Notes:  a  2009 is chosen for illustration as it is the latest year for which data on public hospital expenditure on pharmaceuticals is 
available. 
  b  This refers to private out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditure below the DP threshold of €120 per month (for those who 
spend over €120 per month). The threshold will increase to €132 from January 2012. 
  c  This refers to private out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditure below the DP threshold of €120 per month (for those who 
do not spend over €120 per month). Dorgan (2008) estimated this figure to be €140 million in 2007. 
Sources:    PCRS (2010); HSE (2010); HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011. 
 
2.3.3  PCRS Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
The PCRS administers payments to community pharmacists for pharmaceuticals 
dispensed under the various State schemes. The PCRS is part of the Integrated 
Services Directorate (ISD) of the HSE and has an operational role in relation to 
making payments to primary care contractors (GPs, community pharmacists, 
dentists, optometrists/ophthalmologists) for services provided by them under the 
various State schemes. 
 
In 2010, the PCRS spent €1.9 billion on pharmaceuticals and payments to community 
pharmacists, an increase of nearly 160 per cent in real terms since 2000. Expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals and payments to community pharmacists accounted for over 75 
per cent of total PCRS expenditure in 2009.
19  Over the period 2000-2010, 
pharmaceutical expenditure on the GMS (the largest scheme in expenditure terms) 
increased by 185.2 per cent in real terms, while expenditure on the LTI and HTD 
schemes increased by 138.3 per cent and 444.2 per cent in real terms respectively. In 
part as a result of a reduction in the retail mark-up in 2009 (described in Section 2.4), 
expenditure on the DP Scheme fell by just over 3 per cent in real terms over the 
entire period 2000-2010 (Figure 2.1). 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
19  Authors’ calculations from PCRS (2010). While total PCRS pharmaceutical expenditure for 2010 is available, total PCRS 
expenditure (i.e. including payments to other medical practitioners such as GPs) for 2010 is not yet available (PCRS, 
personal communication, 1 September 2011). 18 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 




Notes:  * 
** 
CPI Adjusted 2010=100 
Includes amongst others the Dental Treatment Services Scheme, the Methadone Treatment Scheme and training grants. 
Sources:    PCRS, Statistical Analysis of Claims and Payments, various years; PCRS, personal communication, 1 September 2011. 
 
Pharmaceutical expenditure is a function of the price, volume and product mix of 
products dispensed. In terms of price, we can further disaggregate pharmaceutical 
expenditure under the three largest schemes (i.e. GMS, DP and LTI) into the 
ingredient cost, pharmacy fees/mark-ups and VAT. Figure 2.2 illustrates the trends in 
these components of the total payments for the GMS, DP and LTI schemes over the 
period 2005-2010.
20 In 2010, pharmacy fees and mark-ups comprised 21.4 per cent 
of total payments under the GMS Scheme, in contrast to 29.3 per cent and 27.8 per 
cent under the DP and LTI schemes respectively. The impact of the reduction in the 
wholesale and retail mark-ups on the DP and LTI schemes in 2009 (described in 
Section 2.4) is particularly apparent for the DP Scheme; pharmacy fees and mark-ups 
declined from nearly 40 per cent of the total payments under the DP Scheme in 2005 
to just under 30 per cent in 2010. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
20  Data on the ingredient cost, fees and mark-up and VAT components are only available from 2005 onwards (PCRS, personal 
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FIGURE 2.2  Proportion of Payments to Pharmacists by PCRS Accounted for by Ingredient Cost, Mark-Ups, Fees 




Notes:  The ingredient cost refers to the ex-wholesale price (i.e. the ex-factory price plus the wholesale mark-up). See also Section 2.4.2. 
Source:  HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011. 
 
As discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, there have been a number of significant policy 
developments in relation to the pricing of pharmaceuticals in Ireland in recent years. 
However, there have been fewer policy proposals in relation to volume and product 
mix. Over the period 2000-2010, the number of items dispensed increased by 140.6 
per cent on the GMS Scheme, 49.0 per cent on the DP Scheme, 144.6 per cent on the 
LTI Scheme and 297.1 per cent on the HTD Scheme (Figure 2.3). With changing 
eligibility requirements, changing population composition, the introduction of new 
products, and changes in the DP threshold, it is difficult to isolate the precise reasons 
for the differential growth in the number of items dispensed across the various 
schemes over this period. 
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Sources:  2000-2009: PCRS, Statistical Analysis of Claims and Payments, various years. 
2010: HSE, personal communication, 10 August 2011. 
 
2.3.4  Non-PCRS Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
As illustrated in Table 2.2, there is much less information available on the non-PCRS 
components of total pharmaceutical expenditure. In terms of community 
pharmaceutical expenditure, private out-of-pocket or cash payments by individuals 
below the monthly DP threshold comprise the remainder. For those individuals who 
exceed  monthly  DP threshold, the PCRS records the sub-threshold level of 
expenditure, and this amounted to €188.2 million in 2009. Pharmacists do not 
inform the PCRS of the remaining private out-of-pocket expenditure, i.e. sub-
threshold expenditure by those who do not exceed the monthly DP threshold. 
Dorgan (2008) estimated this figure to be €140 million in 2007. 
 
Expenditure in both public and private hospitals accounts for the remainder of total 
pharmaceutical expenditure. In 2009, total pharmaceutical expenditure in public 
hospitals amounted to €308.6 million, an increase of 19.8 per cent in real terms over 
2006  levels.
21  There are no publicly available figures on total prescription 
pharmaceutical expenditure in the private hospital sector. 
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2.3.5  Provision of Data on Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
An important ingredient of policy analysis and debate is high-quality reliable data 
with which to paint a picture of the composition and trends in expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals in Ireland. Although certain parts of this picture are clear, in several 
instances, especially in the hospital sector and out-of-pocket or cash payments in the 




The HSE is the appropriate body to collect this data as it is already responsible for 
compiling the data on the GMS and various CDS (published in the annual PCRS 
Statistical Analysis of Claims and Payments documents), and is thus best placed to 
co-ordinate data collection across the public and private community and hospital 
sectors. 
 
One of the challenges for the HSE  in putting together a complete picture of 
pharmaceutical expenditures in Ireland will be accessing data related to the private 
sector. One of the most important components of such expenditure is the out-of-
pocket expenditure by individuals below the DP threshold of €120 per month 
(increased to €132 in Budget 2012). These data are already partially submitted to the 
HSE, but only for those patients who exceed the monthly threshold. However, in 
terms of minimising collection costs it would seem reasonable if the sub-threshold 
data were also submitted to the HSE so that it would be in a position to present a 
fuller picture of pharmaceutical expenditure, but without imposing an extra 
administrative burden on pharmacies. The collection of such data will also enhance 
the effectiveness of feedback and other mechanisms being developed by the HSE for 
prescribers  (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7)  and also allows for the 
monitoring of disease incidence. It is not clear whether legislation would be required 
to allow the HSE to gather detailed disaggregated data on sub-threshold DP 
expenditure. Subject to clarification in relation to the legal requirements for such a 
move: 
 
   
Recommendation 2.2: We recommend that pharmacists should be required to 
inform the PCRS of the  out-of-pocket expenditure (i.e.  sub-DP  threshold 
expenditure), by those who do not exceed the DP threshold. 
Recommendation 2.1: We recommend that the HSE should be responsible for 
the collection, preparation and publication of a comprehensive time-series of all 
components of pharmaceutical expenditure (public, private, community and 
hospital) on an annual basis. 22 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
2.4  CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRICING, REIMBURSEMENT AND DELIVERY OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS IN IRELAND 
2.4.1  A Brief Characterisation of the Current Pharmaceutical Delivery Model 
The current community pharmaceutical pricing, reimbursement and delivery model 
can be thought of as two quite distinct but related parts, which are illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. The first is the pharmaceutical delivery system from the manufacturer to 
the pharmacy to the patient. This is the supply side of the model. Second, is the 
demand side, the part that determines which, if any, pharmaceutical is chosen and 
which brand – assuming that there is more than one brand on the market – is 
selected when the patient visits a medical practitioner. The choice is the 
responsibility of the prescriber, in response to the symptoms presented by the 
patient. The supply and demand side connect when the patient presents the 
prescription to the pharmacist to be dispensed. In the following sections, the supply 
and demand side are briefly described, concentrating on the pricing and 
reimbursement arrangements in the community and hospital sectors (the supply-
side), and the delivery of pharmaceuticals to patients (where demand and supply 
interact). 
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Wholesaler  
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Pharmacist 
 HSE agreement sets mark-ups at retail 
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Prescriber /Medical Practitioner 
Makes product and brand choice for 
patient (based on medical literature, 
manufacturer’s advertising, patient 
condition and expectations, etc) 
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Presents prescription to 
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2.4.2  Pricing and Reimbursement in the Community 
The pricing of pharmaceuticals is strongly linked to reimbursement, i.e. pricing and 
reimbursement form part of the same procedure. This involves a number of different 
stages. We distinguish four main stages involved in setting the final reimbursable 
price: 
1)  the determination of the ex-factory price, 
2)  the application of a wholesale mark-up, 
3)  the application of a retail mark-up and dispensing fees, 
4)  the application of sales tax. 
 
Table 2.3 summarises the various stages for the four largest schemes (i.e. GMS, DP. 
LTI and HTD). In many other jurisdictions in which the State provides assistance 
towards pharmaceutical costs,  a similar approach is used  to set the final 
reimbursement price. 
 
TABLE 2.3  Community Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Mechanism, Ireland,  




Regulated at the level of the manufacturer by way of agreements between the State and the 
manufacturers. 
     
March 2008  July 2009





17.66%  10%  8%  DP/LTI: 
HTD: 
           
Retail Mark-Up
e 
GMS:  n/a  n/a  n/a 
DP/LTI:  50%  20%  20% 
HTD:   n/a  n/a  n/a 
           
Dispensing Fee 
GMS:  €3.60 per item 
Sliding fee structure 
(€5.00 to €4.50 to €3.50) 
depending on the number of items 
dispensed per month 
Sliding fee structure 
(€5.00 to €4.50 to €3.50) 
depending on the number of items 
dispensed per month  DP/LTI:  €3.16 per item 
HTD:  n/a  n/a  n/a 
           
Patient Care Fee 
GMS:   n/a  n/a  n/a 
DP/LTI:  n/a  n/a  n/a 
HTD:   €60.52  €62.03
 
€62.03 
(months product dispensed); 
€31.02 (months product not 
dispensed; max 3 months) 




Oral:  0%  0%  0% 
Non-oral:  21%  21%  21% 
 
Notes:  a  The HSE advises each manufacturer or importer of each quantity and value of his/her pharmaceuticals dispensed under the 
GMS and CDS each month and each manufacturer/importer rebates to the HSE an amount 4 per cent of the value (at price to 
wholesaler) of all pharmaceuticals dispensed in the schemes (except those subject to price reductions). 
  b  As per the Health Professionals (Reductions of Payments to Community Pharmacy Contractors) Regulations 2009 – SI 246, 
except for the HTD patient care fee which was amended in line with ‘Towards 2016’ adjustments. The reduction in the HTD 
wholesale mark-up was an indirect effect post FEMPI (implemented March 2011). Priot to this there had been a 5 per cent 
discount historically applied to HTD products that were supplied to the pharmacist by the manufacturer or wholesaler. 
  c  As per the Health Professionals (Reductions of Payments to Community Pharmacy Contractors) Regulations 2011 – SI 300. 
The reduction in the HTD wholesale mark-up was an indirect effect of FEMPI (implemented June 2011). 
  d  In July 2009, the wholesale mark-up for controlled drugs and fridge items remained at 17.66 per cent, while it was reduced 
to 10 per cent for all other items. In June 2011, the mark-up for fridge items was reduced to 12 per cent, and for all other 
items (including controlled drugs) to 8 per cent. 
  e  The retail mark-up applied to all items depends on which scheme they are supplied under. There is no retail mark-up for 
those supplied under the GMS scheme and a 20 per cent mark-up for those supplied under DP and LTI schemes. 
Sources:    PCRS (2008); Government of Ireland (2009, 2011); HSE, personal communication, 5 January 2012. 24 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
2.4.2.1  Ex-Factory Price 
The price to the manufacturer (ex-factory price) is the basis for all prices in the 
market. The prices of pharmaceuticals supplied under the GMS and CDS at the level 
of the manufacturer are set by way of agreements between the State and the 
manufacturers. The price-setting mechanism follows the same procedure regardless 
of the type of pharmaceutical, except where the classification of a pharmaceutical 
changes between agreements.
22  A single maximum price across hospital and 
community supply is also a feature of the agreements. It should be noted, however, 
that hospitals are free to negotiate prices directly with manufacturers.
23 The ex-
factory price (manufacturer price) in Ireland is set with reference to the currency-
adjusted average price to the wholesaler in nine nominated EU Member States (in 
which the pharmaceutical is available).
24 For products reimbursed prior to the 
commencement of the current agreements, a price freeze applies (Barry et al., 
2004). 
 
2.4.2.2  Wholesale Mark-Up 
The next stage in setting the final reimbursable price of pharmaceuticals is the 
application of a wholesale mark-up. As a result of concerns that the wholesale mark-
up was excessive, the Minister reduced the existing wholesale mark-up from 17.66 
per cent to 10 per cent with effect from 1 July 2009. A further reduction to 8 per 
cent for products dispensed under the GMS, DP and LTI schemes was announced in 
March 2011 effective July 2011.
25 
 
2.4.2.3  Retail Mark-Up and Dispensing Fee 
The next step in setting the final reimbursable price of pharmaceuticals is the 
application of a retail mark-up and retail dispensing fees. In Ireland there is no retail 
mark-up for products dispensed under the GMS Scheme, while there is a 20 per cent 
mark-up for products dispensed under the DP and LTI schemes (reduced from 50 per 
cent to 20 per cent from 1 July 2009).
26 All products dispensed under the GMS, DP 
and LTI schemes are subject to a dispensing fee, which is on a sliding scale which 
depends on the number of items dispensed per month/annum. For the Methadone 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
22  See Table 1.1 for the pharmaceutical classification used in this study. 
23  See Chapter 4 for further details. 
24  Chapter 4 discusses external price referencing in further detail. 
25  Chapter 5 discusses the wholesale function in greater detail. As shown in Table 2.3, the wholesale mark-up for controlled 
drugs and fridge items remained at 17.66 after the first round of wholesale mark-up reductions in 2009. In 2011, the 
wholesale mark-up for controlled drugs was reduced to 8 per cent (in line with other items), while the wholesale mark-up 
for fridge items was reduced to 12 per cent. 
26  It has been reported that pharmacists are still applying the 50 per cent retail mark-up to pharmaceuticals dispensed to 
patients below the monthly DP threshold. This means that, for the same drug, three retail prices may apply (Mitchell, 2010). 
For example, a parallel imported pack of 28 20mg Lipitor tablets by B&S Healthcare has a current ex-wholesale price of 
€30.52 (November 2011). Under these three scenarios, the pack would cost €34.02 for GMS patients (i.e. including a €3.50 
dispensing fee), €40.12 for DP patients above the monthly threshold (i.e. including a 20 per cent mark-up and a €3.50 
dispensing fee) and €49.28 for DP patients below the monthly threshold (i.e. including a 50 per cent mark-up and a €3.50 
dispensing fee). Chapter 6 discusses this issue in greater detail. The Irish Pharmaceutical Market | 25 
and HTD schemes, pharmacists receive a monthly patient care fee. Pharmacists in 
Ireland must dispense the product written on the prescription.
27 
 
2.4.2.4  Sales Tax 
A value-added tax (VAT) is levied at 0 per cent on oral pharmaceuticals and at the 
standard rate (currently, 21 per cent) on other pharmaceuticals. The National 
Recovery Plan 2011-2014 contains a commitment to re-examine the VAT system, 
including the goods taxed at 0 per cent (Department of Finance, 2010a).  In 
December 2011, the government announced that the standard rate of VAT will 
increase to 23 per cent from January 2012 (Department of Finance, 2011). VAT is 
applied to the final reimbursable price for the GMS, DP and LTI schemes, but only to 
the ex-wholesale price for the HTD Scheme (NCPE, 2011). 
 
2.4.3  Pricing and Reimbursement in the Hospital Sector 
Under the terms of the IPHA and APMI agreements, a maximum ex-factory price 
applies to pharmaceuticals in both the hospital and community pharmacy sectors 
(HSE, 2006a;  b). Hospitals may purchase pharmaceuticals direct from the 
manufacturer (at the ex-factory price or below) or via a wholesaler (at the ex-factory 
price plus the wholesale mark-up). However, hospitals are exempt from the 
wholesale mark-up if purchases from a single pharmaceutical company exceed €635 
(Vogler et al., 2010). Tendering procedures are increasingly used in hospitals' direct 
dealings with manufacturers; in such cases, the discounts on the ex-factory price can 
be considerable. Of the EU-27, Ireland is one of six Member States that places no 
restrictions on hospitals receiving cost-free pharmaceuticals,  i.e.  hospitals are 
allowed to receive pharmaceuticals directly from manufacturers without having to 
pay for them. The products are typically those which are of strategic relevance for 
the manufacturers. This practice is forbidden in many Member States (Vogler et al., 
2010). 
 
2.4.4  Delivery 
Demand and supply interact when the patient presents their prescription to the 
pharmacist. As discussed above, pharmaceuticals are dispensed by pharmacists 
operating in either a community or hospital setting.
28 The supply of prescription 
pharmaceuticals via the internet is illegal, and no online pharmacies are currently 
authorised to operate  in Ireland  (IMB, 2011). However, the supply of 
pharmaceuticals via alternative retail outlets such as supermarkets is legal, and 
Tesco opened the first of their in-store pharmacies in Ireland in November 2011.
29   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
27  Chapter 6 focuses on the role of the pharmacist. 
28  As explained in Section 2.3.2, a small number of GPs are permitted to dispense pharmaceuticals. 
29  Tesco, personal communication, 24 June 2011; Hunter (2011a). 26 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
In most cases, community and hospital pharmacies purchase their pharmaceuticals 
from one of the three full-line wholesalers operating in the Irish market. In some 
cases, pharmacies may source their pharmaceuticals direct from the manufacturer 
(more common in the hospital sector),
30 or from parallel importers (rarely used in 
the hospital sector). In all cases, pharmacists negotiate discounts off the ex-
wholesale price (or ex-factory price if applicable), with the size of the discounts 
substantially higher in the hospital sector. The use of tendering is limited; the HSE 
use tendering for the supply of blood products and certain vaccines, and some public 
hospitals tender for high-volume products. For pharmaceuticals dispensed under the 
HTD Scheme, the HSE purchase the pharmaceuticals direct from the wholesalers, 
who supply community pharmacists directly. 
 
For GMS patients, a 50c per item co-payment applies (up to a maximum of €10 per 
family per month). This co-payment, which was introduced on 1 October 2010, was 
retained in Budget 2012 due to the very difficult budgetary situation. DP patients pay 
the first €120 per month in full (rising to €132 per month from January 2012). 
 
2.5  CONCLUSION 
Public and private expenditure on pharmaceuticals  is substantial, and public 
pharmaceutical expenditure accounted for an increasing share of public health 
expenditure over the period 2000-2010. In this context, ensuring value for money in 
pharmaceutical expenditure (both public and private) is a key policy concern, as is 
ensuring safety and security of supply. This chapter provides an overview of trends in 
total pharmaceutical expenditure in Ireland (primarily on the public side due to data 
availability), discusses the rationale for government intervention in the sector and 
briefly describes the current situation with regard to the pricing, reimbursement and 
delivery of pharmaceuticals in Ireland. The following chapters concentrate on 
aspects of the pricing, reimbursement and delivery structures in greater detail. It is 
beyond the scope of this report to consider the structure of the various State 
schemes that provide support for pharmaceutical expenses, and which influence 
patient behaviour with regard to the consumption of pharmaceuticals. However, the 
recent Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector 
discusses in greater detail some of the inconsistencies in the schemes and make 
recommendations designed to remove these inconsistencies and ensure greater 
equity (Ruane, 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
30  Ireland is among the countries where over 10 per cent of pharmacy sales originate directly from the manufacturer (Kanavos 
et al., 2011). See Chapter 4 for further discussion. Objectives of the Pharmaceutical Delivery System | 27 
Chapter 3 
 
Objectives of the Pharmaceutical Delivery System 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical delivery model has two main objectives: to provide value for 
money, both to the State and the patient; and to guarantee security of supply. These 
objectives are likely to attract widespread support and agreement. Hence models 
which are designed to meet them  will therefore command commensurate 
acceptance. If there is disagreement then it will probably be over means rather than 
ends. 
 
It is important to note what these two objectives omit. The purpose of the model is 
not to support earnings in the pharmaceutical sector or the status and/or income of 
the medical professions.
1 This does not mean, of course, that the expertise and 
advice of such groups should not be drawn upon and heeded. Indeed, meeting with 
such groups has proved invaluable in the preparation of this report. However, as has 
been noted in a number of instances, the non-traded sector of the economy is often 
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quite uncompetitive and one of the key features of Ireland's EU-IMF bailout package 
is to increase competition in this sector.
2 
 
In this chapter we first discuss the two objectives in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. However, it 
could be argued that other objectives should also be taken into consideration. In 
other words, the specification of the objective function of the model is in some 
sense incomplete with the implication that the results and recommendations may 
not be fully relied upon. These issues are addressed in Section 3.4. 
 
3.2  VALUE FOR MONEY 
In any period, but particularly in one of sluggish growth, high unemployment, large 
budget deficits and cutbacks in public expenditure, it is hard to argue with the view 
that the pharmaceutical delivery model should provide value for money. Public and 
private resources are scarce and hence it is particularly important to ensure good 
value. However, what exactly is meant by the phrase 'value for money'? We adopt 
the definition of the UK's National Audit Office (NAO) which defines good value for 
money "...as the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes".
3 
Hence the definition links inputs – resources – with output – intended outcomes. 
This definition is also consistent with Department of Finance (2007) guidance in the 
area. 
 
The inputs are the services provided by the key participants in the delivery of 
pharmaceuticals to patients, namely  manufacturers,  wholesalers, pharmacists, 
medical practitioners and, of course, the pharmaceutical itself. The output is the 
delivery of the pharmaceutical to the patient at the lowest possible cost. This is, in 
some sense, only an intermediate output, since the final intended outcome is that 
the patient receives the appropriate pharmaceutical for their condition and, as a 
result, their welfare is increased since they are cured or at least their symptoms 
alleviated. Considerable attention will be paid to the prescribing decision, 
particularly with respect to brand choice, but also other dimensions. 
 
In considering the optimal use of resources at least two aspects are worth stressing. 
First, for any given model, we need to ask whether key input providers are receiving 
rents, defined as unnecessary factor payments; in common parlance overpayment or 
excessive returns or prices. The reforms of the pharmaceutical pricing and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
2  Indeed, there is specific reference to the reduction of the 50 per cent mark-up paid for pharmaceuticals under the DP. For 
details see EU/IMF (2010, p. 24). However, reference to this does not appear in the November 2011 update of the EU/IMF 
Programme of Financial Support for Ireland. (For details see www.finance.gov.ie). 
3  For details see the NAO's website: http://www.nao.org.uk/what_we_do/value_for_money_audit.aspx. Accessed 19 April 
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reimbursement model in Ireland introduced from the mid-2000s have concentrated 
on this set of issues, for example by reducing wholesale and retail mark-ups. Second, 
we need to consider whether the inputs can be rearranged or reorganised so as to 
provide a better, more effective delivery system. Here attention is focused on 
alternative models to the current system such as, for example, greater use of 
tendering or preferential provider networks of pharmacists or distribution via the 
internet. These two aspects are, of course, related, although they are conceptually 
separate. For example, it has been argued that the existence of rents in the 
pharmacy sector led not only to, in some sense, 'excessive' entry of new pharmacies, 




Value for money applies both to the  State and the cash  paying  patient. It is 
important that both are considered.
5 The State acts on behalf of the taxpayer in 
organising the GMS and CDS described in Chapter 2. As such the State has a duty to 
taxpayers to ensure that it achieves value for money. However, there is always a 
danger in periods of austerity that increased value for money for the State may be, 
in part at least, shifting some or all of the cost of a scheme either to scheme 
recipients (e.g. the 50c co-payment per prescription item for GMS patients) and/or 
other cash paying users of the service (e.g. reducing the 50 per cent retail mark-up 
for DP payments above the monthly threshold, but not seeking a corresponding 
reduction in the 50 per cent retail mark-up for cash payments below the DP 
threshold).
6 In other words, it is important to distinguish between policies that entail 
cost transference rather than cost containment. Such changes have the advantage 
that the State reduces its costs, but through, in part at least, shifting the cost to 
others either directly or indirectly. By including all patients in the definition of value 
for money the wider implications of cost transference are taken into consideration. 
 
It should be noted that this is not to argue that the State should be precluded from 
shifting at least some of the cost of the GMS and/or CDS to the recipients. To restrict 
the State's freedom in this respect makes the assumption that the current 
exemptions, thresholds and copayments are optimal.
7 This is not necessarily the 
case. A period of unparalleled fiscal austerity may mean what was appropriate in the 
period of high growth in the 1990s and early to mid-2000s may not be appropriate in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
4  For further discussion, see, for example, Bacon (1999). 
5  In the 2011 Programme for Government it is stated that reference pricing and greater use of generics will be introduced and 
that these measures "...will … reduce the State's large drugs bill and the cost to individuals of their medications" 
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2011, p. 6). Hence both the taxpayer and the cash paying patient are considered. 
6  In the case of local authority purchasing of long-term care places in residential homes in the UK, Hancock found that the 
authorities using their buying power were able to obtain prices below the market rate. In order to survive the homes raised 
prices to those residents who were self payers, who subsidised the local authority residents. For a brief summary and 
reference to Hancock’s work see Haviid (2011). 
7   See Ruane (2010) for a discussion of some of the inconsistencies inherent in the current system of public health 
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today's climate. Rather what is being argued is that careful analysis should be 
undertaken of any proposed cost transference to ensure that the benefits are clearly 
shown to outweigh the costs. 
 
3.3  SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
The second key objective that any pharmaceutical delivery model must consider is 
security of supply. In other words, ensuring that when a patient goes to a pharmacy, 
or a pharmacy orders a pharmaceutical from a wholesaler, or a wholesaler orders a 
pharmaceutical from a manufacturer, that the pharmaceutical is supplied in a timely 
manner. Pharmaceuticals, like electricity or home heating fuels, are vital and the 
consequences of a lack of supply can be, potentially at least, life threatening. Hence, 
the requirement for security of supply. 
 
However, security of supply is not exogenous to the model, but is to a considerable 
extent endogenous. In other words, it is determined by the actions of 
manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacists, in part at least in response to 
economic incentives and policy changes. For example, in response to the reduction 
in retail pharmacy mark-ups,  pharmacists  withdrew support for methadone 
treatment
8 and, on another occasion, forced those on the GMS and CDS to pay the 
pharmacist for their pharmaceutical treatment and then seek reimbursement from 
the State.
9 There have also been reported shortages of pharmaceuticals in the US, 
especially those that are older and off patent, due to a combination of 
manufacturing problems, regulatory issues, pricing pressures and takeovers.
10 
Hence, in making regulatory and pricing decisions throughout the pharmaceutical 
chain from the manufacturer through to the wholesaler and pharmacy, cognisance 
needs to be taken by the State of its actions on security of supply. 
 
The lesson to be drawn from past issues with security of supply is not that any input 
supplier can block reform and movement to a better model, but rather that the State 
needs to persuade those groups of the merits of the proposed changes and the 
legitimacy of the reforms. Of course, where the State fails to persuade particular 
groups of the merits of carefully considered and researched reform, it must go ahead 
with them in the broader public interest.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
8  A number of pharmacies in 2007 stopped dispensing methadone in response to HSE moves to reduce fees paid to medical 
card holders. However, after the intervention of the Competition Authority and remarks by the Pharmaceutical Society of 
Ireland, methadone services were resumed. 
9  In 2009, again on the foot of moves by the HSE to reduce fees paid to pharmacies, the latter began to terminate their 
contracts with the HSE. However, the fact that the HSE was able to organise contingency pharmacies and that the chain 
pharmacies such as Boots did not withdraw from HSE schemes, defeated the boycott. 
10  For a discussion see Hunter (2011b) and Jack and Rappeport (2011a; b) Objectives of the Pharmaceutical Delivery System | 31 
3.4  A COMPLETE SET OF OBJECTIVES? 
While value for money and security of supply are the two main objectives for any 
pharmaceutical delivery model, there are also other objectives which, it might be 
argued, should also be included. We consider several of these. Although these may 
be legitimate objectives and we are aware of their importance, nevertheless, for 
reasons discussed below, they are not added to the two main objectives outlined 
above but rather addressed in other ways. 
 
First, it could be argued, quite reasonably, that the pharmaceuticals consumed by 
the patient must be of the required quality, in terms, for example, of purity and 
consistency. However, this is primarily the responsibility of the Irish Medicines Board 
(IMB) and the various monitoring mechanisms that are in place to provide feedback 
from the use of pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, pharmaceutical manufacturers have 
a strong reputational motivation for ensuring that the quality is of the required 
standard. Nevertheless, to the extent that any of the proposals discussed below 
impact on the quality of pharmaceuticals, this will be taken into account. 
 
Second, it could be argued that prescriber choice should be unconstrained. The 
prescriber is charged with taking care of the patient's health and is in the best 
position to identify the most appropriate course of treatment. The relationship 
between the prescriber and the patient is one built on trust and confidentiality. 
Damaging that relationship could thus undermine a vital element of the healthcare 
system. However, it is possible that certain types of limitations on the choices of 
prescribers are consistent with effective prescribing, do not compromise the healthy 
patient-prescriber relationship and would help to improve the value for money of 
the  pharmaceutical  purchasing system. We take the view that it would be 
inappropriate to rule out such measures per se by making unconstrained prescribing 
a precondition for the report. 
 
The issue is thus not so much whether or not the prescriber's choice should be 
constrained, but rather in what way and under what conditions. Does, for example, 
providing increased information on pharmaceutical efficacy and prices so that the 
prescriber can make a better more well informed decision constrain choice? Equally, 
given the busy schedule of a prescriber, is it unreasonable to delegate the choice of 
brand, subject to some exceptions, for a particular pharmaceutical to an expert 
group of the prescriber's peers so as to ensure better value for money? These are 
issues that will be returned to below. 
 
Third,  it could be argued that patients should be provided with enhanced 
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However, this is not so much an objective or constraint on the model as it is a 
possible measure to be employed to improve outcomes and efficiency.  What 
information should be provided and in relation to what decisions? When the 
prescriber makes the decision as to the appropriate course of action is the time 
when the prescriber and patient should discuss issues in relation to treatment 
choice, while the pharmacist can answer further questions when the pharmaceutical 
is being dispensed. Nevertheless, the availability of information on pharmaceutical 
costs may cause the patient to question both the prescription and dispensing 
decisions, which is likely to lead to a better more informed outcome for the patient. 
 
Fourth, it could be argued, given the importance of innovative research-based 
pharmaceutical firms to the Irish economy, the pharmaceutical delivery model 
should play a supportive role for this sector. However, there are many other more 
important factors that determine the location of pharmaceutical firms in Ireland with 
low corporate taxation often identified as significant (Kanavos et al., 2011, p. 29). 
Increased value for money measures would concentrate more on other parts of the 
pharmaceutical delivery system such as generic manufacturers, parallel importers, 
wholesalers, pharmacists and patients, rather than brand name firms. The HSE 
would have to balance supporting the latter group of firms against obtaining greater 
value for money. The recent banking crisis highlights the problems of such dual 
mandates. The regulator in that case had the responsibility of both promoting the 
financial sector and ensuring financial stability, which arguably contributed to the 
depth of the financial crisis in Ireland (Honohan, 2010).
11 
 
Fifth, it could be argued that a key objective of the pharmaceutical delivery model 
should be to ensure equitable access to pharmaceuticals. For example, a patient’s 
income should not prevent them from gaining the appropriate pharmaceutical to 
treat their condition. Access to pharmaceuticals should thus be based on need. 
However, providing equitable access to pharmaceuticals depends upon the eligibility 
conditions for the GMS and CDS. As noted in the Conclusion to Chapter 2, recent 
recommendations have been made to improve eligibility for free public health 
services in Ireland. In this report the focus of attention is on securing value for 
money and security of supply, given the current eligibility conditions for the GMS 
and CDS. 
 
We have eschewed adding these additional conditions to the objectives that the fit 
for purpose model must satisfy for three sets of reasons. First, the quality/industrial 
policy  issue is the responsibility of another part of the wider pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
11   Another example, highlighted in a Financial Times editorial, concerns the dual role with respect to the nuclear industry of 
the Japanese trade and industry ministry, "...which has been responsible for both promoting and regulating nuclear energy. 
This created a damaging conflict of interest and compromised safety" (Financial Times, 2011, p.8). Objectives of the Pharmaceutical Delivery System | 33 
approval and monitoring system, not pricing and reimbursement. Second, some of 
the conditions would involve accepting the constraints of the current model and 
hence largely vitiate the purpose of this report. This does not mean, of course, that 
in making proposals for revising the rules that attention will not be paid to the wider 
implications of a proposal. Third, in considering any model or policy the greater the 
proliferation of goals and objectives the more difficult it is to achieve any of the 
goals. How does one estimate let alone trade-off one goal against another? The 
current exercise is no exception. 
 
3.5  CONCLUSION 
In this section we have considered the merits of alternative objectives for the 
pharmaceutical delivery system from value for money to supporting the innovative 




Other objectives are better achieved by other policy instruments and/or would lead 
to an unnecessary proliferation of objectives that would involve the HSE in making 
inherently difficult trade-offs for which it is not equipped. 
Recommendation  3.1:  We recommend that  the two objectives of the 
pharmaceutical delivery system from the perspective of the HSE should be 
obtaining value for money and ensuring security of supply. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 35 
Chapter 4 
 
Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals 
 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the issue of how the ex-factory prices of pharmaceuticals are 
currently determined before making proposals as to future pricing so as to secure 
better value for money while ensuring security of supply for the HSE and patients 
more widely. In analysing the ex-factory price, pharmaceuticals are divided into 
three categories: single source in-patent pharmaceuticals, parallel imports and 
multiple source off-patent pharmaceuticals. 
 
First, are single source in-patent pharmaceuticals. These pharmaceuticals are still 
subject to patent protection. They are the newer products that often gather huge 
media interest when they are first launched or even before in the early stages of the 
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Second, parallel imports of in-patent single source pharmaceuticals. Although single 
source in-patent pharmaceuticals are typically protected from competition due to 
patent protection, the EU single market imperative means that firms can import a 
single source in-patent pharmaceutical (i.e. parallel imports) from another Member 
State (e.g. the UK or Spain) for sale in Ireland without the permission of the patent 
owner. The parallel import thus competes with the single source in-patent 
pharmaceutical. 
 
Third, multiple source off-patent pharmaceuticals. When the patent expires on a 
pharmaceutical then new suppliers may enter the market in order to compete with 
the incumbent. These are sometimes referred to as generic firms. Sometimes these 
firms brand their products (branded generic) while in others this is not the case 
(unbranded generics). Typically it is the higher volume pharmaceutical products that 
attract generic competition. 
 
As we shall see there are further nuances concerning whether or not the 
pharmaceutical is new or existing. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The current agreements between the State and 
pharmaceutical suppliers that set the framework within which ex-factory prices are 
set is briefly set out in Section 4.2. Next, Section 4.3 deals with price setting for 
single source in-patent pharmaceuticals, while Section 4.4 discusses price setting for 
parallel imports. Attention then turns to the pricing of off-patent pharmaceuticals 
with generic competition; in Section 4.5 for generic competitors with the same or 
similar chemical entity, dosage form and strength, in Section 4.6, for generic 
competitors in the same therapeutic category. The chapter concludes with Section 
4.7. 
 
4.2  SETTING THE FRAMEWORK:  AGREEMENTS  BETWEEN THE STATE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLIERS 
The ex-factory pricing and supply of single source in-patent and multiple source off-
patent pharmaceuticals is set out in the agreements between the HSE and the Irish 
Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association (IPHA),
1  representing the brand name 
manufacturers, and the Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of Ireland 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  The Irish Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association (IPHA) represents 53 research-based pharmaceutical companies, which 
includes both manufacturers of prescription and non-prescription pharmaceuticals (IPHA, undated). The mission of IPHA is 
"...to create a favourable economic, regulatory and political environment, which  will enable the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry in Ireland to meet the growing healthcare needs and expectations of patients" (IPHA, 2011, p. 1). 
For further details of the IPHA see, http://www.ipha.ie. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 37 
(APMI),
2 representing the generic manufacturers.
3 These agreements serve as the 
basis for all prices in the market, for the public and the private sector, in the hospital 
and the community.
4 The present agreements commenced in 2006 and were due to 
expire in September 2010.
5 However, in 2010 a number of amendments to the 
IPHA/HSE agreement (on two occasions, January and December) and APMI/HSE 
agreement (once, September) were announced, including a provision that the 
current agreements will be extended: in the case of the IPHA/HSE agreement to 
March 2012;
6 and in the case of the APMI/HSE agreement until the commencement 
of a scheme of reference pricing and generic substitution, which is likely also to be in 
2012. 
 
The IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements apply to all pharmaceuticals that can be 
prescribed, reimbursed and supplied to the GMS Scheme and the Community Drug 
Schemes (CDS).
7 These agreements also cover all pharmaceuticals supplied to the 
HSE, State-funded hospitals and to State Agencies whose functions normally include 
the provision of pharmaceuticals (HSE, 2006a, p. 1). Such pharmaceuticals are 
subject to marketing authorisation by the Irish Medicines Board (IMB) or European 
Commission. 
 
The price-setting mechanism follows the same procedure regardless of the type of 
pharmaceutical, except where the classification of a pharmaceutical changes 
between agreements. A single maximum price across hospital and community supply 
is also a feature of the agreements. It should be noted, however, that hospitals are 
free to negotiate lower prices directly with manufacturers. 
 
Pharmaceuticals under the 2006 IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements can be 
divided into existing (i.e. at the date of the commencement of the agreement) and 
new (i.e. subsequent to the date of the agreement). Existing pharmaceuticals were 
subject to a price freeze, subject to some exceptions (e.g. production becomes 
uneconomic, thus threatening security of supply). In considering single source in-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
2  The Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of Ireland (APMI) represents nine generic manufacturers (eight of which 
are currently involved in manufacturing in Ireland), and two indigenous manufacturers of OTC products (APMI, personal 
communication, 6 July 2011). The APMI does not have a website. 
3  Not all manufacturers supplying pharmaceuticals to the Irish market are covered by the IPHA and APMI agreements. 
4   Although parallel import prices are not determined in the IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements, they are nevertheless set in 
relation to the prices that result from these agreements. The issue is discussed is greater detail in this chapter. 
5  The first agreement between the State and manufacturers (then represented by the Pharmaceutical and Allied Industries 
Association) was dated July 1969. HSE, personal communication, 6 January 2012. 
6  Details of these changes may be found in DoHC (2010a), while the revision to the HSE/IPHA appears as Annexe A to the 
2006 IPHA/HSE agreement, which is available on the IPHA website: http://www.ipha.ie/alist/ipha-hse-agreement.aspx. 
Accessed 27 September 2011. The extension the agreement to 1 March 2012 was qualified in clause 3 which stated that 
"...the IPHA recognises and accepts that the Agreement may stand amended on the introduction of legislation to provide 
for reference pricing and/or generic substitution." Note that in some instances in 2010 the Minister of Health and Children 
was also party to the agreement. 
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patent pharmaceuticals the report confines its attention to new pharmaceuticals. 
Multiple source off-patent pharmaceuticals can be either existing or new 
pharmaceuticals, although in most cases such pharmaceuticals will be existing. 
 
The ex-factory price set in accordance with the IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements 
is a maximum price. In the case of new pharmaceuticals, for example, reference is 
made to the fact that the ex-factory price "...shall not… exceed the currency adjusted 
price to the wholesaler in the nominated EU member states" (HSE, 2006a, p. 3). 
However, for pharmaceuticals that "...may be high cost or have a significant budget 
impact" a pharmacoeconomic assessment can be undertaken (ibid, p. 2). This 
procedure, which is discussed in Section 4.3.3, may result in a lower ex-factory price 
than that set in accordance with the application of the external reference pricing or, 
in an extreme case, the HSE deciding not to pay for the pharmaceutical under the 
GMS or CDS. 
 
Under the terms of the 2006 IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements, manufacturers 
are required to pay 3.53 per cent of the ex-factory price of all pharmaceuticals 
dispensed under the GMS Scheme to the PCRS (with the exception of patent-expired 
pharmaceuticals subject to the price reductions outlined in the agreements). From 1 
January 2010, the rebate was increased to 4 per cent, and extended to the CDS. 
 
The successive agreements between the HSE and the IPHA and the APMI have, it is 
argued,  resulted in substantial savings.
8  The 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement  was 
expected to result in savings in the order of €300 million between 2006 and 2010, or 
€75 million per annum.
9 There were further savings agreed between the IPHA and 
the HSE in early 2010 of €94 million in a full year. Later in 2010 the IPHA agreed to 
savings of an additional €200 million in 2011.
10 The APMI/HSE in 2010 agreed to 
savings expected to yield €25 million in a full year. These savings are in relation to 
the State pharmaceutical expenditure in both the community and hospital sector, 
which in 2010 stood at approximately €1.9 billion as detailed in Chapter 2. 
 
The proposals made in this chapter involve amending the IPHA/HSE agreement with 
respect to the determination of the price of single source in-patent pharmaceuticals 
and the replacement of the IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements with a different 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
8  These estimates are taken from DoHC (2006b; 2010a; 2011, p. 25) and HSE, personal communication, various dates 2011. 
9   Since the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement was amended and extended to 2012, these annual savings can be expected to 
continue to the latter date. The €300 million estimate appears to have been reduced to €250 million subsequently. 
10   These savings are as follows: "... €155 million are expected under the GMS and community drug schemes through a 
combination of price reductions and increased rebates to the HSE, €35 million under the High Tech Scheme and €10 million 
on hospital medicines" (DoHC, 2011, p. 25). The combination of price reductions and increased rebates was at the 
discretion of individual IPHA members. The €155 million savings includes both a reduction in the ex-factory price and 
increased rebates (€140 million) and additional downstream savings (€15 million). Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 39 
mechanism for the determination of multi-source off-patent pharmaceuticals. In 
both cases prices should be lower and market forces should be used to greater effect 
and extent to price pharmaceuticals than the current administrative pricing 
arrangements. However, the changes proposed are not revolutionary, but rather are 
consistent with the evolving trend in pharmaceutical pricing in Ireland as well as 
practice in other jurisdictions, in both the EU and beyond. 
 
4.3  SETTING THE EX-FACTORY PRICE FOR SINGLE SOURCE IN-PATENT PHARMACEUTICALS 
One of the important ways in which the HSE has achieved greater value for money is 
through reductions in the ex-factory price of single source pharmaceuticals still 
subject to patent protection. Where a firm is in a monopoly position and assuming 
that it is profit maximising, it will charge a monopoly price. Thus the HSE is seeking to 
reduce the monopoly rents that accrue to the firm. Ex-factory price setting consists 
of two mechanisms: international or external reference pricing; and, a 
pharmacoeconomic assessment. The first mechanism  is intended  to reduce 
monopoly rents, the second, in part, to influence the direction of pharmaceutical 
innovation and, in part, to ensure that the benefits that flow from the 
pharmaceutical exceed the costs, particularly compared with other pharmaceuticals 
on the market as well as alternative treatment options. 
 
In considering how to achieve better value for money for single source in-patent 
pharmaceuticals, attention will first concentrate on the formula in the IPHA/HSE 
agreement for determining the ex-factory price of these pharmaceuticals and how 
that formula might be amended and administered. Attention then turns to the 
impact of parallel imports and how these might be used to assist in setting prices for 
single source in-patent pharmaceuticals. 
 
4.3.1  External Price Referencing 
External reference pricing consists of three essential elements: a choice of a basket 
of benchmark Member States,
11 a rule for using the ex-factory price from the basket 
Member States to set the ex-factory price or reference price, and, finally, a means of 
updating the ex-factory price as more pricing data becomes available. Each of these 
elements is described, with reference being made to the experience elsewhere in 
the EU, before some recommendations for revision are considered. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
11  As we shall see in some instances some Member States that employ external reference pricing use non-Member States such 
as Switzerland. However, our interest is confined to Member States only. 40 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
4.3.1.1  External Pricing: Current Arrangements in Ireland 
External price referencing (also referred to as international price referencing) for a 
new pharmaceutical in Ireland involves, under the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement, 
setting the price of the pharmaceutical by reference to the price charged for the 
pharmaceutical in a basket of nine other Member States by the firm seeking a 
listing. The lower priced Member States of Spain, Austria and Belgium were added as 
well as Finland in 2006 to the pre-existing basket of five Member States (i.e., 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK). The current basket is 
drawn exclusively from Member States prior to EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. 
Hence the basket is representative of the EU-15 not the EU-27. The firm provides the 
ex-factory price data to the HSE using a Price Application Form.
12 
 
External price referencing is currently the norm in the EU for setting the ex-factory 
price. Of 25 Member States for which information is readily available all but four use 
external reference pricing (Table 4.1). Typically, however, these Member States use 
a basket of more than nine countries; of the 20 other Member States (besides 
Ireland) that use external reference pricing, 13 use more than nine reference 
countries. In some cases as high a number as 28 countries is used, since non-
Member States such as Norway and Switzerland are included on occasion. However, 
the main message from Table 4.1 is that there is no apparently agreed upon ideal 
number of benchmark countries, although some Member States, such as France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, appear more frequently than others in the basket 
selected by Member States. 
 
TABLE 4.1  Ex-Factory Price Setting Mechanisms in the European Union, 25 Member States,
a 2010 
 
Price Setting Mechanism  Member States 
Free Pricing   Denmark, Germany, Sweden, UK 
External Reference Pricing   
  (Number of Member and Non-Member States used to Estimate Reference Price) 
Average Price  Austria (24), Belgium (12), Ireland (9), Finland (17),
b Lithuania (16),
c Netherlands (4), Portugal 
(4).  
Lowest Price  Bulgaria (12), Cyprus (10),
d Czech Republic (26), Estonia (28), France (4), Greece (25),
e 
Hungary (13), Italy (3), Latvia (28), Poland (8), Romania (13),
f Slovak Republic (27),
g Slovenia 
(3), Spain (9). 
 
Notes:  a  Excluding Malta and Luxembourg. 
b  Median rather than average. 
c  The average minus 5 per cent. 
d  The lowest four prices. 
e  Average of the 3 lowest EU-15 and 1 lowest from EU-10. 
f  The lowest three prices. 
g  The lowest six prices. 
Source:  Kanavos et al., (2011, Appendix 1, pp. 80-81).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
12  The HSE can verify the accuracy of the price information by contacting the relevant authorities in other jurisdictions. The 
form may be found at: http://www.ipha.ie/alist/ipha-hse-agreement.aspx?article=b7c7daed-94ac-45bf-b900-
8b1e017dc77b. Accessed 28 September 2011. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 41 
The next step in applying external price referencing is to choose a formula for 
setting the ex-factory price using the ex-factory prices of the basket of reference 
jurisdictions. Under the IPHA/HSE agreement the formula is the (unweighted) 
average of the basket of nine Member States. In 2010 the average or some variant 
was used by seven (including Ireland) of the 21 Member States that used external 
price referencing  to set the ex-factory price  (Table 4.1). There are, however, 
alternative formulae that could be introduced that would facilitate lower prices, 
ensure early adoption and yield the certainty required in order to ensure that 
planning, production and marketing can take place. Instead of using a simple average 
of ex-factory prices, the formula could attach a higher weight to the Member States 
in the basket with lower prices and a lower weight to those with higher prices. This 
should, other things being equal, lead to lower ex-factory prices. A special case of 
this approach is to apply a zero weight to all prices but the lowest; fourteen of the 21 
Member States in Table 4.1 that employ external price referencing use the lowest 
price or some variant of the lowest price from the selected basket of Member States 
to determine the ex-factory price. 
 
The final step in external price referencing is choosing the frequency with which ex-
factory prices are re-assessed or updated. Under the IPHA/HSE agreement the ex-
factory price shall not exceed the average price by reference to nine Member States. 
However, if a new pharmaceutical is not available in all of the nine Member States at 
the date of initial notification to the HSE to be listed for reimbursement purposes, 
then the average price is set by reference to only those Member States out of the 
basket of nine where the new pharmaceutical is available at that date. As the 
pharmaceutical becomes available in the remaining Member States the average 
price is adjusted accordingly. However, this does not happen immediately. In the 
2006 IPHA/HSE agreement there was a Price Monitoring and Review mechanism at 
two distinct time points (two and four years after the commencement of the 
agreement, in 2008 and 2010) to take into account currency adjustments and the 
availability of the pharmaceutical in the remaining Member States in the basket. 
However, there is no adjustment for a year after the date of reimbursement 
approval from the HSE. In other words, once a new pharmaceutical was approved for 
reimbursement its ex-factory price was reviewed between a year and three years 
later. Under the 2010 amendments to the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement there is no 
further price monitoring and review. 
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The evidence suggests that typically Ireland is an early launch Member State for a 
new pharmaceutical.
13 As a result the pharmaceutical is often available in only two 
or three of the basket of nine Member States when its price is set in Ireland. For 
example, in 2010, 14 out of 24 new chemical entities examined by the HSE for 
reimbursement used prices for two Member States for the purposes of setting the 
ex-factory price. In the majority of cases Denmark, Germany and/or the UK were 
selected. All three of these jurisdictions have free pricing, in contrast to the external 
price referencing system of most of the other Member States in Table 4.1. The 
evidence suggests that Germany and the UK had higher than average prices 
compared to other Member States.
14 Prices in Denmark are similar to those in 
Germany and the UK.
15 Given the one to three year delay before review of prices to 
reflect the availability of a pharmaceutical in other Member States in the basket, this 
means that the benefit of lower prices is deferred. In contrast to Ireland most 
Member States re-align the ex-factory price at least annually, and in the case of four 
Member States twice a year.
16 
 
There are certain advantages to the  current  system  of pricing in-patent 
pharmaceuticals embodied in the IPHA/HSE agreement. It is administratively 
straightforward, once the basket of Member States is chosen. By selecting a basket 
of Member States that includes jurisdictions that typically have higher and lower 
prices, the result could be seen in some sense as representative of an EU price.
17 
Furthermore, external price referencing, when set out in an agreement such as that 
between the HSE and the IPHA, provides a stable and predictable environment 
within which planning, production, and marketing can take place. This facilitates 
security of supply. However, that does not mean that the current agreement cannot 
be improved upon nor that it does not suffer shortcomings (OECD, 2010, p. 164). 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
13   For details see European Commission (2009, Figure 36, p. 152). The sequence of Member States in which a pharmaceutical 
is launched reflects a number of factors (ibid, pp. 149-153). An important factor concerns the speed with which a 
pharmaceutical can be marketed. Member States such as Denmark, Germany, and the UK have free pricing and require no 
prior approval. Member States such as France, Italy, and the Netherlands  allow submission of a "...pricing and 
reimbursement dossier before the marketing authorisation is officially granted." (ibid, p.151). These Member States are 
those when pharmaceuticals are first launched in the EU (ibid, Figure 36, p. 152). 
14  Kanavos et al. (2011, Figure 6, p 23) for price comparisons across 150 products for 2008 show that of the nine Member 
States in the Irish basket, Germany ranked one followed by Belgium, the UK, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and 
France. Data for the other Member States, including Denmark, in the Irish basket were not presented. The prices referred to 
the retail prices. 
15   Based on the data supplied by the brand name firms to the HSE for setting the ex-factory price under the IPHA/HSE 
agreement. The mean of the Denmark/Germany price was slightly above 1.00 (at launch, 1.17, at the 2008 price review, 
1.10, at the 2010 price review, 1.05); in contrast, the Denmark/UK price ratio was slightly below 1.00 (at launch 0.90, the 
2008 price review 0.90, the 2010 review, 0.84). 
16  For details see Kanavos et al. (2011, Appendix, pp. 80-81). 
17  It is of course a negotiated compromise between the IPHA and the HSE. See DoHC (2006b) and Barry et al. (2004).
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4.3.1.2  External Referencing Pricing: Some Proposals 
In considering the method by which the ex-factory price is set, we do not advocate 
radical revision of the status quo, but rather consider each of the three elements of 
external reference pricing separately, suggesting reforms so as to achieve lower ex-
factory prices but at the same time ensure security of supply. 
 
In terms of the selection of the basket of Member States: 
 
 
These nine Member States are the higher income Member States drawn from the 
EU-15 and hence are more similar to Ireland than the new Member States that 
joined with the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007. It could, of course, be 
argued that all Member States should be included since pharmaceutical prices tend 
to be positively related to per capita income, particularly for in-patent 
pharmaceuticals (Kanavos et al., 2011, p. 33). However, there is danger, since Ireland 
is used in the basket of 10 other Member States that use external price referencing, 
that firms may delay listing new pharmaceuticals in Ireland since it may lead to price 
reductions in other Member States. Nevertheless, the discussion below concerning 
parallel trade suggests a mechanism by which other Member States not only in the 
EU-15 but also those which joined in 2004 and 2007 might be added to the basket. 
Furthermore, the ex-factory price is a maximum due to the necessity of conducting a 
pharmacoeconomic assessment that might result in a lower price or refusal to 
reimburse the pharmaceutical. 
 
In terms of the pricing formula used to determine the ex-factory price, the issue 
revolves around how the ex-factory price for Ireland should be set based on the 
corresponding prices for each of the nine Member States in the basket. Table 4.1 
suggests the choice is between the average and the lowest priced of the nine 
Member States, with the latter the most frequently used formula. Since we are 
interested in securing greater value for money: 
 
 
Recommendation 4.2: We recommend that the maximum ex-factory price of in-
patent pharmaceuticals should be the lowest price of the basket of nine 
Member States in the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement. 
Recommendation 4.1: We recommend that, initially at least, the basket of 
Member States used for the purposes of determining the maximum ex-factory 
price of in-patent pharmaceuticals should be confined to the nine Member 
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The choice of the lowest priced basket Member State should lead to lower ex-factory 
prices which should benefit all purchasers of pharmaceuticals, whether in the public 
or private sector, community or hospital sectors. 
 
There is, of course, a possibility that by using such an approach that there will be a 
move to parallel exports from Ireland. This may lead to shortages. However, this 
latter possibility should not be overstated. First, as noted above, ex-factory prices 
are likely to be more similar amongst the EU-15, than if some of the Member States 
added at enlargement were included in the basket. Thus the approach adopted in 
this report to setting the ex-factory price reduces the opportunity for parallel 
exports compared to a more expansive approach. Second, wholesalers in Ireland 
have to "...ensure appropriate and continued supplies [to pharmacists and other 
healthcare professionals] so that the needs of the patients in the State in respect of 
such medicinal products are covered."
18 Parallel exports that result in shortages are 
thus inconsistent with this regulation.  
 
In terms of the frequency of the price alignments, it is not clear why there is a need 
to delay the inclusion of the prices of other Member States in estimating the ex-
factory price. The IPHA informed us that the differences in availability of 
pharmaceuticals across Member States reflected differences in the speed with which 
Member States processed manufacturer's requests for inclusion for reimbursement, 
rather than for strategic reasons. Hence if Ireland decided to update the ex-factory 
price on a new in-patent pharmaceutical with a greater frequency than one to three 
years this should,  in principle,  occasion no further repercussions such as on 




Since, as noted above, other Member States update
19 with a similar frequency this 
should not prove too great an administrative burden, especially if it brings price 
reductions forward by up to  three years compared with the 2006 IPHA/HSE 
agreement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
18   Schedule 2 paragraph 11 of S. I. No. 538 of 2007, Medicinal Products (Control of Wholesale Distribution) Regulations 2007. 
19   Such price reviews are clearly appropriate where the ex-factory price has been set solely with reference to the basket of 
nine Member States. Where, after a pharmacoeconomic assessment, the ex-factory price is negotiated below the maximum 
ex-factory price, such reviews are likely to have less relevance. Of course, eventually the maximum ex-factory price might 
be below the negotiated price, in which case the ex-factory price would equal the lower maximum price. 
Recommendation 4.3: We recommend that the maximum ex-factory price for 
in-patent pharmaceuticals should be updated every six months , i.e. on 1 
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For the basket of nine Member States used to derive the ex-factory external 
reference price under the IPHA/HSE agreement, the HSE supplied in anonymised 
format all the prices submitted by the brand name firm at launch and at the 2008 
and 2010 price reviews or realignment. Each different formulation and strength is a 
separate record. The pharmaceuticals were classified by category of scheme at 
launch (i.e. GMS, High Tech or HTD, hospital). The ratio of the average of the prices 
that were submitted (i.e. the ex-factory or external reference price agreed under the 
IPHA/HSE agreement) to the lowest of the prices that were submitted was calculated 
for each in-patent pharmaceutical for which information was provided. This ratio 
was calculated at launch and for each of the two price reviews (i.e. 2008, 2010). For 
example, if at launch, the prices were submitted for three Member States in the 
basket of nine were €4.00 per pack, €3.00, and €2.00, the ratio would be 3/2 or 1.50. 
If, at the first price review, a fourth Member State price was added, €1.50, then the 
ratio would be 2.625/1.50 or 1.75. Thus if the lowest price were used compared to 
the average, the reduction in the ex-factory price would be a third at launch and 43 
per cent at the first price review under this example. 
 
TABLE 4.2  The Ratio of the Basket of Nine Average Price
a to the Basket of Nine Minimum Price, by Scheme, at 
  Year of Launch and Realignment, 2006-2010 
 
 
   
Scheme at Launch 
Total 
 
   





















2006  Launch  1.10  -  -  1.10 
2008 Realignment  1.30  -  -  1.30 
2010 Realignment  1.24  -  -  1.24 
2007  Launch  1.60  1.10  1.10  1.37 
2008 Realignment  1.23  1.21  1.23  1.23 
2010 Realignment  1.31  1.22  1.62  1.34 
2008  Launch  1.25  1.23  1.16  1.23 
2008 Realignment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a. 
2010 Realignment  1.39  1.25  1.26  1.34 
2009  Launch  1.26  1.23  1.30  1.27 
2008 Realignment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a. 
2010 Realignment  1.61  1.67  1.30  1.45 
2010  Launch  1.35  1.26  1.12  1.29 
2008 Realignment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a. 
2010 Realignment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a. 
2011
a  Launch  1.17  1.19  1.18  1.17 
2008 Realignment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a. 
2010 Realignment  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a. 
Total  Launch  1.32  1.21  1.18  1.27 
2008 Realignment  1.26  1.21  1.23  1.25 
2010 Realignment  1.35  1.25  1.39  1.33 
 
Notes:  a  Of those nine Member States for which data was available. 
For the purpose of reimbursement by the HSE, manufactures/parallel importers applies for reimbursement under the GMS, 
High Tech and/or hospital lists. 
    Data are available on 525 products (not unique) launched between September 2006 and July 2011. 
Products for which data was missing were excluded from the analysis. 
Products launched on two schemes were excluded. 
Products for which a basket price was indicated but not available were excluded. 
Final analysis is based on 464 unique products. 
Source:    ESRI calculations from HSE personal communication, 11 August 2011. 46 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
The mean of the ratio of the average to the lowest price in the basket at launch, for 
the two price reviews, by scheme type,
20 is presented in Table 4.2. It shows, for 
example, that at launch in 2007 for HTD products on average the average or external 
reference price was 10 per cent above the lowest price. Overall, the data show – the 
bottom right hand corner of the table – that if the lowest price were used to set the 
ex-factory price rather than the average, the ex-factory price would fall by between 
20 and 25 per cent depending on whether at launch, or either of the subsequent two 
price reviews is considered. 
 
4.3.2  External Price Referencing and Parallel Imports 
The EU Single Market allows firms, whether parallel importers, wholesalers, 
pharmacies and others, to purchase in-patent and other pharmaceuticals in Member 
States with lower prices and re-sell them in Member States where prices are higher, 
without the authorisation of the patent owner.
21 A series of European Court of 
Justice rulings have underpinned its legitimacy.  Parallel importation of 
pharmaceutical products from non-EU or non-EEA countries into the EU is not, 
however, permitted. Parallel imports are identical to the original manufacturer's 
products
22 except that they may be packaged differently and may not carry the 
original manufacturer's warranty. Parallel imports into Ireland are thus, by definition, 
in-patent pharmaceuticals from another Member State.
23,24 
 
Parallel imports are usually undertaken by specialist firms such as Autumn 
Healthcare Limited and B&S Healthcare, that must comply with certain regulatory 
requirements, concerning for example packaging and labelling.
25 The determination 
of the ex-factory price for parallel imports is not part of either the IPHA/HSE or 
APMI/HSE agreements. Instead, the HSE sets an ex-factory price for parallel imports 
which is at a small discount – at least 3 per cent in 2010, 7 per cent in 2011–to the 
single source in-patent ex-factory price. In other words, if the single source in-patent 
pharmaceutical ex-factory price is €10.00 per unit and the discount is 3 (7) per cent, 
then the ex-factory price for the parallel import would be €9.7 (€9.3) per unit. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
20  Not all pharmaceuticals are available under all schemes. The manufacturer/parallel importer of the in-patent 
pharmaceutical decides for which schemes to request listing. 
21   There is an extensive literature on various legal and economic aspects of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals. See, for 
example, Kyle (2009), Kanavos & Costs-Font (2005), Kanavos & Kowal (2008) and O’Donoghue & Macnab (2009). 
22   Identical in that the "...parallel-distributed product must have the same active substance(s), the same pharmaceutical form 
and be identical to, or have no significant therapeutic difference from, the Irish-market product" (IMB, 2007, p. 4). The 
latter source contains the IMB's guidance on parallel import product authorisations. 
23  Manufacturers undertake various strategies to protect their interests from parallel trade, such as applying for marketing 
authorisation for different dosages and strengths and rationing supply to wholesalers believed to be engaged in parallel 
trade (e.g. Canada) (OECD, 2008). 
24  Off-patent pharmaceuticals may also be subject to parallel imports. 
25   For details see the IMB website, www.imb.ie. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 47 
Overall, in 2009 it was estimated that 9 per cent of Irish pharmaceutical sales were 
accounted for by parallel traded products; the comparable figure for the UK was 14 
per cent, for Denmark 20 per cent.
26 The importance of parallel imports in the 
community pharmacy sector has risen dramatically in Ireland.
27 In nominal terms the 
increase was from €50 million in 2005 to a peak of €250 million in 2010 before an 
anticipated decline in 2011 to €220 million.
28 Table 4.3 provides details of the 
importance of parallel imports in respect of the ten leading individual high volume 
products, by value, for the GMS and one of the CDS, the DP Scheme.  
 
The value and volume shares of parallel imports are quite similar reflecting the small 
price discount of parallel imports in relation to the brand name price. For virtually all 
the high volume in-patent pharmaceuticals in Table 4.3, there are at least some 
parallel imports, fentanyl is the only exception. The importance of parallel imports 
varies considerably across the leading ten in-patent pharmaceuticals for the GMS 
and DP Scheme. The highest penetration of parallel imports was lansoprazole at 25-
26 per cent in 2010. If a 10 per cent share is taken as significant, then in 2010 parallel 
imports are significant in six of the 10 leading in-patent pharmaceuticals, for both 
the GMS and the DP Scheme. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
26  European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (2011, p. 3). It is not clear if value or volume is used to 
measure parallel import market share. However, in the case of Ireland this would make little difference due to the fact that 
whether measured by value or volume, the market share of parallel imports is very similar (Table 4.3), reflecting the fact 
that applications for reimbursement of parallel imports were only accepted if the price was at a least 3 per cent in 2010 and 
7 per cent in 2011 below the brand name price. Since parallel imports are priced at a discount to the brand name in-patent 
product, the market share of parallel imports measured using volume should be greater than that using value. While this is 
typically the case in Table 4.3 it is not always the case. This may be due to the fact that some dosage forms and strengths – 
typically small volume – of a pharmaceutical there may be no parallel imported product either for some or all of the time 
period referred to in the table. 
27  Parallel imports play a very limited role in the hospital sector. Based on discussions with industry participants, we 
understand that such products are unattractive, inter alia, due to the fact that the source Member State can change, which 
often leads to a change in packaging. 
28  Based on IMS data supplied by the Pharmaceutical Distributors Federation (PDF), personal communication, 19 September 
2011. 48 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
TABLE 4.3  Parallel Imports as a Proportion (Volume and Value) of the Top 10 Pharmaceuticals (Value) Without a 













c  Value  Volume  Value 
 
 
%  %  %  % 
1.  Atorvastatin  22.9  24.4  20.2  20.1 
2.  Salmeterol and other drugs for obstructive airway diseases  7.8  8.1  7.1  7.3 
3.  Pregabalin  13.5  13.1  15.7  15.3 
4.  Olanzapine  14.4  13.6  7.2  7.2 
5.  Tiotropium bromide  12.4  11.9  10.8  10.5 
6.  Escitalopram  17.8  17.3  13.5  12.8 
7.  Formoterol and other drugs for obstructive airway diseases  2.3  2.2  3.0  2.9 
8.  Quetiapine  1.1  1.3  1.6  1.7 
9.  Lansoprazole  23.1  25.5  20.4  20.3 










Volume  Value  Volume  Value 
 
 
%  %  %  % 
1.  Atorvastatin  21.5  22.9  19.5  19.5 
2.  Salmeterol and other drugs for obstructive airway diseases  6.4  6.9  6.1  6.4 
3.  Pregabalin  12.7  12.6  14.6  14.5 
4.  Formoterol and other drugs for obstructive airway diseases  1.7  1.6  2.6  2.6 
5.  Mesalazine  0.7  0.5  1.1  0.7 
6.  Montelukast  3.3  3.2  6.7  6.6 
7.  Escitalopram  16.6  16.2  13.6  13.0 
8.  Tiotropium bromide  10.6  10.2  10.2  9.9 
9.  Lansoprazole  24.5  25.9  22.7  22.7 
10.  Olanzapine  13.6  13.0  7.6  7.4 
 
Notes:  a  All dosage forms and strengths are included. For example, for atorvastatin, all available Lipitor tablets (10mg, 20mg, 40mg and 
80mg) are included. In the case of Lipitor, all strengths are parallel imported by one or more importer. This may not be the 
case for all pharmaceuticals in the top 10, i.e. the parallel importer may only choose to import a selection of the dosage forms 
or strengths. 
  b  Year to Date 30 June 2011. 
  c  Volume refers to the number of dispensed items claimed for in a given year (e.g. 1 Lipitor 28 tablet package). 
Source:    HSE personal communication, 23 August 2011. 
 
The presence of parallel imports suggests that ex-factory prices in other Member 
States are below those in Ireland. External price referencing, under the existing 
IPHA/HSE agreement, relies on price data for Member States in the basket supplied 
by the firm seeking reimbursement under the GMS and/or CDS and in public 
hospitals.
29 The IPHA/HSE agreement refers to the price charged to the wholesaler – 
the ex-factory price. However, this reported/listed ex-factory price may, for a variety 
of reasons, either be higher than the actual or effective price charged to the 
wholesaler or the actual or effective price paid by the reimbursement authorities in 
the other Member State. This may occur because the firm offers rebates and 
discounts, for a variety of reasons, off the listed ex-factory price. In the 2006 
IPHA/HSE agreement, for example, there is a 3.53 per cent rebate for the HSE on in-
patent pharmaceuticals, subsequently raised to 4 per cent in 2010. Such rebates are 
offered in other jurisdictions such as Germany (Paris and Docteur, 2008, pp. 23-24). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
29  It should be noted that in making an application a firm may request listing under the GMS, the CDS or for hospital use. See 
Tilson et al. (2010) for some examples. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 49 
According to the European Commission it is common for firms, in order to maintain 
prices for external price referencing purposes, to offer hidden discounts off the listed 
ex-factory price since that does not affect the reference price.
30 It is thus important 
that mechanisms are in place to detect these discounts so that the purchaser, the 
HSE, can address these issues with the firm supplying the in-patent pharmaceutical 
and seek a price adjustment. Here we distinguish between mechanisms to question 
the pricing information with respect to the nine Member States in the current basket 
and how such information might be used to expand the list of Member States that 
could be added to the basket itself. 
 
The HSE could in principle track the Member State(s) from which parallel imports are 
supplied since this information is supplied to the IMB, although we understand that 
this is not currently coded on the PCRS database. The HSE will be aware, however, 
through the use of the PCRS database, of the market penetration of parallel imports 
for a particular in-patent pharmaceutical. All of the parallel importers into Ireland for 
a particular in-patent pharmaceutical will be priced at a discount to the ex-factory 
price of the in-patent pharmaceutical, typically the ex-factory price less a small 
percentage. Discounts to the pharmacist are used as a way for parallel imports to 
gain market. However, these discounts are not reflected in lower prices to the HSE 
or the cash paying customer. The higher the market share of an in-patent 
pharmaceutical accounted for by parallel imports and the larger the number of 
parallel import competitor pharmaceutical products, the greater  is  the  likely 
discount off the price paid by the HSE. 
 
Information on the penetration of parallel imports can be used in two ways with 
respect to external price referencing, where attention is confined to only those nine 
Member States in the basket. 
•  First, if the parallel imports come from a Member State above the ex-factory 
price set in accordance with the IPHA/HSE agreement, it suggests that the price 
used for such Member State(s) in the Irish basket is higher than the actual or 
effective price in the other Member State. If, for example, the ex-factory price in 
Ireland is, using the basket of nine Member States, €0.20 per dose and extensive 
parallel imports come from a Member State in the basket where the listed ex-
factory price supplied to the HSE was €0.50 per dose, then that would be 
grounds for questioning the appropriateness of the latter price. The difference 
may, of course, be due to delays in updating the basket of prices or exchange 
rate adjustments, rather than a lower ex-factory price in the basket Member 
State. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
30  This is discussed further in European Commission (2009, p. 151) and, for Germany, Paris & Docteur (2008, p. 19). 50 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
•  Second, parallel imports may come from a Member State that has a list price 
below the ex-factory price set in Ireland based on the basket of nine Member 
States. This would not, of course, be unexpected since this difference gives rise 
to the arbitrage opportunity which motivates parallel importers to enter the 
market. However, if after adding to the listed ex-factory price supplied for the 
Member State an estimate of the transaction costs of bringing the parallel 
imported product to the Irish market, the price is above the ex-factory price set 
in accordance with the IPHA/HSE agreement, then this suggests that the listed 
ex-factory price used for the Member State is too high.
31 For example, suppose 
that the ex-factory price is using the basket of nine Member States again €0.20 
per dose, the listed ex-factory price in the other Member State supplied to the 
HSE is €0.16 per dose, and the transaction costs €0.10 per dose. As €0.26 is 
greater than €0.20, there are grounds for questioning the appropriateness of the 
listed ex-factory price of €0.16. 
 
Of course, under the proposals set out earlier in the chapter the ex-factory price 
would be set with respect to the lowest priced Member State in the basket, not the 
average. 
 
Parallel imports can also be used to assist in determining the basket of Member 
States that should be used for the purposes of setting the ex-factory price under 
the IPHA/HSE agreement. Where parallel imports are important across a range of in-
patent pharmaceuticals from a particular Member State on a consistent and 
sustainable basis, then this is prima facie evidence that prices are lower in this 
Member State than the ex-factory price set under the IPHA/HSE agreement. 
Furthermore, the successful penetration of the Irish market suggests that the price 
differences are real and not just theoretical. Hence consideration could be given to 
adding this Member State to the basket from which the ex-factory price is set. 
 
Hence, given this discussion of how parallel imports can inform ex-factory pricing in 
Ireland: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
31  These transaction costs include the licensing, relabeling, discounts, distribution costs and an allowance for risk. Parallel 
importers could be requested to provide an estimate. The purpose is not to be exact, but rather to give a reasonable 
estimate. 
Recommendation 4.4: We recommend that the HSE monitor parallel imports in 
order to assist it to: (i) validate the pricing information provided to set the 
maximum ex-factory price for the current basket of nine Member States; and, 
(ii) determine whether additional Member States should be added to the 
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The issue is what filters or triggers should be in place for the HSE to investigate the 
veracity of the price supplied by the pharmaceutical firm or to add another Member 
State to the basket. Although this is to a considerable extent a matter of judgement, 
simple rules could be set up using the PCRS database that would result in the HSE 
raising questions about the appropriateness of the basket of prices supplied to 
estimate the ex-factory price under the IPHA/HSE agreement as well as suggesting 
new Member States that should be added to the basket. If, for example, parallel 
imports account for a large market share of an in-patent pharmaceutical (e.g. 
greater than 10 per cent), for a sufficiently long time (e.g. three to six months), and 
the pharmaceutical is important in terms of PCRS pharmaceutical expenditure (e.g. 
top 20 or top 50 in-patent pharmaceuticals) then this might be an appropriate 
trigger. No doubt some experimentation would be necessary in order to perfect the 
appropriate trigger. 
 
4.3.3  Pharmacoeconomic Assessment 
Establishing the maximum ex-factory price is the first step in a two-step procedure 
for reimbursement under the GMS and CDS. The second step is a 
pharmacoeconomic assessment. Under the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement provision is 
made for pharmacoeconomic assessment prior to reimbursement of 
pharmaceuticals that "...may be high cost or have a significant budget impact on the 
Irish healthcare system" (HSE, 2006a, p. 2). This marked a major change, replacing an 
informal process. 
 
The IPHA/HSE agreement's procedures are designed to ensure speedy access to 
market of new pharmaceuticals, with decisions to be made by the HSE within 90 
days of receipt of the reimbursement application.
32 According to the 2006 IPHA/HSE 
agreement the assessment will be conducted using the existing Health Technology 
Assessment Guidelines, with any new guidelines to be agreed between the IPHA and 
HSE.
33 At the present time new guidelines are being developed under the Health 
Information and Quality Authority (HIQA), which under the Health Act 2007 has a 
statutory remit for the development of such guidelines.
34 
 
Since 2009 the National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics (NCPE) considers the cost-
effectiveness of all new pharmaceuticals applying to the HSE for reimbursement 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
32  There are appeal procedures in the IPHA/HSE agreement. There has been one appeal between 2006 and 2009 when the 
National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics (NCPE) recommended refusal for reimbursement. The NCPE's decision was 
confirmed. See Tilson et al. (2010, p. 313) for details. 
33  These 2000 guidelines were developed by the IPHA and NCPE with input from the DoHC. 
34  For further discussion of HIQA role see http://www.hiqa.ie/healthcare/health-technology-assessment/guidelines (accessed 
15 July 2011). In 2010 HIQA published on their website Guidelines for Budget Impact Analysis of Health Technologies in 
Ireland and Guidelines for Economic Evaluation of Health Technologies in Ireland. These guidelines were developed by HIQA 
with input from the NCPE and a Scientific Advisory Committee, which included representative of IPHA as well as experts in 
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) methodology from outside of Ireland.
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under the GMS and CDS.
35 All such pharmaceuticals are first subject to a rapid 
review by the NCPE where considerations such as cost, budgetary impact and other 
factors  are considered. The rapid review, which takes two weeks, either 
recommends that the pharmaceutical is approved for reimbursement or is subject to 
a HTA. Of the twelve pharmaceuticals subject to a HTA between September 2006 
and February 2009, the average duration of the process was 2.7 months, less than 
the 90 day limit in the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement.
36 
 
There are certain important parameters that determine the result of the HTA. The 
discount rate used is 4 per cent, while the benefit is measured in terms of quality-
adjusted life years (QALY) with initially a price used of €45,000 per QALY, more 
recently reduced to €20,000 per QALY. Thus fewer pharmaceuticals will be 
reimbursed using the HTA approach with the latter price per QALY. Summaries of the 
HTAs are posted on the NCPE website. 
 
In an analysis of the 12 HTAs conducted between 2006 and 2009 referred to above, 
Tilson et al. (2010, Table II, p. 314) report that the NCPE recommended six being 
reimbursed (including one where the QALY was €57,280, well above the €45,000 
threshold, on account of its innovative nature), two were recommended with 
restrictions and two were not recommended either because cost effectiveness was 
not demonstrated or insufficient clinical evidence for use was available. However, 
several in the latter two categories were reimbursed by the HSE after a price 
reduction by the firm submitting the application. Hence instead of being a zero/one 
decision, to reimburse or not to reimburse, the use of the HTA by the HSE seems to 
have  developed into a more subtle instrument that is used to negotiate the 
reimbursement price with the firm applying to have its product listed when it does 
not fall below the threshold cost per QALY. 
 
When a pharmaceutical is approved it will have a specific targeted use and 
population where its use is most appropriate. In some cases the new pharmaceutical 
product may be a marginal improvement over existing pharmaceuticals on the 
market which would confine its use to those patients particularly able to benefit 
from that improvement. However, since the new in-patent pharmaceutical will often 
be heavily marketed, its use may possibly extend also to patients that can be treated 
perfectly adequately with existing, but lower cost, pharmaceuticals. Thus the HSE's 
pharmaceutical expenditure is needlessly raised, with no obvious benefit to patients.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
35  The discussion relies on papers published by the NCPE. See, for example, Barry et al. (2009), Barry et al. (2010), Barry & 
Tilson (2010), Tilson and Barry (2010) and Tilson et al. (2010). In addition the NCPE website provides considerable additional 
material. For details see http://www.ncpe.ie/. The NCPE was set up in 1998 with funding from DoHC. Accessed 15 July 2011. 
36  This underestimates the speed of the process because it includes "...the time taken to make amendments to the original 




Under such agreements the HSE and the firm concerned would agree not only the 
ex-factory price but also the expected sales of the new in-patent pharmaceutical 
based on its use and the size of the population likely to take advantage of the new 
in-patent pharmaceutical. Above the threshold of expected sales, the cost of the 
additional sales – measured as the difference between the cost using the closest 
alternative pharmaceutical and the new in-patent pharmaceutical – would be shared 
between the HSE and the firm. In other words, for those additional sales the firm 
would not receive the full ex-factory price but some amount less. For a completely 
new chemical entity with no close substitutes then the discount off the ex-factory 
price might be quite small; for a new in-patent pharmaceutical for which there are 
large number of existing close substitutes, the discount would be much larger. 
 
These risk sharing agreements or variants thereof are currently employed in a 
number of OECD countries.
37 In surveying what it refers to as product-specific pricing 
agreements, the OECD (2010, p. 172) argues that they "...could well prove to be a 
useful new instrument in promoting patient access to innovative treatments while 
linking public funding to therapeutic value."...However, it notes that many of these 
agreements are recent and as yet "...there is insufficient evidence to be confident of 
their utility"  (ibid,  p. 172).  This suggests that in taking forward the above 
recommendation that the HSE should select those instances where the benefits are 
most likely to outweigh any costs and carefully review the outcome so as to inform 
any future agreements. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
37   The HSE has already entered a small number of such agreements for hospital pharmaceuticals. 
Recommendation 4.5: We recommend that the HSE negotiates risk sharing 
agreements with firms seeking eligibility for reimbursement under the GMS 
and Community Drug Schemes for new pharmaceuticals on introduction in 
terms of expected sales and market penetration. 54 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
4.4  SETTING THE EX-FACTORY  PRICE OF PARALLEL  IMPORTS FOR IN-PATENT 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
Parallel imports can pose a significant competitive challenge to the position of the 
brand in-patent firm.
38 On occasion, parallel imports account for 25 per cent by 
value of a particular in-patent pharmaceutical product (Table 4.3). Furthermore, the 
number of applications to the HSE by parallel importers for reimbursement has 
increased markedly in the recent past: from 242 applications in 2008 to 951 in 2010. 
Parallel imports represented 47 per cent of all applications to the HSE for 
reimbursement in 2008, rising to 70 per cent in 2010.
39 In order to gain market share 
or protect it against subsequent entrants, these parallel importers need to offer 
pharmacists reasons to dispense their products. Hence successive parallel importers 
offer improved terms and conditions in order to attract pharmacy business through, 
for example, discounts of one sort or another (e.g. buy one get three free and so on) 
off the HSE reimbursement price. 
 
The IPHA/HSE agreement, together with the setting of the parallel import product 
ex-factory HSE reimbursement price, provides considerable incentives for parallel 
imports.
40 The IPHA/HSE agreement, for reasons set out above, tends to set a high 
initial price by EU standards for in-patent pharmaceuticals. This price is slow to 
adjust as the pharmaceutical is made available in other lower priced Member States 
within the basket of nine Member States used for external price referencing. At the 
same time the HSE ex-factory reimbursement price for a parallel import is set only 
somewhat below the corresponding in-patent brand name ex-factory price: at least 3 
per cent in 2010 and at least 7 per cent in 2011. The price of parallel imports in the 
source Member State is likely to be substantially more than the discounted price, 
which is consistent with Table 4.2.
41 This provides powerful arbitrage opportunities 
for parallel importers.
42 However, for reasons set out above, a large portion of the 
price advantage goes to the pharmacist, not the HSE.
43 This conclusion is consistent 
with the available EU research which shows parallel imports have little effect on the 
brand name in-patent product price and that the benefits of arbitrage largely accrue 
to the distribution chain rather than the health insurer – the HSE in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
38  Manufacturers undertake various strategies to prevent or restrict parallel imports such as applying for market 
authorisations for different dosages and strengths and rationing supply to wholesalers believed to be engaged in parallel 
trade. For details see European Commission (2009) and OECD (2008). 
39  Based on data supplied by the HSE Products Committee (HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011). In 2010 the 
applications were made by 17 firms. 
40  There is also nothing to prevent pharmacists from dispensing the parallel imported product when the brand name in-patent 
pharmaceutical is prescribed. The pharmacist is not acting illegally in dispensing a parallel import. 
41  It is also consistent with Kanavos et al (2011, Appendix 9, p. 86) which presents mark-up for parallel imports for selected 
Member States, but not Ireland. 
42  Brand name manufacturers do not appear to lower prices to compete with the parallel imports as evidenced by the fact 
that wholesalers state that they cannot compete with such imports. See, for example, UniPhar (2009, p. 15). 
43  This is likely to vary by the number of parallel importers per pharmaceutical product. As more and more enter, the discount 
offered by the most recent entrant is likely to be the higher than existing discounts in order to gain market share. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 55 
Ireland.
44 At the same time parallel trade can cause shortages in the Member State 
from which the exports take place.
45  Nevertheless, given the single market 
imperative, parallel trade is a permanent part of the institutional and economic 
landscape. 
 
The issue thus becomes how more of the benefits of the trade in parallel imports, 
currently most of which are captured in the distribution chain, can be reflected in 
lower ex-factory prices to the HSE, while at the same time continue to provide 




If, for example, the ex-factory price set under the agreements with the 
pharmaceuticals industry was €2.00 per unit and the imported price, including any 
additional costs of bringing the product to market in Ireland, was €1.50 per unit, 
then the issue would be how to share the difference – €0.50 per unit in this example 
– between the HSE and the parallel importer. 
 
When the parallel importer applies for HSE reimbursement disclosure could be made 
by the importer as to the price in the Member State(s) from which the parallel 
imported product is sourced. To this would need to be added an allowance for the 
parallel importer's costs of additional repacking and labelling, license requirements 
from the IMB, etc. The HSE could check the veracity of reported prices by contacting 
authorities in the relevant Member State.
46 The HSE would then have to make a 
commercial judgement of how much of the difference between the imported priced 
of the parallel import and the brand name ex-factory price of the in-patent 
pharmaceutical to capture, in negotiation with the parallel importer. If all the 
difference were captured by the HSE then that would remove the incentive of 
parallel importers to supply into Ireland. If all of the difference were captured by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
44  See, for example, Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005), and Kanavos and Kowal (2008, p. 25) who comment that "[E]vidence 
suggests that parallel distributor rents were between 2.5 and twenty times higher than savings to health insurance" and 
Kanavos and Vandoros (2011). 
45  However, see discussion in Section 4.3.1.2 with respect to the obligation of wholesalers in Ireland to supply the needs of 
patients in the State. 
46   It is recognised, of course, that gathering such data may not always be easy or straightforward. Other Member States may 
not have the relevant information, taking into account rebates and discounts. Furthermore, the parallel importer into 
Ireland may not import directly from another Member State but rather go through a series of intermediaries each of which 
charges a mark-up.  
Recommendation 4.6: We recommend that the HSE set an ex-factory price 
for parallel imports that shares the difference between the imported price of 
the parallel import and the brand name ex-factory price of the in-patent 
pharmaceutical between the parallel importer and the HSE. 56 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
distribution chain then the HSE captures little of the price difference. What is thus 
required is that the HSE shares enough of the price difference but at the same time 
there is still enough remaining to motivate and incentivise the parallel importer to 
supply Ireland and so benefit the HSE. 
 
A 50:50 split seems an appropriate starting point, although each case would have to 
be considered separately.
47 Furthermore, the first parallel importer is taking more 
risk than subsequent parallel importers and so might be expected to receive a larger 
portion of the rent. It would also incentivise early entry of parallel importers. The 
HSE could monitor the timing and extent of penetration of the parallel imported 
product through the PCRS database. Furthermore, market penetration of parallel 
importers under a 50:50 split could be compared with the record of the current 
regime where most of the rent is captured by the distribution chain to judge the 
effect the policy is having. 
 
The Falsified Medicines Directive (Directive 2011/62/EU)
48 adopted in June 2011 will 
introduce a new requirement for the packaging of most pharmaceuticals to bear a 
"safety feature"  or anti-counterfeiting  device.  This requirement is due to be 
introduced over the coming 3-5 years. Where a pharmaceutical is repackaged by a 
parallel importer, the importer will be required to place a safety feature on the pack 
which is "equivalent" to the device placed on the original pack by the originator firm. 
This requirement may potentially increase the cost and complexity of repackaging 
activities and consequently, it may be difficult to predict the future parallel trade 
market until the impact of safety features is better understood.  
 
4.5  SETTING THE EX-FACTORY PRICE FOR HIGH VOLUME MULTIPLE SOURCE OFF-
PATENT PHARMACEUTICALS 
Up to now, our discussion of pharmaceutical pricing has focused on pharmaceuticals 
that are still in-patent. Off-patent pharmaceuticals where there is no  generic 
competition are priced as though they were in-patent, as set out in the IPHA/HSE 
agreement and discussed above. These will tend to be the lower volume off-patent 
pharmaceuticals where the potential return to a generic supplier is insufficient to 
attract entry because the market size is small or where generic substitution is 
deemed inappropriate for medical reasons such as epilepsy products where medical 
practitioners might have bio-equivalence concerns. In this section attention turns to 
the pricing of off-patent pharmaceuticals where, for a specified dosage form and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
47  In other words, if the parallel imported price and the costs of bringing the product to market in Ireland was €3.00 per pack 
and the brand name ex-factory price in Ireland was €4.00 per pack, then the ex-factory price of the parallel import would be 
€3.50 per pack. 
48   Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal supply 
chain of falsified medicinal products. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 57 
strength, the identical pharmaceutical form has been approved by the IMB and is 
available for "...prescription in the Schemes and all pharmaceuticals supplied to the 
HSE, State funded hospitals to State agencies whose functions normally include the 
provision of pharmaceuticals" (HSE, 2006a, p. 4). These will be referred to as generic 
competitors to the brand name or originator.  Taken together, for a given 
pharmaceutical product, these will be termed as interchangeable pharmaceutical 
products. Generic products  will tend to be for the higher volume off-patent 
pharmaceuticals where the return is likely to be sufficient to attract generic entry. 
 
It should be noted that the distinction between off-patent pharmaceuticals with 
generic competition and those without generic competition is not determined 
exogenously  to the regulatory and pricing model, but rather is determined 
endogenously. In other words, the market conditions in large part determine the 
presence and success of generics. These market conditions refer to the regulatory 
(e.g. the fees charged by the IMB for registration,  etc.), legal (e.g. whether 
pharmacists can  select a different brand from that prescribed by a medical 
practitioner) and the reimbursement (e.g. the IPHA/HSE agreement that sees brand 
name prices falling with the onset of generic competition, the speed of price and 
reimbursement approval) framework. At the present time Ireland has short delays 
for price and reimbursement.
49 The introduction of reference pricing and generic 
substitution legislation in 2012 is likely to provide greater incentives for more 
generic competition. 
 
In this section the current pricing arrangements in Ireland for off-patent 
pharmaceuticals with generic competition are first set out, before attention turns to 
current proposals for reference pricing and generic substitution. These proposals, 
while moving in the right direction, in terms of securing better value for money, do 
not address certain important issues relating to, for example, how the reference 
price is set, the treatment of 'no  substitution'  prescriptions  and the issue  of 
prescriptions using the International Non-proprietary Name (INN). Hence the report 
discusses two alternative mechanisms to set the reference price and provides some 
guidance on when they might be best employed. While the focus of the discussion 
relates to the HSE, the application of the proposals to the cash paying patient is also 
considered. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
49   European Generic Medicines Association (2009, pp. 19-20). 58 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
4.5.1  Current Pricing Rules & Mechanisms 
Under the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement, where a generic is available under the GMS 
and CDS then the ex-factory price of the brand falls in two stages:
50 
•  By an initial 20 per cent; 
•  Twenty-two months later an additional 15 per cent also measured relative to the 
brand name price prior to the entry of the generic.  
Thus under the IPHA/HSE agreement the brand name pharmaceutical declines by 35 
per cent over 22 months. 
 
In early 2010 the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement was extended from September 2010 to 
March 2012. Annexe 1 was added to the 2006 IPHA/HSE agreement. Brand name 
pharmaceuticals which had commenced the 35 per cent reduction over 22 months 
by 1 February 2010 were reduced by an additional 40 per cent. This subset of 
products, in effect, has been reduced in price by 61 per cent from their original in-
patent price. However, all off-patent reductions post 1 February 2010 reverted to 35 
per cent over 22 months. In late 2010 the IPHA agreed to a further package of 
savings. However, it was left to individual IPHA members as to how they achieved 
the reductions. In some cases this resulted in further declines in the price of off-
patent pharmaceuticals where there was generic competition, in others a rebate was 
given to the HSE. 
 
Generic ex-factory prices are set by reference to the off-patent ex-factory price of 
the brand name pharmaceutical. A framework for setting maximum prices forms 
part of the agreement between the trade association representing the generic firms, 
the Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of Ireland (APMI), and the HSE.
51 
Although the APMI/HSE agreement does not specify the generic ex-factory price 
relative to the brand name price, the HSE stated that the generic ex-factory price 
must be at least 5.6 per cent lower than the brand name ex-factory price, for all 
products launched after 1 February 2010.
52 Thus if the brand name ex-factory price 
falls by 35 per cent 22 months after the generic first appears, the generic ex-factory 
price is 38.6 per cent lower than the brand name ex-factory price prior to the entry 
of generic competition.
53 Hence, like the pricing of parallel imports, it is the brand 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
50  There are certain phasing in arrangements under the IPHA/HSE agreement. For details see (HSE, 2006a, p.5). 
51  The APMI/HSE agreement, like the IPHA/HSE agreement, also ran from 2006 to 2010. The APMI/HSE agreement, like the 
IPHA/HSE agreement was extended in 2010 until 2012 (DoHC, 2010a). However, when the IPHA agreed to further 
reductions, the APMI did not follow suit immediately meaning that some generic ex-factory prices exceeded the brand 
name ex-factory price for a period in late 2010/early 2011. Typically the IPHA/HSE agreement is agreed first, then the 
APMI/HSE agreement (APMI, personal communication, 6 July 2011). 
52   Based on information supplied by the HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011. 
53   This is a modest decline compared with the fall in price of generics, compared to the brand name price prior to generic 
entry, recorded for other Member States. Kanavos et al. (2011, pp. 26-27) find that "[G]eneric prices average about 25% of 
the originator price, 12 and 24 months following patent expiry." Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 59 
name price that drives the ex-factory price of the generic. However, in both cases 
the difference between the ex-factory brand name price is quite small compared 
with either that of the parallel import or generic – a few percentage points. 
 
The HSE's room for policy discretion with respect to lowering off-patent 
pharmaceutical prices experiencing generic competition arguably was and is limited. 
Generic penetration in Ireland is low by EU standards – of the 16 Member States for 
which the European Commission had data for 2007, the share of the pharmaceutical 
market accounted for generics was the lowest in Ireland, when measured in value 
terms (12 per cent) and third lowest, when measured by volume (34 per cent) 
(European Commission, 2009, Figure 11, p. 62). Furthermore, the importance of 
generic prescription appears to have fallen over time in Ireland – not risen as one 
might have expected.
54 This low penetration reflects the limited ability of the 
pharmacist to dispense a generic when the brand name is prescribed, due to legal 
constraints and the low levels of generic prescribing by medical practitioners. 
Therefore, no financial incentives exist for pharmacists to dispense lower priced 
generics. For the DP and LTI Schemes, the pharmacist faces a disincentive to 
dispense a lower priced product due to the existence of a 20 per cent retail mark-up 
in addition to a dispensing fee per item. As a result the HSE could not rely on 
competition and market forces to bring about lower prices, particularly over a short 
period. Hence the HSE intervened through administrative pricing in the form of 
agreements with the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
4.5.2  Reference Pricing and Generic Substitution 
The Minister for Health and Children signalled in 2010 the introduction of generic 
substitution of interchangeable generic products and reference pricing
55 following 
proposals for such changes.
56 This was affirmed in the Programme for Government 
of the incoming administration in early 2011 (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011, p. 
36). Generic substitution and reference pricing go hand in hand: 
•  Generic substitution gives the pharmacist the legal authority to dispense a 
different brand of the same chemical entity, dosage form and strength from that 
prescribed by the medical practitioner. Such a group of products are considered 
interchangeable, perfect substitutes. Interchangeability is usually certified by an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
54   In 2007, 19 per cent of prescriptions were dispensed generically. Generic prescribing accounted for 8 per cent of GMS 
expenditure in 2007. In 1997 the "...the percentage of items prescribed generically exceeded 22 per cent by volume and 12 
per cent by expenditure" (Barry et al., 2010, p. 243). See Chapter 7 for further discussion. 
55  Not to be confused with external price referencing discussed above. Reference pricing in this discussion refers to setting the 
ex-factory price of interchangeable pharmaceutical products. 
56  For details see DoHC (2010b) and Moran (2010). The importance of reference pricing and generic substitution is likely to 
increase with a number of high volume pharmaceuticals, such as Lipitor (atorvastatin), coming off patent. See Economist 
(2010) and Moran (2010, p. 12). 60 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
expert body such as the IMB or a separate Committee on Interchangeability 
Medicines;
57 while, 
•  Reference pricing sets a common price for a group of interchangeable 
pharmaceutical products. 
 
Such pricing schemes are commonly employed in other Member States, Canada, 
New Zealand and elsewhere.
58 
 
Typically under reference pricing the medical practitioner can write a 'no 
substitution' prescription for a particular brand to be dispensed for medical reasons. 
Such no-substitution prescriptions are typically for the higher priced brand name 
product. If the HSE is the payer then it pays the brand name price; if it is in the cash 
market the patient pays the brand name price. If the preference of the patient is for 
a particular interchangeable product, then the patient in a State scheme will pay for 
the difference between the reference price and the product selected; if the patient is 
a cash paying customer then they will pay the full price.
59 
 
An illustration may clarify the operation of reference pricing. Suppose there are four 
different suppliers of pharmaceutical X, which have been deemed interchangeable. 
Each supplier is asked to submit a price to the HSE for a specific dosage form and 
strength. The following four prices are submitted, one by the brand name supplier 
(Brand 1), the remaining three by generic suppliers (Generic 1, 2, and 3): 
Brand 1  €0.80 
Generic 1  €0.10 
Generic 2  €0.08 
Generic 3  €0.07 
 
Under this stylised example it is assumed that the brand name is not reduced in price 
with the entry of generic competition, while the generic suppliers price at a much 
lower level than the brand.
60 In effect, the generics compete and establish a price 
that reflects competition between the generics rather than related to the price of 
the brand as is the case under current pricing arrangements. A reference price is 
selected, typically the lowest; €0.07 in this example. However, if the patient was 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
57   The latter body was recommended by Moran (2010, pp. 9-10). 
58  On the EU see Moran (2010, p. 8, and Annex B, p. 14). 
59  In the community sector, the State through the DP Scheme provides insurance for all residents subject to a monthly 
deductable of €120 (increasing to €132 from January 2012), as set out in Chapter 2. 
60  In the example, Generic 1 is assumed to have entered the market first and gained a degree of product differentiation so 
that it can charge a somewhat higher price than Generic 2 and so on. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 61 
under the GMS or one of the CDS and had a preference for Brand 1 then there would 
be a co-payment of €0.73 (i.e. €0.80-€0.07). On the other hand, if the prescriber, for 
medical reasons, felt that Brand 1 should be dispensed then the State would pay 
€0.80 not €0.07. 
 
If reference pricing is to succeed in getting better value for money, there is a need to 
ensure that competition and competitive mechanisms set prices. The Working Group 
on Reference Pricing and Generic Substitution (Working Group) that examined 
reference pricing in Ireland was aware of the importance of the promotion of 
competitive markets (Moran, 2010, p. 1). The question thus becomes how should 
the reference price be set? If market mechanisms are to be used this implies a shift 
away from the current administrative pricing arrangements for off-patent 
pharmaceuticals outlined above in the IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements, which 
terminate in 2012. However, there is a clause in the Annexe to the IPHA/HSE 
agreement "may stand amended" on the introduction of reference pricing and/or 
generic substitution prior to the expiry of the agreement. 
 
The Working Group acknowledges the importance of competitive markets, the 
importance of a sufficient number of competing pharmaceuticals and low barriers to 
entry as well as suggesting the reference price should be the lowest priced 
interchangeable supplier – €0.07 in the above example.
61 However, it did not 
consider what alternative mechanisms can or should be used to determine the prices 
submitted by suppliers, beyond the statement that these prices be "...submitted by 
suppliers in line with national pricing arrangements" (Moran, 2010, p. 6). This is an 
important issue. There is a literature on these issues which can be used to inform the 
decision as to the most appropriate form of determining the reference price. It is to 
these and related issues that attention now turns. 
 
4.5.3  Setting the Reference Price: Competition for the Market versus 
Competition in the Market? 
Two methods of setting the reference price are considered: competition for the 
market and competition in the market. The former is sometimes referred to as 
competitive tendering, the latter as side-by-side competition. Each is considered 
separately, before attention turns to instances where it might be appropriate to 
employ each method. The discussion concludes by arguing that competition for the 
market should be used for the leading high volume off-patent pharmaceuticals with 
generic competition, while for low volume items competition in the market is likely 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
61  The Working Group stated that the reference price is "...usually the lowest unless there are concerns about continuity of 
supply" (Moran, 2010, p. 7). 62 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
to be more appropriate. However, the line between the two will become clearer as 
the HSE gains experience in implementing reference pricing. 
 
Competition for the market through a tendering process. Suppliers submit tenders 
to supply the market for a specified period of time. The period would need to be 
long enough to cover any transaction costs of setting up the tender, but short 
enough so as not to discourage entry into the Irish market. The lowest priced tender 
wins the competition. This price becomes the reference price. The supplier winning 
the tender supplies all of the pharmaceutical for the period of the tender. There is 
no opportunity for unsuccessful bidders to supply at lower prices for the period of 
the tender. Those firms bidding for the tender would clearly have to have 
demonstrated that they would be  able to supply this volume of the 
pharmaceutical.
62 Tendering has been used by New Zealand since the mid-1990s and 
the province of Saskatchewan since the mid-1970s. Details on the former are 
presented in Box 4.1. More recently the Netherlands has introduced tendering 
(Kanavos et al., 2009). 
 
There are exceptions to the lowest priced brand being dispensed. Typically these 
exceptions will be for the brand name product, which will usually be priced above 
the reference price. First, the medical practitioner prescribes a particular brand, an 
issue discussed in Section 4.5.5. Second, the patient has a preference for a particular 
brand and requests the medical practitioner to prescribe that brand. The pricing 
arrangements in both instances were discussed in Section 4.5.2.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
62   Given the importance of security of supply it is important that this requirement is credibly evaluated and that measures are 
put in place to ensure compliance, such as the successful bidder posting a bond to be forfeited in case of full or partial non-
adherence to the contract. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 63 
BOX 4.1 The New Zealand Tendering Experience: 1996 – present 
The Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) is the New Zealand Crown 
agency that decides, on behalf of District Health Boards (DHBs), which medicines 
and related products are subsidised for use in the community and public hospitals. 
 
One of the main roles of PHARMAC is the management of the medicines budget. 
This budget is set each year by the Minister of Health, on the advice of DHBs and 
PHARMAC. The Pharmaceutical Budget includes funding for medicines dispensed in 
the community, and for cancer medicines that are used in DHB hospitals. For 
community medicines, DHBs reimburse community pharmacists for dispensing 
prescribed medicines and PHARMAC works on their behalf to manage the spending. 
The list of subsidised medicines is published in The Pharmaceutical Schedule. One of 
the tools employed by PHARMAC for the supply of pharmaceuticals in New Zealand 
is tendering. 
 
PHARMAC uses tendering for many off-patent pharmaceuticals, offering sole supply 
status to the successful supplier, which means that supplier's brand would be the 
only one subsidised for a particular formulation for a specified period of time 
(usually no more than 3 years). This involves issuing tender documents to 
pharmaceutical suppliers inviting their bids for a set list of pharmaceuticals, and 
evaluating bids taking account of product acceptability, relevant clinical issues, 
supply and distribution arrangements and price. Nearly one-third of the 
approximately 1,700 formulations listed on the Pharmaceutical Schedule are 
sourced through tendering arrangements. 
 
PHARMAC has employed tendering as a way to reduce the cost of medicines since 
1996-1997 when the first tender (for one product, paracetamol), led to a 44 per cent 
price reduction. By 2002-03, tenders for over 1,000 line items were issued, and this 
produced savings of about NZ$23 million.  By 2008, cumulative savings from 
tendering are estimated to exceed NZ$300 million. 
Source: PHARMAC, 2009; http://www.pharmac.govt.nz; personal communication, PHARMAC, 2 
November 2011. 
 
Competition in the market whereby suppliers submit prices. These prices might, for 
example, be list prices or the list price net of usual and customary discounts, that are 
not related to efficient buying (e.g. electronic ordering). The lowest price submitted 
becomes the reference price. The pharmacist is reimbursed the reference price, 
irrespective of the brand dispensed. The same patient and medical practitioner 
exceptions apply as with competition for the market. This approach is used in a 
number of jurisdictions including Ontario, details of which are presented in Box 4.2. 
 
In both cases the objective of the exercise from the view point of the HSE, acting as 
purchaser, is to set as low a price as possible for interchangeable products, while at 
the same time ensuring security of supply. 
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BOX 4.2  Interchangeable Pharmaceutical Products and Reference Pricing: The 
  Ontario Experience, 1970s – present. 
Ontario has longstanding policies to promote generic competition and reference 
pricing dating back to the 1970s.The Committee to Evaluate Drugs (formerly the 
Drug Quality and Therapeutics Committee) recommends that a pharmaceutical 
product should be an interchangeable product with the brand name pharmaceutical. 
All interchangeable products for a given pharmaceutical by dosage form and 
strength are listed in the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary. Under the original system 
in the 1970s, pharmaceutical suppliers submitted prices to the Ontario Drug Benefit 
(ODB) programme. The ODB would only reimburse up to the lowest priced 
interchangeable product, irrespective of which interchangeable pharmaceutical 
product was dispensed.  
A persistent theme of inquiries and commissions into the ODB dating from the 1970s 
is that the prices submitted to the ODB were too high in the sense that the generic 
firms supplied interchangeable pharmaceutical products to pharmacies at lower 
prices. At first, the discrepancy reflected the fact that ODB asked for prices to be 
based on smaller order sizes such as 50s and 100s so as to ensure that smaller 
pharmacies were not disadvantaged. However, for high volume multiple source 
interchangeable drugs the vast majority of purchases were for larger quantities, with 
consequent lower average prices due to quantity discounts.  
There has, however, been a more persistent concern that even after controlling for 
order size, that the price submitted to the ODB for a generic product is higher, often 
considerably above the price paid by the pharmacist. This was consistent with 
research conducted by the ODB in the mid-2000s showing generic prices were much 
higher in Ontario than in the US, New Zealand, France, Germany or the UK. Under 
the Transparent Drug System for Patients Act, 2006, the generic price was fixed at 50 
per cent of the brand name equivalent. Rebates and discounts were prohibited. 
However, generic firms found ways around this prohibition. Since the ODB only 
covers a certain sector of the Ontario market, rebates and discounts could still be 
offered on pharmacy orders for the private sector. Similarly, some Ontario 
pharmacies are part of Canada-wide chains so that rebates and discounts can be 
routed to these chains in other parts of Canada. Finally, the 2006 Act permitted 
professional allowances for patient care, which also become a vehicle for offering 
rebates and discounts to pharmacies.  
In 2010, Ontario announced radical changes. The price of generic products will fall 
from 50 per cent to a maximum of 25 per cent of the reference brand price by 1 
April 2012; professional allowances were abolished for the ODB and phased out in 
the private sector by 1 April 2013. Whether these changes will succeed in removing 
the rebates and discounts from the system remains to be seen. In any event, the 
history of Ontario in using competition in the market shows how hard it is to prevent 
generic firms competing to gain market share by offering discounts and rebates. 
Source: Gorecki (1992) and information supplied by Drug Program Services, Ontario Ministry of 
Health and Long-term Care. 
 
In considering whether competition in the market or competition for the market is 
likely to lead to a lower price it is important to characterise the nature of the 
competition involved. In competition for the market, the supplier with the winning 
tender is guaranteed the market for a specified period of time. The tender process 
thus determines jointly both the supplier and the reference price. In making a bid 
the supplier will be aware of the size of the market, since the HSE will provide such 
information in the tender document. The supplier will not have to fight for market 
share or market the product once the tender is won. The supplier thus has an 
incentive to bid a low competitive price, which in turn becomes the reference price. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 65 
 
In contrast, in competition in the market the supplier plays a two stage competitive 
game. 
•  First, each supplier submits a price to the HSE for the given pharmaceutical. The 
lowest price of those submitted is the reference price. It is likely that all the 
generic suppliers will submit similar prices, as in the example above. Indeed, the 
reference pricing system might be structured so as to allow suppliers that submit 
a price above the reference price to subsequently match the reference price.
63 
However, it seems likely whether or not there is a formal mechanism for such 
price matching, that all generic suppliers will in fact accept reimbursement at 
the reference price. Since the State pays the reference price, irrespective of the 
interchangeable product dispensed, the firm that submits the lowest price has 
no guarantee that it will supply all of the market, in contrast to competition for 
the market.
64 Thus the incentive to quote the competitive price is lower than 
under the tendering process. Indeed, the incentive is to submit a very high price 
and compete for market share through discounts to the pharmacist. 
•  Second, while the first stage determines the price, the second stage determines 
the market shares of the suppliers. The decision as to which interchangeable 
brand to dispense rests with the pharmacist, providing, of course, that the 
prescriber has not for medical reasons selected a specific product. Here the 
pharmacist is likely to have several different, usually generic suppliers, from 
which to select. On what basis, given that all products are certified as equally 
effective (i.e. interchangeable) and have the same reimbursement price, will the 
choice be made? It is suggested that the pharmacist will select the product that 
yields the greatest return, measured as the difference between the reference 
price and the effective price that the pharmacist pays, net of all discounts and 
other inducements that are offered by the generic supplier (e.g. buy one get one 
free, etc.). Thus firms will compete on discounts to the pharmacist for market 
share. 
•  It is thus inherent in the second stage that suppliers, particularly generics, will 
compete for business through discounts to the pharmacist. While discounts can 
provide incentives for suppliers to become more efficient and thus in a better 
position to offer discounts, the magnitude that discounts can reach suggests that 
it is not due to efficiency gains but rather strategically setting a high price to the 
HSE, which occurred in Ontario (Box 4.2).  However, the difficulty is that 
discounts accrue to the pharmacist, not the purchasing agency, the HSE or the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
63   This price matching is suggested in Moran (2010, p. 7). 
64  Unless of course the price is at a predatory level. Hoffman La-Roche employed this tactic in the hospital market in Canada in 
1970-1971 in face of generic competition for its brand of diazepam, Valium, and was successfully prosecuted for predatory 
pricing under competition law. (For details see Gorecki, 1986). More recently in the UK, Napp Pharmaceuticals was found to 
have charged predatory prices in the hospital market for sustained release morphine (for details see Whish, 2009, pp.741-
742). 66 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
cash patient. Hence the HSE needs to maintain careful market monitoring to 
ensure that these discounts are not unreasonable.
65 
 
Thus given the two stage nature of competition in the market generic suppliers will 
have an incentive to offer a low/high price to the HSE. The submitted price will be 
low enough to be well below the brand name and thus satisfy the purchaser's (i.e. 
HSE's) concerns over value for money. The generic suppliers' ex-factory price is likely 
to at least match what is available under the current IPHA/HSE agreement or else 
there is little advantage for the HSE moving to reference pricing. Since the generic 
suppliers are likely to prefer reference pricing over the current arrangements, they 
also have an incentive to meet or beat the current IPHA/HSE price reductions. 
Indeed, the IPHA/HSE agreement might establish a focal point around which prices 
converge. The submitted price will, at the same time, be high enough for discounting 
and other forms of sales promotion/competition at the pharmacy level. 
 
Competition for the market does not suffer from the problems outlined with respect 
to competition in the market; the price submitted is more likely to be the 
competitive price. Furthermore, competition for the market also avoids the 
anticompetitive price enhancing effects of price matching, which appears to be 
inherent in competition in the market.
66 
 
Competition for the market and competition in the market should not necessarily be 
considered as alternatives, but to a considerable degree as complements. The 
transaction costs involved in tendering may be higher than for competition in the 
market. These costs refer to not only the tender process itself, but also ensuring that 
the supplier bidding for the tender can supply for the tender period. However, these 
costs should not be overstated or exaggerated. Some hospitals in the State conduct 
regular tenders for pharmaceuticals, while the HSE purchases vaccine via tendering. 
In Canada,  the province of Saskatchewan conducts tenders for selected 
pharmaceuticals for its community pharmaceutical programme and yet it has a 
population of only 1.054 million. New Zealand, which conducts extensive tendering 
for pharmaceuticals, has a population of 4.4 million. In the Netherlands the largest 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
65  Of course, it could be argued that discounts could be abolished or prohibited. However, discounts take many forms and it is 
unclear how they could all be abolished. Furthermore, there is a competitive impetus underlying discounts inherent in 
competition in the market: much better to utilise that impetus than ignore it. 
66  For references concerning price matching see Competition Authority (2003, p. 18, footnote 30). Price matching is where one 
firm promises to match another firm's price. For example, retailers often advertise that if a customer can find anybody that 
charges a lower price they will match the price. There is also a possibility of collusion to agree on the reference price among 
generic suppliers. Thus careful attention would need to be paid by the purchasing agency to detect and, if possible, prevent 
such behaviour. Such an agreement would most likely be a breach of competition law. For a discussion of other aspects of 
competition law in pharmaceuticals see Section 2.2.1.1. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 67 
health insurer has a client base of about 2.6 million.
67 On the other hand, accepting 
bids by generic firms at face value, given the incentives described above for these 
prices to be above the competitive level, is also likely to lead to monitoring costs. 
The HSE will have to constantly examine the magnitude of discounts and then take 
action to reduce reimbursement prices. This has been an ongoing characteristic of 
the Ontario system since the 1970s (Box 4.2). 
 
The evidence suggests that tendering leads to substantial savings. Manufacturers 
have strong incentives to provide the best possible price, given that providers who 
are not successful will not gain any market share. The US Veterans Administration 
estimates that it  has saved over US$1.5  billion  through national contracting 
arrangements between 1996 and 2003 (OECD, 2008), while savings of over NZD$300 
million have been achieved in New Zealand over a 10-year period (PHARMAC, 
2010).
68 In Saskatchewan, tendering saved CDN$18.5 million in 2009/10 off the 
provinces pharmaceutical expenditure or 4 per cent (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Health, 2010a, p. 6, 13). Typically in the Netherlands savings on ten pharmaceuticals 
varied between 76 and 93 per cent (Kanavos et al, 2009, Table 3, pp. 20-21). 
 
It could be argued, however, that competition for the market might be more likely to 
result in a monopoly situation whereas this is less likely in the case of competition in 
the market. Hence, while tendering results in short-term gains these could be offset 
by subsequent price increases. Two possible mechanisms can be identified. 
•  First, generic competition could be eliminated through predatory pricing by the 
brand name firm. Such below cost selling is, of course, illegal under both Irish 
and EU competition law. There have been, as noted above, successful 
prosecutions of such behaviour in other jurisdictions. There is no reason to 
assume that the Irish Competition Authority will be any less successful. 
•  Second, competition requires firms that can compete or credibly threaten to 
compete for the market. Without such competition market power will result in 
prices above the competitive norm. It could be argued that under tendering if 
the losing supplier(s) is unable to supply the market for the period of the tender 
– say six months – then it might be forced to withdraw from the market. If there 
were significant sunk costs
69 associated with entering the Irish market (i.e. 
participating in subsequent tenders), tendering might have the effect of raising a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
67   The population of the Netherlands in 2011 was 16.6 million, while the market share of the largest health insurer was 15.7 
per cent in terms of gross premium income in 2008. Assuming all persons in the Netherlands are insured and that the 
market shares in terms of gross premium income and population are the same, results in 2.6 million for the largest insurer. 
For details see Dutch Association of Health Insurers (2011, Table 1.1 p. 12; Table 9.3, p. 107). When tendering was first 
introduced health insurers acted as a group in organising tenders. However, this was deemed inconsistent with competition 
law. Hence insurers now conduct tenders individually rather than collectively. For details see Kanavos et al. (2009, p. 37). 
68   On the basis of 2009 figures, the savings amount to approximately 5 per cent of total PHARMAC expenditure in that year 
(PHARMAC, personal communication, 15 February 2010). 
69  Costs that cannot be recovered if the firm later exits the market. 68 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
barrier to entry. However, it is not clear that there are substantial sunk costs of 
entry in Ireland; indeed, opportunistic entry by parallel imports might suggest 
entry is low cost. Also, if tendering were restricted to high volume off-patent 
pharmaceuticals, then suppliers that are unsuccessful in a tender will have a 
strong incentive to remain in the market. Furthermore, if hospitals continue to 
tender for pharmaceuticals independently of the GMS and CDS then they will 
provide a substantial market (Table 2.1) 
 
The New Zealand market, as noted above, is of a similar size to that of Ireland and 
New Zealand has successfully engaged in tendering for sole supply for many years. 
Indeed, there are now more generic suppliers in the New Zealand market and 
competition is strong. Where suppliers have left the market it has occurred only in 
terms of HQs relocating to Australia and in no instance has a supplier ceased to sell 
in New Zealand. 
70 
 
4.5.4  Competition for the Market and Competition in the Market: Some 
Estimates of the Cost Savings 
In order to gain a sense of what the savings might be if a tendering procedure were 
adopted we compared the ex-factory price of the leading 20 pharmaceuticals by 
value on the GMS Scheme in 2010 (September 2011 ex-factory price) with the 
equivalent price in New Zealand (September 2011 ex-factory price). Within each 
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC), we selected the most frequently dispensed 
product (dosage form and strength), calculated the unit ex-factory price and the 
equivalent unit ex-factory price for the corresponding product in New Zealand. The 
results are presented in Table 4.4. In some cases tendering was not used as indicated 
in the table. Nevertheless, the table indicates that to the extent that the results of 
New Zealand can be replicated in Ireland, substantially lower prices and consequent 
better value for money could be obtained by competition for the market for selected 
high volume off-patent products. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
70  However, there are some key differences between New Zealand and Ireland, in that New Zealand only has one or two 
domestic-based manufacturers and the vast majority of pharmaceuticals are and have always been imported. However, 
rather than leaving the New Zealand market, the most significant manufacturer in the New Zealand market has moved from 
an approach largely based around the domestic market to source 70-80 per cent of its revenue from export sales 
(PHARMAC, personal communication, 15 February 2010).  
TABLE 4.4  A Comparison of Ex-Factory 2011 Prices, Ireland and New Zealand, Top 20 GMS Pharmaceuticals by Value, 2010 
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d  Lipitor  10 mg  28  15.53  0.55  Lipitor  10 mg  30  10.3  0.34  No  1.62 
2  Salmeterol
e  Seretide Evohaler
f  125mg  1  43.31  43.31  Seretide  125mg  1  27.95  27.95  No  1.55 
3  Esomeprazole
g  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
4  Pregabalin
g  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
5  Lansoprazole  Zoton Fastab  30mg  28  21.77  0.78  Solox  30mg  28  2.62  0.09  No  8.31 
6  Omeprazole  Losec Mups  20mg  28  13.16  0.47  Omezol Relief
h  20mg  90  2.13  0.02  No  19.86 
7  Olanzapine  Zyprexa  10mg  28  93.76  3.35  Dr Reddy's 
Olanzapine
i 
10mg  28  3.57  0.13  No  26.26 
8  Clopidogrel  Plavix  75mg  28  36.43  1.30  Apo-Clopidogrel  75mg  90  9.14  0.10  Yes  12.81 
9  Rosuvastatin
g  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
10  Tiotropium 
bromide 
Spiriva  18mcg  1  40.35  1.35  Spirivaj
j  18mcg  1  39.37  1.31  No  1.02 
11  Escitalopram  Lexapro  10mg  28  20.94  0.75  Loxalate  10mg  28  1.49  0.05  Yes  14.05 
12  Formoterol
e  Symbicort 
Turbohaler 
200/6mg  1  46.4  46.40  Vannair
k  200/6mg  1  22.53  22.53  No  2.06 
13  Quetiapine  Seroquel  25mg  60  37.77  0.63  Dr Reddy's 
Quetiapine
l 
25mg  60  3.94  0.07  No  9.59 
14  Pravastatin  Lipostat  20mg  28  11.52  0.41  Cholvastin  20mg  30  3.06  0.10  No  4.03 
15  Fentanyl  Durogesic Dtrans 
Transdermal 
Patches 
25mcg  5  35.7  7.14  Mylan Fentanyl 
Patch 
25mcg  5  5.15  1.03  Yes  6.93 
16  Pantoprazole  Protium  40mg  28  13.02  0.47  Dr Reddy's 
Pantoprazole  
40mg  28  0.87  0.03  Yes  14.97 
17  Perindopril  Coversyl Arginine
f  5mg  30  9.6  0.32  Coversyl
m  4mg  30  14.06  0.47  No  0.68 
18  Amlodipine  Istin  5mg  28  5.53  0.20  Apo-Amlodipine  5mg  100  1.49  0.01  No
n  13.26 
19  Donepezil  Aricept  10mg  28  44.18  1.58  Donepezil-Rex  10mg  90  7.91  0.09  Yes  17.95 
20  Alendronic acid  Fosamax  70mg  4  12.79  3.20  Fosamax
o  70mg  4  12.88  3.22  No  0.99 
 
Notes:    Where more than one product of a particular strength is reimbursed in New Zealand we have selected the more expensive one for comparison. 
  a  September 2011 prices. 
  b  Price per unit refers to price per tablet, capsule, tube, inhaler, etc. 
  c  September 2011 prices – NZ dollar converted at the Central Bank average exchange rate for January-June 2011 €1=NZ$1.78. 
  
  d  PHARMAC have announced that a new brand of Atorvastatin (Dr Reddy's Atorvastatin) will be available from 1 November 2011 (Tab 10mg pack size 30 - €1.63 per pack or 0.05 per tablet). This change 
would increase the price ratio from 1:1.62 to 1:11. http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/2011/09/14/2011-09%20Dr%20Reddy%27s%20Atorvastatin%20notification.pdf 
  e  And other drugs for obstructive airway diseases. 
  f  The highest volume product in Ireland does not have an equivalent in the PHARMAC listing so an alternative had to be selected. 
  g  There is no PHARMAC record for this ATC. 
  h  Omezol Relief is currently in the transition period of a sole supply arrangement, with sole supply being effective 1 January 2012. 
  i  Two brands of the same dose, pack size and price available, the other brand is Olanzine. 
  j  A Special Authority for Subsidy is required for Tiotropium bromide. 
  k  A Special Authority for Subsidy is required for combination inhalers in New Zealand. Additional subsidy by endorsement for Symbicort Turbuhaler is available for patients where the initial dispensing was 
before 1 July 2011 (Symbicort Turbohaler 200/6mg is €33.71). 
  l  Two brands of the same dose, pack size and price available, the other brand is Seroquel. 
  m  The highest volume product in Ireland (5mg Coversyl) does not have an equivalent in the PHARMAC listing so 4mg has been used as an illustration. 
It should be noted that this ACE inhibitor is hardly used in New Zealand. It is only used for patients who were on this product before June 1998 and requires a written endorsement from a physician to be 
fully subsidised in New Zealand. Most of the New Zealand ACE inhibitor market is shared between Quinapril, Enalapril, and Cilazapril. These products are all on sole supply arrangements and are 
significantly cheaper than Perindopril (all less than €0.06 per tablet vs. €0.30-0.50 for Perindopril). In the last financial year PHARMAC subsidised approximately 1m prescriptions (up to 3 months supply 
for a patient) for Cilazapril and these three products combined compared to just 3,000 for Perindopril (PHARMAC, Personal Communication 05 October 2011). 
  n  There will be sole supply from this manufacturer from 1 November 2011. 
  o  A Special Authority for Subsidy is required for Fosamax. 
Sources:    ESRI Calculations. 
Ireland: HSE personal communication, 30 September 2011. 
New Zealand: PHARMAC (2011a, b); PHMAC, personal communication 5 October 2011. 
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In order to provide a benchmark against which to compare the savings from 
reference pricing where the firms submit prices to the HSE for reimbursement 
purposes, we estimated, for the 20 most frequently prescribed pharmaceuticals with 
a generic equivalent under the GMS (by value), the savings if they were priced at the 
lowest rather than the actual ex-factory price. For example, if there were two 
suppliers of a given interchangeable pharmaceutical with ex-factory prices of €0.50 
(i.e. the brand name) and €0.25 (i.e. the generic) per unit and each supplier claimed 
for 50 units, then the total cost would be €37.5, the revised cost, if the lowest priced 
generic were used, €25, with savings of 33.3 per cent.
71 For the 20 most frequently 
prescribed pharmaceuticals with a generic equivalent, these savings, as shown in 
Table 4.5, vary from approximately 30 per cent for lansoprazole to close to zero for 
diclofenac. 
 
TABLE 4.5  Potential Cost Savings of Using Lowest Priced Generic Equivalent Compared to Ex-Factory Price, Top 
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1  Bisoprolol  962,746  2,652,161  2,546,703  -4.0 
2  Amlodipine  815,923  5,302,884  5,192,348  -2.1 
3  Ramipril  765,250  3,475,696  3,353,670  -3.5 
4  Esomeprazole  753,774  18,526,091  17,942,902  -3.1 
5  Lansoprazole  683,422  13,609,651  9,564,659  -29.7 
6  Omeprazole  650,866  8,152,730  6,890,147  -15.5 
7  Rosuvastatin  581,934  11,285,873  9,951,577  -11.8 
8  Diclofenac  562,854  4,528,215  4,502,146  -0.6 
9  Pantoprazole  503,557  5,611,118  5,194,413  -7.4 
10  Pravastatin  489,338  5,362,750  5,135,220  -4.2 
11  Clopidogrel  342,349  12,310,381  9,729,518  -21.0 
12  Venlafaxine  320,377  4,321,574  4,125,736  -4.5 
13  Alendronic acid  319,919  4,215,288  4,107,088  -2.6 
14  Doxazosin  289,922  5,466,280  4,676,268  -14.5 
15  Tamsulosin  217,806  4,318,392  3,298,912  -23.6 
16  Olanzapine  196,858  13,489,462  12,938,893  -4.1 
17  Risedronic acid  161,902  3,208,429  3,045,827  -5.1 
18  Risperidone  131,714  3,418,850  2,811,089  -17.8 
19  Lamotrigine  124,943  6,713,496  -  - 
20  Donepezil  119,312  4,725,006  4,478,048  -5.2 
Total  8,994,766  140,694,327  123,437,779  -12.3 
 
Notes:  For 16 of the 678 products listed no ex-factory price was provided. For these products 8 per cent was subtracted from the 
reimbursable price (i.e., ex-wholesale) provided by the HSE. 
A: Number of items in this ATC claimed in 2010. 
B: Number of items dispensed in 2010 multiplied by the ex-factory price (1 September 2011) for each listed pharmaceutical  
C: Number of items dispensed in 2010 multiplied by the minimum ex-factory price (1 September 2011) summed over dose and 
pack size within the ATC. 
D: Percentge difference between B and C. 
For lamotrigine, which is used to treat epilepsy, there are concerns about equivalence and so a price comparison is not reported 
in the table. However, if it were considered interchangeable, the reduction would be 41 per cent. 
Source:  ESRI Calculation from HSE personal communication, 30 September 2011. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
71  As noted in Table 4.5, the estimates control for dose and pack size. The HSE conducted a similar exercise to that in Table 4.5 
for the top 100 pharmaceutical products by expenditure with a generic for 2009 (accounting for 80 per cent of expenditure 
on GMS and CDS) and estimated potential savings, using the lowest cost generic, of €55.4 million under the GMS and €22.3 
million under the DP Scheme (Moran,2010, pp. 11-12). 72 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 





At first the HSE might wish to limit tendering to a small number of such 
pharmaceuticals and as experience is gained a judgement can be made as to where 
the line can be drawn. In designing the tenders the experience of the HSE itself in 
tendering for vaccines and blood products, as well as those hospitals that already 
tender and the international examples mentioned above can be drawn upon.  
 
4.5.5  No Substitution Prescriptions: What Rules? 
It is common as part and parcel of reference pricing systems, irrespective of whether 
the price setting mechanism is competition for the market or competition in the 
market, that medical practitioners can insist on a particular interchangeable product 
being dispensed. Typically this product is the long-standing brand name that until 
generic entry accounted for 100 per cent of the market.
72 There is a budgetary 
implication of these no substitution prescriptions, since the brand name price is 
usually much higher than the generic. The exception of no substitution prescriptions 
is allowed on medical or clinical grounds. The issue thus becomes how no 
substitution prescriptions should be accommodated within reference pricing. Two 
options are considered; the very permissive option suggested by the Working Group; 
and  a  much more rigorous policy  exemplified by the rules in  Ontario and 
Saskatchewan. 
 
It should perhaps be noted that the dispensing of generics, while in some instances 
accounting for in excess of 50 per cent of a particular pharmaceutical product, in 
other instances generics account for less than 5 per cent of prescriptions (Table 4.6). 
This suggests considerable prescribing by brand name. Whether this translates into 
no substitution prescriptions is, as yet, unclear. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
72  In this context parallel imports are included with the brand name. 
Recommendation 4.7: We recommend that the reference price for high 
volume off-patent interchangeable pharmaceutical products should be set 
through competitive tendering. Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 73 
TABLE 4.6  Generics (Branded and Unbranded) as a Proportion of the Top 10 Pharmaceuticals with a Generic 





2010  2011 
 
Volume  Value  Volume  Value 
 
%  %  %  % 
Esomeprazole  5.7  4.4  24.5  25.7 
Rosuvastatin  2.5  1.8  21.6  19.6 
Clopidogrel  16.0  12.6  28.3  27.2 
Pantoprazole  30.8  33.2  41.7  40.4 
Omeprazole  52.2  54.6  58.1  59.8 
Acetylsalicylic Acid-Aspirin (Antithrombotic)  22.2  16.2  17.5  12.9 
Venlafaxine  19.5  23.0  24.4  25.8 
Lamotrigine  5.3  4.2  5.9  4.5 
Budesonide  41.1  48.1  5.7  6.9 




2010  2011 
 
Volume  Value  Volume  Value 
 
%  %  %  % 
Esomeprazole  3.2  2.4  15.4  16.2 
Rosuvastatin  1.5  1.0  15.2  13.6 
Clopidogrel  10.3  7.9  19.3  18.1 
Omeprazole  33.2  35.6  38.9  41.2 
Pantoprazole  19.7  21.2  29.2  27.6 
Venlafaxine  12.9  15.2  17.1  17.6 
Acetylsalicylic Acid-Aspirin (Antithrombotic)  10.1  7.0  8.5  6.0 
Gabapentin  10.5  7.7  14.2  9.0 
Anastrozole  0.0  0.0  3.0  2.4 
Amlodipine  28.2  33.8  33.1  31.9 
 
Notes: 
a Year to Date June 2011 
For lamotrigine and gabapentin, which are used to treat epilepsy, there might be concerns about equivalence. 
Source:  ESRI calculations from HSE personal communication, 23 September 2011. 
 
The Working Group view on the procedures for dealing with no substitution 
prescriptions are set out as follows: 
Some patients will require a particular brand of pharmaceutical for 
clinical reasons. In these instances prescribers may object to 
substitution by including a specified code on the prescription. This will 
enable the HSE to monitor the usage of exemptions by prescribers 
(Moran, 2010, p. 5) 
A footnote in Moran (2010, p. 5) refers to Sweden where prescribers objected to 
substitution in 2.5 per cent of cases, by simply ticking the appropriate box on the 
prescription form.
73 The 2.5 per cent appears a low figure. However, no substitution 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
73  In Sweden in 2006 generics accounted for 44 per cent of the market measured by volume and 14 per cent by value, while 
no substitution pharmaceuticals accounted for 2.5 per cent by volume. These percentages imply that non-generic 
pharmaceuticals were 4.8 times more the price of generic pharmaceuticals. If the no substitution prescriptions were priced 
at the same price as generic then expenditure on off-patent pharmaceuticals experiencing generic competition would 
increase by 5.4 per cent (100 to 105.4); if, on the other hand, these no substitution drugs were priced at the brand level 
then expenditure on off-patent pharmaceuticals would increase by 26 per cent from 100 to 126. Thus expenditure on off-
patent pharmaceuticals with generic competition is raised by 19 per cent because of no substitution prescriptions (i.e. 1 – 
126/105.4). This calculation relies on a number of obvious simplifying assumptions and hence should be regarded as 
indicative rather than definitive. The data is drawn from Redman and Hoggard (2007, pp. 51-52). 74 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
prescriptions account for 5.4 per cent of prescriptions where substitution was 
possible (i.e. off-patent pharmaceuticals with generic competition) and it increased 
expenditure on off-patent pharmaceuticals where generic competition existed by 
close to 20 per cent in Sweden. 
 
If all that is required for a no substitution prescription is a specified code on the 
prescription, then this approach has a number of difficulties. First, it may create 
incentives for either the patient or the pharmacist to add the code, if the process 
used does not prevent them from doing so.
74 It would be much better to require the 
prescriber to complete the specified code and, in his/her own hand, write the words 
'no substitution' across the prescription.
75 Second, there is limited feedback to the 
HSE and/or the body responsible for certifying interchangeability as to why it is 
clinically necessary not to permit substitution. This is important since if there are 
problems with the process then this should be determined sooner rather than later. 
Third, casual empiricism suggests that Irish consumers are brand conscious and 
hence may request prescribers to use no substitution prescriptions in view of the 
low proposed bar to their use.
76 Furthermore, as noted above the incidence of 
generic prescribing in Ireland is low by international standards and appears to have 
declined in the last decade, suggesting that medical practitioners are also brand 
loyal. Fourth, as pointed out by Bloom and Van Reenen (1998), the HSE (i.e. the 
principal) would like medical practitioners (i.e. the agent) to prescribe in a cost-
effective manner by carefully evaluating all prescriptions on the basis of budgetary 
cost versus therapeutic benefit trade-off.
77 However, medical practitioners are "...far 
more likely to be concerned with patient welfare than with ensuring value-conscious 
prescribing" (ibid, p. 323). This will tend to result in too many no substitution 
prescriptions when the bar is set as low as the Working Group's proposals. 
 
In Saskatchewan the policy towards no substitution prescriptions is set out as 
follows:  
It is recognized that extremely rare cases may exist in which a person is 
not able to use a particular brand of product. In such cases, the 
prescriber may request exemption from full payment of incremental 
cost when a specific brand of pharmaceutical in an interchangeable or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
74  The patient would thus escape paying the co-payment (the difference between the reference price and the brand 
dispensed) while the pharmacist could claim for the brand but dispense a generic or dispense the brand if it has a higher 
absolute mark-up than the generic. Such action would probably be in breach of the rules governing reference pricing and 
generic substitution and if enforced appropriately unlikely to occur. But such enforcement nevertheless consumes 
resources which might be better employed elsewhere. 
75  Prescriptions with no substitution printed across the script would be ineligible. 
76  For example, brand name milk and private label milk often exist side by side, despite a substantial difference in price 
although they would clearly be considered interchangeable products.  
77  The text paraphrases Bloom and Van Reenen (1998, p.323) which refers to the National Health System in the UK, but the 
argument applies equally to the HSE.
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maximum allowable cost category is found to be essential for a 
particular patient. There is no provision for "blanket" exemptions. Each 
request must be patient and product specific. 
The request may be submitted in writing or by telephone ... and must 
provide sufficient details to permit thorough, objective assessment. 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Health, 2010b, p. 276.) 
In Ontario similar procedures are in place, including completion of a Canada 
Vigilance Reporting Form designed to detect adverse reactions to pharmaceuticals 
marketed in Canada.




The two Canadian provinces set a much higher bar than the Working Group for the 
use of no substitution prescriptions. It reflects the view that interchangeable 
products are manufactured to the same standards and are considered bioequivalent, 
the same as in the EU. However, at the same time the Saskatchewan and Ontario 
approach meets all of the four criticisms set out above of the permissive approach to 
no substitution prescribing proposed by the Working Group. There is little chance of 
abuse; the HSE and the body certifying interchangeability gets feedback as to the 
reasons for no substitution; the medical practitioner is in a much better position to 
resist requests from patients for the brand to be written as a no substitution 





The form may have to be modified slightly since there may be instances where no-
substitution is warranted but this may not be due to an adverse reaction to the 
pharmaceutical. For example, it may be a swallowing difficulty that requires a 
dispersible tablet or a known hypersensitivity to an excipient, which is likely to be 
very rare.
80   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
78  For details see Ontario, Ministry of Health (2008, p 1.9). 
79  For details see: 
http://www.imb.ie/images/uploaded/documents/Adverse%20Reaction%20Form_HM_May%202011.pdf. Accessed 1 
November 2011. 
80   The experience of New Zealand, discussed in Section 7.3.3, might also be drawn upon. 
Recommendation 4.8: We recommend that for the HSE to reimburse an 
interchangeable pharmaceutical product at a price higher than the reference 
price, the medical practitioner must complete an IMB Adverse Reaction 
Report Form and write, in his/her own handwriting, 'no substitution' across 
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An example can be used to illustrate the impact of no substitution prescriptions 
(Table 4.7). If the brand price is 60 per cent higher than the reference price and no 
substitution prescriptions account for 10 per cent of the market, the HSE 
expenditure would rise by 6 per cent, but if the brand name price was twice the 
reference price, the increase in HSE expenditure would be 10 per cent. 
 
TABLE 4.7  Illustrative Example of the Impact of No Substitution Prescriptions on Pharmaceutical Costs 
 
Share of No. Substitution Prescriptions  Total Expenditure (€) 
(%)  Brand/Reference Price = 1.60  Brand/Reference Price = 2.0 
0  100  100 
10  106  110 
20  112  130 
50  130  150 
 
Source:  See text. 
 
4.5.6  International Non-Proprietary Name Prescriptions 
At the present time if a medical practitioner writes a prescription using the INN,
81 
then the pharmacist decides which pharmaceutical product to dispense to the 
patient. If there is one or more generics available then the pharmacist can either 
dispense one of those or the higher priced brand name. Of course, under the current 
IPHA/HSE agreement and the pricing rules that flow from it there is not a large price 
difference between the ex-factory price of the brand and the generic. That, however, 
is likely to change with the introduction of reference pricing, where it seems unlikely 
that the brand name will lower its price to compete with the generics, especially if 
the rather permissive conditions for no substitution prescriptions set out by the 
Working Group are implemented. Hence it is vital that reference pricing also applies 
to prescriptions written in INN. In other words, only the reference price will be paid. 





   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
81   INN prescribing is discussed further in Section 7.2.2. INN prescribing means that the active ingredient name is used (e.g. 
atorvastatin) rather than the brand or proprietary name (e.g. Lipitor). 
Recommendation 4.9: We recommend that if a prescription is written using the 
international non-proprietary name then the pharmacist is reimbursed at the 
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4.5.7  Patient Adherence to Pharmaceutical Regime 
Pharmaceuticals appear in different sizes, shapes and colours. Pharmaceuticals 
considered interchangeable products may not always be identical in terms of these 
characteristics. Hence an issue arises when generic substitution and reference 
pricing are introduced that the patient's mix of size, colour and shape of 
pharmaceuticals may change solely because a different interchangeable product is 
dispensed. This may be a problem for patients on multi-pharmaceuticals.
82 Problems 
may occur with ensuring patient adherence with their pharmaceutical regimen. 
However, the answer is not to abandon generic substitution and reference pricing, 
but rather ensure that some of the savings generated are used to address this 
problem by the prescriber and the dispenser, where it should be seen as part of a 
wider problem of ensuring patient adherence rather than as a problem in its own 
right. 
 
There are a number of solutions to this potential problem. Generic firms have an 
obvious incentive to make their pharmaceuticals the same colour and shape as the 
brand to gain market share. Indeed, a leading generic supplier informed us that to 
the extent possible that their pharmaceuticals are the same shape and colour as the 
brand name or originator product. In some cases, however the shape may be a 
registered trademark (e.g. Viagra) or the brand name firm may change the shape, 
size or colour of a pharmaceutical as its patent nears expiry (e.g. Lipitor, which will 
shortly become off-patent, is changing the size and shape of its tablets in Ireland).
83 
One of the factors considered in awarding a tender could be the degree and 
seriousness of any confusion due to differences in size and colour. Furthermore, for 
persons on multiple pharmaceuticals monitored dosage systems exist in which the 
pharmaceuticals can be pre-sorted by the time they are supposed to be taken in 
order to encourage compliance.
84 
 
The issue of patient adherence to a pharmaceutical regime is part of the wider issue 
of ensuring that when reference pricing and generic substitution are introduced that 
patients, medical practitioners and pharmacists are aware of the proposed changes 
and the fact that those products which are considered interchangeable can be 
substituted for each other and have the same therapeutic impact. The success of an 
information campaign is essential, especially with respect to patients in that success 
will mean that medical practitioners and pharmacists will need to devote less time to 
explaining generic substitution to patients. The Working Group in its report set out 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
82  The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA) found that one in five adults over the age of 50 years in Ireland take five or 
more medications, with one in two of all over 75s on five or more medications (Barrett et al., 2011; Table 5.A45). 
83   Based on an undated letter from Pfizer Healthcare Ireland to pharmacists titled "Smaller Lipitor Tablets". It is believed that 
the letter was circulated in October 2011. 
84   See, for example, the MyMed system offered by Unicare in Ireland. 
For details see http://www.unicarepharmacy.ie/Care_at_Home/Default.668.html. Accessed 8 November 2011. 78 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
the basis of a communication strategy that serves as a useful point of departure 
(Moran, 2010, p. 19).
85 
 
4.5.8  A Matter of Definition: Same or Similar 
An issue arises as what is meant by an interchangeable product. Traditionally, this 
has been taken to mean that all products with the same active ingredient and the 
same dosage form and strength are considered interchangeable. However, an issue 
arises with respect to where the brand name firm changes the presentation – (e.g. 
from a capsule to a tablet as occurred with respect to Losec (i.e. omeprazole) in 
Ontario,  or a tablet that is slightly different size and shape as in the Lipitor 
illustration above) or formulation (e.g. the use of a different salt in Coversyl).
86 
Should the different presentations/formulations be considered interchangeable? In 
answering this question it should be remembered that what is of interest is that the 
different presentations/formulations  of the same active ingredient should be 
considered equivalent or interchangeable in terms of treating the patient. If an 
unduly narrow interpretation of interchangeability is taken then this is likely to 
create an incentive for the brand name firm to change the presentation and/or 
formulation prior to entry of the generic in order to impede competition. While such 
conduct might be challenged under competition law, it would be preferable to act to 
prevent such conduct from occurring in the first place by not having a narrow 






In Ontario, for example, interchangeability is defined as follows: 
In order for one drug product to be designated as interchangeable with 
another, both drug products must contain a drug or drugs in the same 
amounts of the same or similar active ingredients in the same or similar 
dosage form as the other product. "Similar active ingredients" means 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
85   Another potential problem that occurred in Ontario when generic substitution was first being introduced was the issue of 
legal liability if generic substitution takes place and the patient suffers an adverse reaction. In the case of Ontario the 
liability was assumed by the province. However, this issue has not to date been raised in the discussion on generic 
substitution in Ireland. If a similar concern does arise, however, the same solution as used in Ontario would seem 
appropriate. 
86   See Kubler (2006) and Health Canada (2006). 
Recommendation 4.10:  We recommend that the definition of 
interchangeability should be broad enough to accommodate minor changes 
in formulation (e.g. use of different salts) and presentation (e.g. different 
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different salts, esters, complexes or solvates of the same therapeutic 
moiety.
87 
As noted above decisions concerning interchangeability could be made by a 
Committee on Interchangeable Medicines, as recommended by the Working 
Group,
88 or by the Irish Medicines Board. 
 
4.5.9  Interaction Public/Private 
At the present time the IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements determine the ex-
factory price of pharmaceuticals that are off-patent and which experience generic 
competition. These agreements set the ex-factory price irrespective of whether or 
not the pharmaceutical is paid for by the HSE under the GMS or one of the CDS or 
whether the patient pays for the pharmaceutical because, for example, it is under 
the monthly DP threshold. The proposals in this section concerned with reference 
pricing and generic substitution suggest an alternative mechanism for setting the ex-
factory price for off-patent pharmaceuticals subject to generic competition. There 
should no difficulty in such an arrangement. The prescription written by a medical 
practitioner for a pharmaceutical does not vary by who pays for the pharmaceutical. 
One difference will be payment for no substitution prescriptions: for the GMS and 
CDS, the State pays the difference between the reference price and the brand name 
price, while in the cash sector the patient pays the full price for the brand name 
(once they are below the monthly threshold for the DP Scheme or do not participate 
in any State scheme). 
 
4.6  REFERENCE PRICING FOR DIFFERENT PHARMACEUTICALS: THERAPEUTIC SUBSTITUTION 
The discussion of reference pricing and generic substitution has concentrated on 
interchangeability of pharmaceuticals with the same active ingredient.
89 However, it 
has been argued that substitution should take place at other levels where different 
pharmaceuticals are grouped together to treat the same condition. Frequently, the 
different pharmaceuticals employ a similar mechanism to treat the condition. 
Irrespective of the mechanism the end result is very similar. Sometimes in the 
literature these are referred to as me-too pharmaceuticals, minor improvements 
over existing pharmaceuticals. Thus these pharmaceuticals are close substitutes for 
each other, but at the same time there may be substantial differences in price. 
Hence there may be grounds for applying reference pricing and generic substitution 
to such instances. The two instances most frequently mentioned are statins and 
proton pump inhibitors (PPI). Saskatchewan, for example, will only pay up to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
87   The definition is set out on the website of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care. For details see: 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/drugs/generic.html. Accessed 14 December 2011. 
88   Moran (2010, pp. 9-10). 
89   This is sometimes referred to as ATC Level 5. For details see http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index. Accessed 3 November 
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certain amount per tablet for a group of six proton pump inhibitors (PPIs), details of 
which are provided in Box 4.3. The practice dates back to 2004.
90 In contrast to 
reference pricing and generic substitution discussed in Section 4.5, if such measures 
are extended to therapeutic substitution then this could, in theory, involve setting 
the price for in-patent pharmaceuticals. 
 
BOX 4.3  Saskatchewan's Approach to Reimbursement of  Proton Pump 
  Inhibitors – Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) 
For many common medical conditions, drug manufacturers market a wide variety of 
prescription drugs that often vary in price but achieve the same medical effect. Under 
the MAC policy, the Drug Plan obtains expert advice on which prescription drug 
products within a group of similar medications are safe and beneficial, and the most 
cost-effective. The price of the most cost-effective drugs are used as a guide to set the 
maximum allowable cost the Drug Plan will cover for other similar drugs used to treat 
the same condition. The price is not necessarily set at the lowest cost drug. 
Patients have two options if they are prescribed a drug whose price is above the MAC 
for the group; (1) they can either continue to take the higher priced drug and pay the 
difference in cost over the MAC or, (2) they can talk to their physician about switching to 
a drug that is within the MAC. If the patient wishes to switch medications they will need 
a new prescription from their physician. 
 
If the patient chooses to remain on a higher priced drug, then only the maximum 
allowable cost will go towards their deductible and/or calculation of their co-payment. 
 
The expert drug review committees assess the need for exemptions (and any exemption 
criteria) as they review each possible MAC group. Exemption criteria (where applicable) 
are noted in the chart below for each group. Exemption requests are considered on a 
case-by-case basis. Prescribers or pharmacists may make exemption requests, with 
supporting detailed information, to the Drug Plan via the Exception Drug Status process. 
 
The MAC policy applies equally to all Saskatchewan residents eligible for benefits under 
the Drug Plan and Extended Benefits Branch. 
 
Maximum Allowable Cost Group(s) 
Proton Pump Inhibitors (PPIs) 








Patients who are intolerant or refractory to at least two drugs priced within the 
MAC policy. 
Patients requiring administration of a PPI by nasogastric tube. 
Notes:  These drugs are available under the Exception Drug Status (EDS) program. 
Patients must meet EDS criteria to qualify for coverage. See Appendix A for 
information on EDS criteria for specific PPIs. 
HP-PAC prescriptions are not affected by this policy. 
Please refer to formulary/website for actual prices. 
Source: Saskatchewan Ministry of Health (2011, p. 275). 
 
Once the HSE has the generic substitution and reference pricing in place for 
pharmaceuticals that are the same chemical entity then attention should be paid to 
broader therapeutic substitution where there may also be substantial savings. 
However, as the example in Box 4.3 makes clear careful attention will need to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
90   Consideration might also be given to the STEPS system used in Northern Ireland for cost-effective pharmaceutical 
management. See, for example, Scott et al. (2007). Setting the Ex-Factory Price of Pharmaceuticals | 81 
given to the criteria for exception such that it commands widespread support 
amongst medical practitioners and pharmacists. This suggests that the legislation 
introducing reference pricing and generic substitution should be framed so that it 
can accommodate therapeutic substitution. 
 
4.7  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out proposals for the ex-factory pricing and reimbursement of 
single source in-patent and off-patent pharmaceuticals with generic competition 
which will, we believe, lead to lower prices and better value for money, while at the 
same time ensuring security of supply. In the case of the former, the changes reflect 
the retention of the current administrative pricing arrangements, but important 
changes in price determination. In contrast,  for multisource off-patent 
pharmaceuticals a new approach is proposed: reference pricing and generic 
substitution, with an important role for tendering for high volume interchangeable 
pharmaceutical products. While new to Ireland, this is the norm elsewhere in the 
developed world. In considering all these changes every attempt has been made to 
use market mechanisms and information to set prices. The reforms attempt to 
harness market forces to get better value for money, rather than attempting to 
subvert or ignore them. The Middle Man: The Wholesale Function | 83 
Chapter 5 
 
The Middle Man: The Wholesale Function 
 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The wholesale function is an important component in the pharmaceutical delivery 
system,  helping to ensure  safe and efficient delivery of pharmaceuticals. The 
wholesaler acts as a middle man between the manufacturer and the pharmacy, 
whether the latter is located in a hospital or in the community. In this chapter, we 
first set out the role of the wholesaler (Section 5.2), before attention turns to the 
recent HSE moves to reduce the wholesale mark-up (Section 5.3). An issue that has 
arisen, in part because of these changes, is whether the current wholesale business 
model, which relies on a mark-up over the ex-factory price of a pharmaceutical, is 
sustainable and what alternatives might be more appropriate, issues considered in 
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5.2  THE WHOLESALER'S FUNCTION AND ROLE
1 
The wholesale function in Ireland is largely the responsibility of full-line wholesalers, 
who are authorised and regulated by the Irish Medicines Board (IMB).
2 These firms 
carry an extensive range of pharmaceuticals: approximately 12,500 individual items 
or stock keeping units (SKUs).
3 The wholesalers deliver pharmaceuticals twice daily 
to pharmacies from a small number of distribution depots (i.e. 3 or 4). Pharmacies 
order electronically from wholesalers. There is a short lead time for ordering.
4 The 
three leading full-line  wholesalers, Cahill  May Roberts Group Limited  (CMR);
5 
Uniphar Group plc (Uniphar);
6 and, United Drug plc (United Drug),
7 offer nation-wide 
distribution. In 2008, the three wholesalers accounted for 90 per cent of the 
wholesale market, with United Drug the market leader, accounting for 44 per cent.
8 
The present structure of the wholesaling function emerged after a period of intense 
competition in the mid-1990s.
9 
 
Individual pharmacies, whether in the hospital or the community, are unable to 
stock the variety of pharmaceuticals that a  wholesaler carries. Storage space 
constraints are frequently a consideration. Wastage is also likely to be a factor since 
the pharmacy may not be able to predict demand with great accuracy. The 
wholesaler, by acting for a large number of pharmacies, is better able to manage 
variations in demand. Furthermore, by responding rapidly to pharmacy orders, 
wholesalers reduce the need of pharmacies to carry a large inventory. 
 
Each of the main full-line wholesalers also acts as an agent for individual brand name 
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and so distribute these firms' products to other 
wholesalers. This is referred to as pre-wholesaling. There is a limited degree of 
forward linkage, with CMR owning the Dr Morris/Unicare chain of around 70 retail 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  This discussion is based on Competition Authority (2002), Indecon (2007), the websites of the three leading full-line 
wholesalers and meetings with industry participants. 
2   There are about 150-160 authorised wholesalers, which includes brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers, short-line 
wholesalers, pharmacies and the HSE. In some instances the same organisation has more than one authorisation. For 
example, the HSE has two, the Medicinal Products Division and Shared Services. For details see the IMB website: 
http://www.imb.ie/EN/Medicines/Wholesale-Distribution/Licensing-.aspx. Accessed 19 September 2011. 
3  A SKU is number or code used to identify each unique product or item for sale. A different SKU will be used for each 
pharmaceutical, by supplier, strength, dosage form and so on. 
4  This frequency of deliveries and the use of electronic ordering is not unusual by EU norms. For details see Indecon (2007, 
Table 4.3, p. 38). 
5  Cahill May Roberts is owned by Celesio which has operations in a number of EU Member States, in retail and mail-order 
pharmacy as well as pharmaceutical wholesale operations. For details see Celesio (2010; 2011). 
6  Uniphar also distributes other items besides pharmaceuticals and in 2008 purchased a firm in the UK distributing medical 
and surgical devices to hospitals. Uniphar also purchased Boileau and Boyd Ltd., which operated mainly in the Dublin area. 
Uniphar, through its Independent Pharmacy Ownership Scheme (IPOS), has interests in retail pharmacy in Ireland. For 
details see Uniphar (2009). 
7  United Drug has interests in a wide array of health-care and pharmaceutical activities. In 2010, 60 per cent of its profits 
were generated outside Ireland. For details see United Drug (2011). 
8  The 90 per cent figure is from Dorgan (2008, p. 12), while Macarthur (2007, p. 57) also cites the 90 per cent figure as well as 
individual market shares: Uniphar, 30 per cent and CMR, 20 per cent. 
9  Based on two High Court judgments discussed later in the chapter. The Middle Man: The Wholesale Function | 85 
pharmacies and Uniphar assisting young pharmacists purchase pharmacies through 
its Independent Pharmacy Ownership Scheme (IPOS).
10 We understand that United 
Drug has no involvement in the ownership of pharmacies. 
 
Pharmacies typically use two full-line wholesalers: a primary wholesaler that supplies 
most of the pharmacy's needs and a second wholesaler if there are supply problems 
with the primary wholesaler. Wholesalers thus compete to be the primary 
wholesaler for the pharmacist's business. Competition takes place on both quality 
and price dimensions. First, wholesalers compete on the quality of service, in terms 
of the range of pharmaceuticals stocked, the frequency of delivery and response 
time, where it appears that the wholesalers are quite similar. Second, they may offer 
competitive discounts and rebates.
11 Some of these rebates are related to cost-
savings, e.g. in return for ordering electronically or paying bills within a certain 
period time. In other instances, the rebates are essentially price cutting to secure 
and retain business from the pharmacy. 
 
If there is vigorous competition between the wholesalers for the business of 
pharmacies, which are able to play one wholesaler off against the other, then the 
wholesalers should earn normal rates of return and any rents that might exist in the 
distribution chain would accrue to the pharmacist.
12 Of course, it is perfectly possible 
that although the rents accrue to the pharmacist that this does not necessarily result 
in high returns to community pharmacy, since without controls on entry, additional 
pharmacies will be attracted into the market by the high returns.
13 It is an issue we 
will return to in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2.1  Alternative Wholesaling Models 
Although the discussion  has centred on full-line  wholesalers,  the traditional 
pharmaceutical distribution model, mention also needs to be made of short-line 
wholesalers. Instead of carrying an inventory of 12,500 SKUs the short-line 
wholesaler's inventory is much lower, perhaps in the 100s, normally with much less 
frequency of delivery than the full-line wholesalers. In a number of instances short-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
10   In 2004, Uniphar estimated that between 0 and 20 per cent of its sales were to IPOS-linked pharmacies, which were under 
no contractual obligation to source with Uniphar (Competition Authority, 2004, para. 1.9). For details of the IPOS scheme 
see ibid, para. 1.6 and 1.7. The IPOS scheme has recently caused considerable financial difficulties for Uniphar. For details 
see discussion in Section 5.4.1. 
11   The terms rebate and discount are used interchangeably to indicate a reduction in price conditional on meeting some 
requirement, such as a minimum level of sales.  
12   A rent is a payment for a good or service greater than is necessary to pay for the factors of production (e.g. land, labour and 
capital) required to supply and sustain the good or service. For example, a famous football player might be paid €100,000 a 
week, but would be prepared to supply his services for €20,000 a week (his next best alternative), the difference, €80,000, 
is rent. 
13  To the extent that entry lowers the returns, pharmacies will be observed earning a normal rate of return. However, at the 
same time entry will have been excessive compared to a situation where such high returns did not exist. 86 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
line wholesalers supply parallel imports and thus are in a position to undercut the 
full-line  wholesalers who are more likely to source from the brand name 
manufacturer, particularly in view of their pre-wholesaling agreements. However, 
this situation has changed. In 2011 the three full-line wholesalers either distribute 
parallel imports or anticipate doing so in the near future.
14 
 
Another model of wholesale distribution that has gained a limited foothold is Direct 
to Pharmacy (DTP).
15 Under this model the brand name manufacturer uses a 
Logistics Service Provider (LSP), which may be a full-line wholesaler, to distribute its 
products.
16 The LSP does not take title to the pharmaceuticals since the brand name 
manufacturer deals directly with the pharmacist. The manufacturer sets the price 
and other terms of supply (e.g. frequency of delivery) to the pharmacist and pays the 
LSP  a fee for distribution to standards set by the manufacturer.  Instead of 
wholesalers competing for pharmacy business, under the traditional  full-line 
distribution model, wholesalers have to compete, with other LSPs, for the business 
of the brand name manufacturer. Until the summer of 2011, DTP was used to only a 
limited degree, often for only selected pharmaceutical products of a supplier. 
However, subsequently Novartis Ireland, Janssen Pharmaceuticals and Acetelion 
have moved to DTP for products under the High Tech Drug Scheme.
17 
 
5.3  REDUCING THE WHOLESALE MARGIN FOR GMS AND COMMUNITY DRUG SCHEMES 
Since wholesalers are remunerated indirectly, via pharmacy payments, there is no 
direct pricing agreement between the HSE and wholesalers, either individually or 
through the full-line wholesaler's trade association, the Pharmaceutical Distributors 
Federation (PDF).
18 This contrasts with the HSE agreements with manufacturers and 
pharmacists, discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, respectively. The absence of a separate 
PDF/HSE agreement in part reflected the fact that there was a 17.66 per cent 
wholesale mark-up built into the reimbursement price paid to the pharmacy by the 
HSE under the GMS and CDS;
19 and, in part, by the fact that when the HSE decided to 
consider the issue of the wholesale margin in 2005-2006, legal advice suggested that 
negotiations with the PDF were inconsistent with the Competition Act 2002.
20 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
14  This is not unusual for wholesalers in other Member States. See Macarthur (2007, p. 127) for details. 
15  This model is described in greater detail in Office of Fair Trading (2007) and Macarthur (2007). The ex-factory price is the 
same irrespective of the distribution model. It is that set in accordance with the IPHA/HSE and APMI/HSE agreements 
discussed in Chapter 4. Equally the price that the pharmacist is reimbursed is the same irrespective of the distribution 
method. 
16  The brand name manufacturer could decide to perform the wholesaling function itself or contract to a logistic firm such as 
DHL or UPS. 
17   Based on discussion with market participants. 
18  The three full-line wholesalers are the only members of the PDF. 
19  This mark-up has been expressed in a couple of ways. It is 17.66 per cent of the ex-factory price or 15 per cent of the ex-
wholesale price. Thus if the ex-factory price is €85.00, the 17.66 per cent wholesale margin results in an ex-wholesale price 
of €100. Thus the wholesale margin is €15 or 15 per cent of the ex-wholesale price. 
20  For further discussion on the latter issue see HSE (2007). The Middle Man: The Wholesale Function | 87 
 
In order to establish an appropriate benchmark mark-up for wholesalers, the HSE 
commissioned research to assist in setting "...a fair price for the service provided" 
(Indecon, 2007, p.i). The research established that the wholesaler's mark-up in 
Ireland was twice that of selected European countries (Indecon, 2007, Table 4.1, p. 
35). Bar one country, the UK, none had a wholesale mark-up above 10 per cent. The 
research concluded that the wholesale mark-up was in fact divided 50:50 between 
the wholesaler and the pharmacist (HSE, 2007).
21 The mechanism that facilitated the 
division was the common practice of wholesalers offering rebates and discounts off 
the wholesale price to the pharmacy.
22 It is, in effect, price competition. It reflects 
the fact that there is competition between the wholesalers for pharmacy business. 
Without such competition – if there was, for example, only one wholesaler and entry 
barriers into wholesaling were high – then there would be no rebates and discounts 
– apart from those related to efficiencies in purchasing – and the wholesale mark-up 
would accrue almost entirely to the wholesaler and not be shared with the 
pharmacy. 
 
The HSE decided to reduce the wholesale mark-up; in other words, squeeze the 
rents out of the distribution system. On 17 September 2007, after a consultation 
period and drawing on Indecon (2007), the HSE decided to unilaterally reduce the 
wholesale mark-up.
23 It was announced that the GMS and CDS wholesale mark-up 
would be reduced from 17.66 per cent of the ex-factory price to 8 per cent from 1 
December 2007 and to 7 per cent from 1 December 2008.
24 Thus the wholesale 
mark-up was reduced by lowering the reimbursement price paid to pharmacies by 
the HSE; the reduction was thus captured by the HSE. However, there is many a slip 
between the cup and the lip, as implementing the policy demonstrated. 
 
Although the first stage of the reduction was to come into effect from 1 December 
2007, the HSE delayed its implementation until 1 March 2008. A case was taken by 
Hickey Pharmacies, a chain of 26 pharmacies, against the HSE claiming the HSE were 
in breach of its pharmacy contract by unilaterally reducing the wholesale mark-up, 
without consultation. The High Court ruled in favour of Hickey Pharmacies and the 
wholesale mark-up of 17.66 per cent was reinstated by the HSE in October 2008.
25 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
21  The division is redacted from the published Indecon (2007, p. ii) report, but appears in the HSE (2007) press release. 
22  Discounting appears to have started in the late 1970s, having become relatively widespread in the 1980s and well 
established and quite significant by the early 1990s. In the case of the Hickey Pharmacy Group, consisting of 26 pharmacies, 
the discount from its primary wholesaler was 11-12 per cent. For details see Hickey & Ors trading as Hickeys Pharmacy v 
The Health Service Executive [2008] IEHC 290. This High Court judgment will be referred to as Hickey v Health Service 
Executive. 
23  This process is described in some detail in Hickey v Health Service Executive. 
24  This was announced in a letter to pharmacies from the HSE dated 17 September 2007. The letter is reproduced in Hickey v 
Health Service Executive. 
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The ruling by the High Court on 11 September 2008 centred on clause 12(1) of the 
Community Pharmacy Contractor Agreement for the Provision of Community 
Pharmacy Services under the Health Act 1970 (the 1996 CPC Agreement), which in 
turn was based on a 1971 Memorandum of Agreement between the Minister for 
Health and Children and the Irish Pharmaceutical Union (IPU).
26 The judgment said 
that under clause 12(1) the pharmacists were contractually entitled to receive 
payments at a rate, or rates, unilaterally determined by the Minister (not the HSE) by 
approval or direction, following consultation. However, there had not been the 
required consultation. The judgment pointed out that it was not concerned with the 
merits of the case, only whether the 1996 CPC Agreement had been adhered to by 
the Minister for Health and Children. 
 
The Minister did, however, subsequently reduce the wholesale mark-up: from 1 July 
2009 from 17.66 per cent to 10 per cent;
27 with a further reduction to 8 per cent in 
June  2011.
28  The reductions took place under the provisions of the Financial 
Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2009  (FEMPI). The legislation 
reflected severe economic crisis and the need to take a range of measures. These 
included, under Section 9 (1), the power to the Minister for Health and Children, 
after consultation, and with the consent of the Minister for Finance, to "...by 
regulation, reduce … the amount of payment to be made to health professionals… ." 
As with the earlier attempt to reduce the wholesale margin there was a High Court 
challenge by pharmacists, but this time it was unsuccessful.
29 It was argued, on 
behalf of the pharmacists,  that under FEMPI, and the consequent statutory 
instruments, the consultation was not meaningful, the swingeing reductions were 
never intended under the legislation, and, that the reductions amounted to an 
interference with the pharmacists'  property rights and were arbitrary and/or 
capricious. The High Court judgment vindicated the legislation and the statutory 
instruments containing the reductions.
30 
 
In sum, the Minister and the HSE have reduced the wholesale mark-up and thus 
squeezed, albeit not easily, rents out of the distribution chain and obtained better 
value for money, without compromising security of supply.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
26  The IPU and the Department of Health and Children negotiated the CPC Agreement and its predecessors. Using this 
template, individual pharmacies then entered into contractual agreements with the Health Boards and their successor, the 
HSE. See also Chapter 6. Note that the IPU subsequently changed its name to the Irish Pharmacy Union. 
27  The wholesale mark-up remained at 17.66 per cent for controlled drugs and fridge items. The change was effected through 
a S. I. No. 246 of 2009, Health Professionals (Reductions of Payments to Community Pharmacy Contractors) Regulations 
2009. See Table 2.3. 
28  The wholesale mark-up for controlled drugs was reduced from 17.66 to 8 per cent, while it fell to 12 per cent for fridge 
items. This change was effected through S. I. No. 300 of 2011, Health Professionals (Reductions of Payments to Community 
Pharmacy Contractors) Regulations 2011. See Table 2.3. 
29  In contrast to the earlier unsuccessful attempt to reduce wholesale margins, there were some offsetting policy changes 
such as adjusting the dispensing fee. These are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
30  See J & J Haire & Company Ltd & Ors v Minister for Health and Children & Ors [2009] IEHC 562. This will be referred to as 
Haire v MfH&C. The language in the previous sentence in the text closely follows the wording of the judgment. The Middle Man: The Wholesale Function | 89 
5.4  IS THE CURRENT WHOLESALE BUSINESS MODEL BROKEN? 
Business models can change for a variety of reasons. The underlying economic and 
technological conditions can change rendering the old model redundant. The 
internet, for example, revolutionised the way in which airline reservations are made 
and boarding passes are issued. Equally, irrespective of changing technology, an 
entrepreneur may come up with a better model, such as just in time production for 
assembling automobiles which avoids the necessity of holding large stocks of spare 
parts and to a lesser extent to be vertically integrated. In the case of pharmaceutical 
wholesaling, it could be argued that recent and prospective changes in economic 
conditions result in the need to reconsider the current model. Independently, new 
models are emerging elsewhere. In some instances such as DTP these are the result 




In this section we first examine recent changes that have affected the economics of 
the full-line wholesale business. These include the various moves by the HSE to 
reduce pharmaceutical prices and mark-ups that have already been discussed 
earlier, the growth in demand for pharmaceuticals, bad debt provision and cherry 
picking by parallel importers and brand name manufacturers. In order to address the 
impact of some of these changes in more detail we undertook a survey of the three 
full-line wholesalers, and this is the subject of the second part of the section. 
 
5.4.1  Economic Conditions, Government Policy, Bad Debt and Cherry Picking 
The current wholesale business model relies on a percentage mark-up over the ex-
factory price in order to generate enough revenue for wholesalers to cover their 
costs and make at least a normal rate of return. There seems to be an acceptance 
that the wholesalers compete vigorously with each other (e.g.  Competition 
Authority, 2004; Indecon, 2007), so that costs are unlikely to be excessive because of 
lack of competition. However, there are a number of policy and other changes that 
may have an impact on the viability of the model. 
 
First, the IPHA/HSE agreements resulted in a series of ex-factory price reductions 
dating from 2006 for single source in-patent pharmaceuticals and multiple source 
off-patent pharmaceuticals, while reference pricing and generic substitution will be 
introduced in 2012. These reductions in price will mean that the ex-factory price, on 
which the wholesale mark-up is based, will fall, reducing, other things being equal, 
the income of wholesalers. However, while it is the case that the ex-factory price is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
31  In the UK, for example, there has been a move to Direct to Pharmacy models by manufacturers. See Office of Fair Trading 
(2007) for a discussion. The representative body for the full-line wholesalers, the PDF, has argued for the introduction of a 
Public Service Obligation (PSO) under which all wholesalers would be required to carry the full range of pharmaceuticals 
(Uniphar, 2010, p. 6). The IPU (2011b) also favours a PSO. This is discussed further later in the chapter. 90 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
lower than it otherwise would be on these pharmaceuticals, it may nevertheless be 
the case that the overall value of pharmaceutical expenditures increases. Hence, 
while the absolute amount earned on an individual item may have been lower than 
it otherwise would be, this may be more than offset by the growing volume of 
pharmaceuticals. Hence, if the mark-up is based on overall sales, then wholesaler 
revenue may well  increase, albeit at a slower rate  than if prices remained 
unchanged. 
 
The overall growth in demand, measured in volume and value, for pharmaceuticals 
in Ireland was considerable between 2000-2010, as shown in Chapter 2. The growth 
in pharmaceutical demand in Ireland, measured on a per capita basis, was also high 
by EU
32 and OECD
33 standards in the 2000s. Overall pharmaceutical expenditure in 
Ireland still increased after 2006, although there has been some moderation in 
growth in expenditure and even a small decline in 2009/2010.
34 In terms of future 
growth, Bennett et al. (2009, p. 97) forecast for the GMS and CDS that the number of 
prescriptions will, other things being equal, increase from 54 million in 2006 to 
approximately 75-100 million in 2020, with the estimated total pharmaceutical cost 
increasing 1.4 to 2 fold – from €1.1 billion in 2006 to €1.5-2.3 billion by 2020.
35  
 
The projections of Bennett et al. (2009) do not take into account the impact of the 
recession on the demand for pharmaceuticals, the price reductions under the 
IPHA/HSE agreement, or the possible impact of generic substitution and reference 
pricing (the latter two were discussed in Chapter 4). As noted above, despite the 
IPHA/HSE agreement overall pharmaceutical expenditure continued to increase post 
2006 no doubt reflecting the key drivers of population growth and ageing, as well as 
rising expectations, although there has been a moderation in expenditure growth. 
Some of the recent moderation in pharmaceutical expenditure growth is 
undoubtedly due to the measures taken by the State and some by the decline in 
demand due to the recession. Looking ahead the economy will eventually recover 
from the current recession. However, there will likely continue to be downward 
pressure on pharmaceutical prices, especially if the recommendations in this report 
are implemented. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
32   Kanavos et al. (2011, Figure 1, p. 11) measured over the period 2000-2008. 
33   Borowitz, et al. (2011, Figure 15, p. 48) measured over the period 2000-2009. 
34   However, the volume of pharmaceuticals continued to rise in 2009 and 2010. This picture is consistent with the record of 
growth of the full-line wholesalers as presented in Section 5.4.2, while Figure 2.1 details the annual growth on the GMS and 
CDS. 
35   In 2010, PCRS expenditure on pharmaceuticals and payments to community pharmacists had reached €1.9 billion (Chapter 
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Nevertheless, the overall trends outlined above may not be replicated with respect 
to full-line wholesalers.
36 Under certain assumptions – two-thirds of products on the 
High Tech Drugs Scheme move to a DTP model, that within twelve months of an in-
patent pharmaceutical coming off-patent a generic competitor(s) enters the market 
and prices drop by 60 per cent and that overall volume grows by 3 per cent per year 
– the PDF estimate that the sales of full-line wholesalers will decline, perhaps 
substantially.  However, before these forecasts are accepted the accuracy and 
veracity of these important assumptions would need to be established. 
 
Second, under the GMS and CDS, the price paid to the pharmacy contained an 
implicit wholesale mark-up. This mark-up was reduced by the HSE on the grounds 
that it was much higher than in other EU Member States and that much of it accrued 
to pharmacists through wholesalers discounting to attract and retain pharmacy 
business. In other words, the rents – measured by the reduction in the wholesale 
mark-up - were captured by the pharmacist not the wholesaler, as evidenced by the 
widespread protests by pharmacists when the mark-up was reduced. Hence this 
change should have had little or no net effect on the full-line wholesale model. 
 
Third, it is likely that wholesalers are adversely affected by bad debt from the 
pharmacy sector. This reflects two separate but related issues. First, the various 
supply side measures taken by the HSE in the recent past aimed at reducing the 
wholesale mark-up are likely to have placed at least some pharmacy businesses 
under financial stress, especially if they had purchased pharmacy premises at 
inflated prices.
37 This, combined with the severity of the recession, may have knock-
on effects on their ability to pay wholesalers. Second, to the extent that wholesalers 
are involved in pharmacy operations either directly through ownership or via 
assisting pharmacists purchasing pharmacies, then it is likely that wholesalers will be 
experiencing financial difficulties. Uniphar, with its IPOS scheme for assisting young 
pharmacists to purchase pharmacies, has had to take significant impairment charges: 
in 2008 these amounted to €97 million (Uniphar, 2009, p. 5). Celesio, the owner of 
CMR and the Unicare/DocMorris pharmacy chain, recorded a fall in revenue from its 
Irish pharmacy business of 6.3 per cent in 2010 compared to 2009 (Celesio, 2011, p. 
70). United Drug has no direct ownership interest in retail pharmacy.
38 
 
The impact of bad debt due to the recession and HSE policy changes has varied by 
wholesaler. Nevertheless, these difficulties reflect business decisions taken by these 
wholesalers and it is not at all clear that it has any implications for the wholesalers' 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
36   This paragraph is based on unpublished estimates by the PDF. 
37  However, as we shall see in Chapter 6, community pharmacy numbers increased through the recession, albeit at a declining 
rate, while the exit rate has remained more or less constant.  
38   However, United Drug has provided "...significant guarantees … to retail pharmacists to assist in start-up costs" (HSE, 2007). 92 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
business model, as opposed to individual wholesalers. Furthermore,  to a 
considerable extent these bad debts reflect cyclical factors such as the property 
bubble bursting and weakness in retail demand and thus do not provide a sound 
justification for revising the current business model.
39 Finally, businesses in many 
sectors of the economy are contending with high levels of bad debts at the current 
time, so it is difficult to justify why pharmaceutical wholesalers should be singled out 
for special treatment. 
 
Fourth, there may be cherry picking by short-line wholesalers that distribute parallel 
imports, with which the full-line wholesalers have difficulty competing. The parallel 
importer is able to import the in-patent single source pharmaceutical from another 
Member State and offer discounts and rebates that the full-line wholesaler cannot 
meet unless the brand name manufacturer drops its price to the wholesaler. These 
parallel imports are likely to compete with the more recently introduced higher 
priced pharmaceuticals where the wholesalers' percentage mark-up provides a 
valuable source of revenue. The wholesalers identify parallel imports as a source of 
competition and revenue loss (United Drug, 2011, p. 6; Uniphar, 2009, p. 15; 2010, p. 
12; 2011, p. 12). Although full-line wholesalers have traditionally not distributed 
parallel imports, no doubt reflecting their pre-wholesaling agreements with the 
brand name manufacturers, in 2011  the  three  full-line  wholesalers started or 
expected to start the distribution of parallel imports. 
 
Fifth, there may be cherry picking by brand name manufacturers through DTP. Such a 
model is applied in the UK and since many of the same brand name manufacturers 
operate in both jurisdictions then the model may become more widely used in 
Ireland.
40 However, one of the reasons it is used in the UK – apart from claims of 
increased efficiency – is the desire by the brand name manufacturers to capture the 
discounts received by pharmacists from wholesalers.
41 Given the recent reduction in 
the wholesale margin by the HSE, this is much less likely to be the case in Ireland. 
Nevertheless, if the DTP model became widespread then there may be a danger that 
this could lead to a fall in the quality of service standards to pharmacies (e.g. less 
frequent deliveries) which might affect the standard of patient care provided by the 
pharmacist.
42 However, the penetration of the DTP model has been very limited to 
date in Ireland and we do not have any evidence that it has led to a decline in service 
quality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
39  In the case of the bursting of the property bubble there is also likely to be a structural element as well. 
40  For a discussion of the DTP model in the UK see Office of Fair Trading (2007) and more generally Macarthur (2007). 
41  As noted above in the sample of countries used by Indecon (2007) the only country with a wholesale mark-up over 10 per 
cent, apart from Ireland, was the UK. 
42  This is argued in an Office of Fair Trading (2007) report on wholesale pharmaceutical distribution in the UK. The Middle Man: The Wholesale Function | 93 
In sum, it is not clear that the reduction in the wholesale mark-up or possible 
reduction in pharmaceutical expenditure has any implications for the viability of the 
full-line wholesale model. In the latter case, for example, this may result in a decline 
in the number of full-line wholesalers, rather than an abandonment of the model. 
Although competition would not be as strong with two full-line wholesalers as three, 
pharmacists would still be able to play one off against the other. Impairment 
changes may threaten some wholesalers more than others, but it is not at all clear 
that it threatens the full-line wholesaler model as such. However, this is not the case 
with respect to cherry picking implied by parallel imports or DTP. On the first issue, 
full-line wholesalers are either selling or expect to sell parallel imports, while DTP is 
in its infancy. Nevertheless, we will return to the latter issue in the conclusions to the 
chapter. 
 
5.4.2  Full-Line Wholesaler Survey 
In order to gain a better understanding of the position of the three  full-line 
wholesalers, we undertook a survey in relation to sales, measured both in value and 
volume, as well as a measure of the major costs of the three full-line wholesalers.
43 
The survey was confined to the prescription pharmaceutical business and operations 
in Ireland and covered the period 2005 to 2010 with a forecast for 2011. Details for 
hospital and community pharmacy operations were broken out separately for some 
purposes. Since the wholesaling market is competitive, it was of course necessary for 
each wholesaler to respond to the survey separately. In presenting the survey results 
the data are aggregated in such a way that individual wholesalers cannot  be 
identified. 
 
All three full-line wholesalers stock a large number of pharmaceuticals, when 
measured by the number of SKUs – around the 12,500 figure referred to above. The 
volume of sales of the three full-line wholesalers, taken together, measured in terms 
of SKUs, increased year on year, over the period 2005 to 2011 (Figure 5.1). The only 
exception was a decline in 2010 with a strong recovery in 2011 to exceed the 2009 
sales volume. A similar pattern up to 2010 is repeated for sales measured in value, 
whether measured in real or nominal terms (Figure 5.1), but the sales do not recover 
their previous highs.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
43  Annexe D contains a copy of the covering letter and the survey itself. 94 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 




Notes:  Volume measured by number of SKUs. 
Total sales includes both hospital and community sales. 
Source:  Full-line Wholesaler Survey. 
 
The pattern of sales by value and volume reflects a number of factors. First, the 
volume and value decline reflect the market penetration of parallel imports which 
took market share from the full-line wholesalers. One way of testing for this is the 
pattern of sales in the hospital and community pharmacy sector, since parallel 
imports are more likely to penetrate the community than the hospital sector.
44 The 
data in Figure 5.2, which presents trends in the volume of SKUs by each sector, is 
consistent with this view. There is no decline in the volume of sales in the hospital 
market for 2010 except for a small decline forecast for 2011, but there is in the 
community sector, although recovery in community sales is forecast for 2011. In part 
the change in 2011 might be that the hospital sector is shifting some of the GMS and 
CDS expenditure to the community sector. In other words, but for this change 
hospital sales of the full-line  wholesalers would continue to have risen while 
community sales levelled off. 
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FIGURE 5.2  Full-Line Wholesalers, Community and Hospital Sales, Volume, Ireland, 2005-2011 
 
 
Note:  Volume measured by number of SKUs 
Source:  Full-Line Wholesaler Survey 
 
A second way of determining the influence of parallel imports is to add parallel 
imports to the sales of full-line wholesalers. The data is available for 2006 to 2011 
but for community sales only. Parallel imports rose from €50 million in 2006 to peak 
at €250 million in 2010, before being expected to decline in 2011 to €220 million.
45 
The results are presented in Figure 5.3. This shows sales levelling off in nominal and 
real terms in 2010, and falling into 2011. 
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FIGURE 5.3  Community Pharmaceutical Sales, Full-Line Wholesalers and Parallel Imports, Ireland, 2006-2011 
 
 
Source:  Full-line Wholesaler Survey and information provided by the PDF. 
 
The  full-line  wholesaler survey also asked questions on the structure of the 
wholesaling distribution function. While aggregating volume and value of sales 
across the three full-line wholesalers is comparing like with like, the same does not 
necessarily apply to the breakdown of costs, since not all of the three full-line 
wholesalers used comparable breakdown of costs of wholesaling and distribution. 
Nevertheless, for all three full-line wholesalers wages and salaries formed by far the 
largest component of costs. 
 
As noted above, cherry picking by parallel imports and DTP sales may have raised 
questions concerning the viability of the full-line wholesaler model.  However, 
whether revenue covers costs reflects other factors such as the recession, the 
efficiency of the wholesalers, and prescribing practices of medical practitioners. 
Isolating the impact of any one influence is likely to be a difficult exercise. Hence 
these caveats need to be borne in mind in interpreting cost and revenue data. 
 
In order to see whether the full-line wholesalers are covering their costs, we took 
the net revenue, or income earned, by the full-line wholesalers, and then subtracted 
from it the costs of distribution. It is assumed that wholesalers make a mark-up of 8 
per cent on community sales and zero on hospital sales. The assumption concerning 
the wholesale margin reflects the discussion above on the reduction of the 
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on hospital sales.
46 All costs are totalled, except bad debts.
47 For the purposes of this 
illustration, the costs have been accepted at face value and we have not audited 
them. The difference between income and cost is the return to the wholesaler. In 
each year between 2005 and 2011, wholesalers, as a group, cover their costs. If 
income is expressed as a percentage of total sales (i.e. community and hospital), the 
data show the resulting price-cost margin increased steadily from 2005 to 2007, 
before declining subsequently. Hence like other sectors of the Irish economy 
pharmaceutical wholesalers have experienced falling returns, but as a group, 
continue to cover their costs. 
 
5.5  ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
It is not at all clear that the current full-line wholesale or traditional model is broken. 
Nevertheless, apart from general macroeconomic conditions which are affecting all 
business sectors, there are threats to the model, the largest of which appears to be 
cherry picking either due parallel imports or, perhaps in the future, DTP. Alternative 
models have been proposed to address these concerns: 
•  Public Service Obligation model under which all wholesalers, irrespective of 
whether they are full or short-line, would be required to adhere to the same 
standards of service, including distributing all 12,500 SKUs.  Brand name 
manufacturers would still be able to use the DTP model, but would be required 
to supply their entire range of SKUs to wholesalers; and/or 
•  Instead of a mark-up  over the ex-factory  price, wholesalers would be 
reimbursed for their wholesaling service provision through a fee per SKU or a 
deregressive mark-up (i.e. the mark-up varies inversely with the ex-factory 
price). There has been a trend towards such pricing models in the EU.
48 
 
5.5.1  Cherry Picking: Why a Problem? 
Cherry picking can only pose a threat to the stability of the current model if cross-
subsidies from high profitability products to low profitability ones are essential to 
sustain full-line supply. In other words, the threat must involve a loss of sales of high 
profitability items so great that profits from the sales of the remaining items become 
negative. Whether this is so depends upon two factors: the relative importance of 
revenues from items vulnerable to competition; and, the relative costs of supplying 
these classes of items. If it is a material threat, regulatory responses may address the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
46   If the total sales of the three full-line wholesalers to community pharmacies are TPHS, then wholesaler revenue is: 
(TPHSx0.85) x (0.08). TPHS includes the 17.66 per cent wholesaler mark-up, since the reduction in wholesale margins 
discussed in Section 5.3 affected the reimbursement price paid to pharmacies, not the wholesale price to the pharmacy. 
47  The costs of wholesaling distribution are those listed in the full-line wholesaler survey in Appendix D. 
48   At the present time six Member States use the wholesale mark up model (including Ireland), 11 employ a deregressive mark 
up, two use a mixture of a fixed fee and a mark-up and seven use a fee for service model. Based on a personal 
communication, European Association of Pharmaceutical Full-Line Wholesalers, 3 October 2011. 98 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
revenue or cost sides of the market. However, as discussed above it is not at all clear 
that recent economic, institutional and other changes have made the current model 
untenable. 
 
5.5.2  Revenue-Side Solutions: A PSO 
One revenue-side response might be to impose a Public Service Obligation (PSO) on 
all wholesalers whereby they would all be required to carry the full 12,500 items that 
the full-line wholesalers carry. However, the introduction of the PSO would likely 
have adverse effects on competition and the development of new models of 
distribution. 
 
A PSO would dampen competition between the full-line and short-line wholesalers. 
The latter would be required to invest in facilities similar to full-line wholesalers, 
which given the uncertainty surrounding parallel imports price advantage on a 
medium to longer term basis and the fact that there are already three full-line 
wholesalers, is likely to mean that parallel importers would exit the market.
49 While 
full-line wholesalers are beginning to respond to the threat of parallel imports by 
distributing these pharmaceuticals, given their pre-wholesaling agreements 
combined with the PSO, they may discontinue distribution of parallel imports. This is 
likely to eliminate the possibility of the HSE taking advantage of parallel imports to 
secure better value for money, but also adversely affect trade between Member 
States and thus may breach EU law on free movement of goods. 
 
A PSO that compelled brand name manufacturers to supply all their products to full-
line wholesalers is likely to reduce the attractiveness of the DTP model. If the DTP 
model is designed to give the brand name manufacturer greater control over the 
distribution of their product portfolio and realise efficiencies through selecting one 
or more LSPs, then having to supply all wholesalers removes the rationale for DTP. 
Hence a PSO requirement is likely to reduce the attractiveness of the DTP model as 
well as stifle the development of alternative distribution models. 
 
Even if a PSO-type mechanism were considered desirable, regulators in others 
sectors such as air transport and electronic communications have recently 
developed PSO models that are more efficient than a blanket requirement on all 
suppliers. The option used to ensure that broadband connections are available in 
rural areas (the National Broadband Scheme) and (until recently) to provide for 
regional air connections is to tender for the minimum subsidy required for a single 
firm to provide the unprofitable element of coverage. After all, the logic of a PSO is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
49   This point is reinforced by the observation of excess capacity in the full-line wholesalers distribution depots (Competition 
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that someone should provide universal coverage, not necessarily that everyone 
should do so. 
 
A variant of the PSO is a duty on all pharmaceutical firms to supply, subject to usual 
and customary conditions, the full range of products to full-line wholesalers. 
However, this seems to be similar to the PSO, although not exactly the same. The 
duty to supply would remove the advantage of the DTP model for the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. However, the duty to supply would not have the 
other unattractive features discussed above. Nevertheless, it would interfere with 
the choice of distribution models that pharmaceutical manufacturers could select. 
 
In sum, the evidence does not suggest that introducing a PSO requirement that 
requires all wholesalers to replicate the product offering of the full-line wholesalers 
is merited as a way of preventing cherry picking. Full-line wholesalers are currently 
distributing, or expect to market, parallel imports to pharmacies, while the DTP has 
limited market penetration. A PSO which would restrict competition and discourage 
new forms of wholesale distribution is a disproportionate response. The duty to 
supply, while not so onerous would,  nevertheless limit the options of the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. 
 
5.5.3  Cost Side Solutions: Fee Per Pack 
A possible cost side response would be a fee per SKU method of pricing, so as to gear 
the compensation for carrying each type of item more closely to the cost of doing so, 
thereby removing the need for cross-subsidies. However, the case for doing this 
rests more on what is economically efficient than on the unsustainability of the 
overall model. A fixed fee reflects the fact that the cost of distributing one SKU 
differs little from another, apart from obvious differences such as whether or not 
cold storage is used. Agency distribution models, such as DTP, often charge a fixed 
fee per item distributed. Furthermore, in the mark-up model there is a danger that 
for certain low cost items that the mark-up may be insufficient to cover the cost of 
distribution. Hence there is a danger that efficiency and security of supply may be 
undermined. 
 
However, it could be argued that it is inappropriate to consider each item on its own. 
The wholesaler provides a full service to the pharmacist and considers the overall 
revenue situation. It is vital from a competitive point of view for a full-line 
wholesaler to be able to provide such a service. Furthermore, it is important to make 
the distinction between the average and marginal cost. While the mark-up on some 
low cost items may not be sufficient to cover the average wholesale cost, it may 
nevertheless be the case that the marginal costs are covered. In other words, the 100 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
full-line wholesaler obtains a large portion of its revenue from a small number of 
SKUs – the high selling in-patent pharmaceuticals – which more than cover the costs 
and there is a tail of lower cost SKUs which given the fixed costs already incurred for 
the high volume, have a low marginal cost of distribution. Thus, it is not at all clear 
that a wholesale model which relies on an average fee per SKU is superior to the 
current mark-up model. 
 
In sum, it does not appear that there is a compelling case that recent events have 
provided sufficient grounds for revising the business model of wholesalers. 
Furthermore, at least some of the wholesalers' statements suggest that they can 
cope with the current situation. For example, United Drug (2011, p. 6) state that 
"[W]hilst it is likely that austerity measures will continue in the current economic 
climate, United Drug has proven that it is in a strong position competitively to deal 
with these measures and can continue to grow revenue and market share." Celesio 
(2011, p. 76) continues to invest in CMR. 
 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that there is an inconsistency between the 
recommendation in Chapter 6 for a fixed dispensing fee and the rejection of a fixed 
distribution fee for the wholesaling function. However, that view would be mistaken 
for two reasons. First, abolition  of the current percentage mark-up for the 
pharmacist removes the incentive for the dispensing of higher priced 
pharmaceuticals. The wholesaler, in contrast, is not able to influence the 
pharmaceuticals purchased by the pharmacist or prescribed by the medical 
practitioner. Second, there is limited competition in community pharmacy for patient 
business whereas there is competition amongst wholesalers for the business of 
pharmacies. By switching the compensation of pharmacists to a fixed dispensing fee, 
this can be advertised by pharmacists to attract patients and thus encourage 
community pharmacy competition. 
 
5.6  CONCLUSION 
The wholesale function is an important bridge between the manufacturer and the 
pharmacist. The evidence suggests that there is vigorous competition between the 
three  full-line  wholesalers. The market appears to work well. Government 
intervention has consisted primarily of clawing back rents through a reduction in the 
wholesale margin  in the distribution chain that were largely accruing to the 
pharmacist not the wholesaler. While it is the case that the current recession and 
policy moves have placed wholesalers under financial pressure, this is insufficient 
reason to change the wholesalers' current business model. Many other sectors are 
experiencing falling profits and demand. Government policy needs to create the 
conditions for the overall growth of the economy, not come to the assistance of 
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However, there are some issues that might raise concerns over the DTP model. 
Under this model the brand name manufacturer sets the quality standards. A recent 
Office of Fair Trading (2007, p. 9) study on pharmaceutical distribution, although it 
reached no view on the merits of DTP as compared to the traditional wholesale 
distribution model, concluded that, "DTP schemes have the potential to impact on 
the service levels provided to pharmacies and the service levels that they can in turn 
offer to patients." Since DTP has limited penetration in Ireland these potential 
concerns are not likely to be realised in Ireland. Furthermore, under the relevant 
regulation, in Ireland wholesalers, irrespective of whether they are full-line or DTP, 
have to "...ensure appropriate and continued supplies [to pharmacists and other 
healthcare professionals] so that the needs of the patients in the State in respect of 





This we feel is a proportionate response to recent developments in the wholesale 
pharmaceutical sector. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
50   Schedule 2 paragraph 11 of S. I. No. 538 of 2007, Medicinal Products (Control of Wholesale Distribution) Regulations 2007. 
Recommendation 5.1: We recommend that the HSE actively monitor the 
importance and service levels offered by DTP brand name manufacturers. If 
the service levels fall below levels considered acceptable to the HSE, then it 
should negotiate minimum quality standards with brand name 
manufacturers using the DTP model. Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function | 103 
Chapter 6 
 
Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
The dispensing role of the pharmacist brings together the supply and demand sides 
of the pharmaceutical chain. On the supply side the pharmacist is the last stage in 
the distribution chain from the supplier or manufacturer and the wholesaler to the 
patient; on the demand side, the patient presents the prescription written by the 
prescriber  who  has  assessed  the  patient's  condition  and  decided  that  a 
pharmaceutical is the appropriate course of treatment. The role of the pharmacist is 
to dispense the pharmaceutical deemed appropriate by the prescriber, together with 
associated services. There may, of course, be interaction between the pharmacist 
and the prescriber, if the former has concerns over the pharmaceutical prescribed 
(e.g. the quantity). 
 
In this chapter the function and role of the pharmacist is first set out (Section 6.2), 
before attention turns towards HSE policy towards the reimbursement of the 
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how the move to the new model of pharmacy reimbursement, with its greater 
emphasis on the dispensing fee component, can be advanced. Next attention turns 
in Section 6.4 to the inter-relationship between pharmacy costs and restrictions on 
advertising and the provision of information to patients. Alternative models of 
delivery of the dispensing function are the subject of Section 6.5. Section 6.6 
concludes. 
 
There  are  certain  issues  which  have  already  been  dealt  with  concerning  the 
dispensing role in previous chapters and hence do not need to be rehearsed here. In 
particular reference pricing and generic substitution (Chapter 4) and the reduction in 
the wholesale mark-up implicit in the reimbursement price paid to pharmacies by 
the State (Chapter 5) are not discussed in this chapter. 
 
6.2  THE DISPENSING ROLE AND FUNCTION 
The pharmacist is responsible, on receipt of a valid prescription, for dispensing the 
pharmaceutical(s) stated on the prescription to the patient.
1 The pharmacist may 
also provide the patient with advice on when (e.g. after a meal), how (e.g. with 
water) to take the pharmaceutical, where to store the pharmaceutical (e.g. in the 
fridge)  as  well  as  inform  the  patient  on  the  possible  side-effects  of  the 
pharmaceutical. In addition, where the patient is taking several pharmaceuticals the 
pharmacist may provide information on possible adverse reactions. For a patient 
that may have difficulty complying with the pharmaceutical regimen, the pharmacist 
may furnish the patient with a dose administration aid which makes compliance 
easier (e.g. monitored dosage systems whereby all pharmaceuticals to be taken at 
breakfast, lunch and dinner are grouped separately by time of consumption). 
Recently, the role of the pharmacist has been extended to include the provision of 
the seasonal influenza  vaccine
2  and the dispensing of emergency hormonal 
contraception (which was switched from a prescription-only to an OTC basis in 
February 2011 (Donnellan, 2011)). 
 
6.2.1  Growth in Pharmacy Businesses 
Pharmacy services are provided through pharmacies. Apart from the fact that for 
each pharmacy business there has to be a supervising pharmacist with at least three 
years experience and various other regulatory requirements concerning record 
keeping and a patient consultation area,
3 there is no limitation on the overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1   The Code of Conduct (PSI, 2009a) sets out what is expected of the pharmacist. More detail in relation to dispensing is found   
in Section 9 of S. I. No. 488 of 2008 Regulation of Retail Pharmacy Businesses Regulations 2008 and Clause 9 of the 1996 
CPC Agreement. 
2   For details see: http://www.thepsi.ie/gns/pharmacy-practice/current-developments/Seasonal_Influenza_Vaccination.aspx. 
Accessed 16 December 2011. 
3   These are set out in S. I. No. 488 of 2008 Regulation of Retail Pharmacy Businesses Regulations 2008. Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function | 105 
number of pharmacy businesses nor on how many can be owned by a chain 
pharmacy.
4 Furthermore, pharmacies can be owned by non-pharmacists. Internet 
sales of pharmaceuticals are prohibited, but not OTC products.
5 
 
In 2011, there were 1,734 pharmacy businesses registered with the Pharmaceutical 
Society of Ireland (PSI).
6 A separate business is registered for each pharmacy outlet, 
irrespective of whether or not it is part of a pharmacy chain. The vast majority of 
pharmacy businesses are community or retail, with the remainder classified as 
hospital pharmacy businesses (Table 6.1). In 2011, for example, 95.7 per cent of 
pharmacy businesses were community outlets. The number of pharmacy businesses 
has gradually increased, year-on-year, from 1,372 in 2004 to 1,734 in 2011 or by 26 
per cent.
7 The rate of openings has dropped from a peak of 9.3 per cent in 2005, to 
1.9 per cent in 2011. Closings have generally remained at 1.6 per cent or less since 
2006. Hence despite the deep recession that started in 2008 and the reductions in 
wholesale and retail margins under the State pharmaceutical schemes, the number 
of pharmacy businesses has continued to increase.
8 
 
TABLE 6.1  Pharmacy Businesses, Community and Hospital, Openings and Closings, Ireland, 2004-2011 
 
  Community  Hospital  Total  Openings  Closings 
  N  N  N  N  N/Total  N  N/Total 
2004  1,323  49  1,372  55  4.0  n.a.   
2005  1,419  49  1,468  137  9.3  41  2.8 
2006  1,510  50  1,560  95  6.1  7  0.4 
2007  1,567  61  1,628  68  4.2  0  0.0 
2008  1,608  72  1,680  66  3.9  14  0.8 
2009  1,628  76  1,704  51  3.0  27  1.6 
2010  1,652  76  1,728  43  2.5  19  1.1 
2011  1,659  75  1,734  34  1.9  22  1.3 
 
Notes:  Openings are defined as new openings and exclude relocations and transfer of ownership; closings are defined as closure of 
existing businesses and exclude relocations and transfers of ownership. The data for 2011 refer to events as of 1 July 2011. 
However, in order to estimate the number of openings and closings for 2011 it was assumed that the same number of openings 
and closings occurred in the second half as occurred in the first. 
Source:  Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland, Annual Report, various years, and PSI, personal communication, 15 September 2011. 
 
6.2.2  The Importance of Pharmacy Chains 
Pharmacy chains, under which two or more pharmacy businesses are under common 
ownership, are of limited importance. In 2007, for example, the largest pharmacy 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
4   It should be noted that between 1996 and 2002 there were regulations that limited the entry of new pharmacy businesses. 
For details and discussion see Gorecki (2011). The PSI  (2009b)  in a recent submission argued unsuccessfully for 
reintroduction of such restrictions on entry. 
5   As noted in Chapter 1, the terms pharmaceutical as used in the report refers to prescription pharmaceuticals. 
6   The PSI is "...an independent statutory body, established under the Pharmacy Act 2007. … charged with … the effective 
regulation of pharmacy services in Ireland." The quote is taken from the PSI's website: http://www.thepsi.ie/gns/about-
psi/overview.aspx. Accessed 13 September 2011. The PSI is governed by a 21 member board, with a non-pharmacist 
majority appointed by the Minister for Health. 
7   This increase applied to both community or retail and hospital pharmacy businesses. 
8   This seems inconsistent with the views of the IPU (2009) as to the impact of margin reductions and other changes made 
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chain  had  58  outlets  accounting  for  3.7  per  cent of  all  community  pharmacy 
businesses (Table 6.2). The seven chains with 16 or more outlets accounted for only 
13.3 per cent of all community pharmacy businesses. Single outlet pharmacies 
accounted for 55 per cent of all community pharmacies in 2006 (PwC, 2007, Table 1). 
Non-pharmacist ownership accounted for only 12 per cent of outlets (ibid, Table 2). 
 
It appears that since 2007 there has been a gradual increase in the importance of the 
leading pharmacy chains, but the share of community pharmacies accounted for 
such chains is still modest (Table 6.2). As noted in Chapter 5, Unicare/Doc Morris 
currently has around 70 pharmacies or 4.2 per cent of community pharmacies in 
2011, while Boots has 63 pharmacies
9 or 3.8 per cent of community pharmacies in 
2011. In contrast, the McSweeney pharmacy chain has 18 outlets in 2011, down 
from 28 pharmacy businesses in 2007.
10 Nevertheless, the majority of pharmacies – 
52 per cent − were still single outlet in 2011.
11 Non-pharmacist ownership accounted 
for 15 per cent of all community pharmacies in 2011; such  ownership was  especially 
important with respect to chain pharmacies.
12 In terms of new entry, in November 
2011 Tesco Ireland, the largest grocery supermarket chain, announced the opening 




TABLE 6.2  Community Pharmacy Businesses, Leading Pharmacy Chains, Ireland, 2007 and 2011 
 
  Number of Outlets  Share of All Community Pharmacies 
  2007  2011  2007  2011 
  N  N  %  % 
Pharmacy Chain         
Unicare/Doc Morris  58  70  3.7  4.2 
Boots  41  63  2.6  3.8 
McSweeney  28  18  1.8  1.1 
Hickeys  26  20  1.6  1.2 
Sam McCauley  22  25  1.4  1.5 
McCabes  17  21  1.1  1.3 
Bradleys  16  16  1.0  1.0 
Others  1,359  1,426  86.7  85.9 
Total  1,567  1,659  100  100 
 
Note:  The identity of the leading pharmacy chains was taken from Macarthur (2007) for 2007, with the number of outlets of stores for 
2011 was taken from the websites of the individual chains. 
Source:  Macarthur (2007, Table 3.3, p. 58), the websites of the leading pharmacy chains, and Table 6.1.  
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
9   For details see http://www.boots.ie. Accessed 14 September 2011. 
10   For details see http://www.mcsweeneygroup.ie/. Accessed 13 September 2011. 
11   For details see IPU (2011a, p. 13). The estimate is based on the IPU membership.  
12   Ibid, p 13. Non-pharmacists owned 28 per cent of chain pharmacies, but only 9 per cent of non-chain pharmacies. A chain 
pharmacist owned two or more community pharmacies. 
13   Tesco personnel communication, 24 June 2011 and media reports 3-4 November 2011. Note that prior to November 2011 
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6.2.3  Pharmacies, Pharmacists and the Population Served 
Ireland has a low average number of pharmacists to pharmacies and a low ratio of 
population per pharmacy (Table 6.3). Low in this instance is measured relative to five 
other jurisdictions – Great Britain, Northern Ireland, New South Wales (Australia), 
British Columbia (Canada) and New Zealand - that were selected by the PSI in 
conducting a study of the level of registration fees that the PSI should charge. These 
data suggest that for this sample of jurisdictions that Ireland has relatively small 
scale pharmacy outlets measured in terms of the population served and the number 
of pharmacists per pharmacy. 
 
TABLE 6.3  Pharmacy, Pharmacies, and Population, Comparative Data for Six Jurisdictions, 2006 
 
Jurisdiction  Average Number of 
Pharmacists per 
Pharmacy 
Population per Pharmacy 
(N) 
Great Britain  3.03  4,571 
Northern Ireland  3.54  3,428 
New South Wales  4.50  3,902 
British Columbia  4.02  4,333 
New Zealand  3.11  4,602 
Ireland  2.68  2,771 
 
Source:  PSI (2008a, Figure 3, p. 13). 
 
6.2.4  Composition of Pharmacy Sales: Prescription, OTC and Other Products 
Community pharmacy businesses typically not only dispense pharmaceuticals, but 
also sell a variety of other products, such as beauty products, and over-the-counter 
pharmaceuticals (OTC) products. In 2005, for example, pharmaceuticals accounted 
for 67 per cent of community pharmacy turnover, OTC, 14 per cent and other sales 
19 per cent (PwC, 2007, Figure 3). This is a similar distribution to a 2001/02 survey, 
where the corresponding percentages were 61, 20 and 19, respectively (Indecon, 
2002,  Table  6.5,  p. 43).
14  The  majority of  pharmaceutical  sales of  community 
pharmacies are funded by the GMS and CDS – 72 per cent in 2001/02 (ibid, Table 6.3, 
p. 42) and 81 per cent in 2005 (PwC, 2007, Figure 3).
15 Nevertheless, a substantial 
proportion of pharmaceutical expenditure is accounted for by out of pocket or cash 
payments, which is likely to increase with the raising of the DP Scheme threshold to 
€132 in 2012. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
14   Differences between the two data sources may be due to different survey methodologies and the fact that PwC (2007) 
excludes VAT from turnover while Indecon (2002) appears to include VAT in its turnover measures. 
15   These data refer to payments made under the GMS and CDS. Hence expenditure below the DP Scheme threshold is not 
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6.2.5  Provision of Information to Patients 
In providing pharmacy services to the patient pharmacists are required, according to 
the PSI Code of Conduct: 
Provide  honest,  relevant,  accurate,  current  and  appropriate 
information to patients regarding the nature, cost, value and benefit 
of  medicines,  health-related  products  and  services  provided  by 
them. (PSI, 2009a, n.p.) 
 
Such information might, for example, explain not only matters in relation to how the 
patient should take the pharmaceutical but also how the pharmacy set the price for 
dispensing a prescription. Typically, this consists of a dispensing fee, mark-up (in 
some cases) and the ingredient or pharmaceutical cost. If the patient is a cash paying 
customer then the retail price includes a mark-up of between 20 and 50 per cent.
16 
The pharmacist has to dispense the prescription as written. The dispensing fee is 
fixed. However, it is not clear how often such information is imparted to patients, if 
at all. In terms of the cost information readily available in the pharmacy there is 
typically no posting of pricing information, such as the dispensing fee, while the 




In 2009 the PSI clarified the meaning of the Code of Conduct with respect to 
advertising and promotion of medical products on the basis of price or quantity 
discounts in Practice Notice No. 5, 
… the position is that neither the regulatory provisions, nor the 
professional codes in place, permit or support the advertising or 
promotion of medicinal products to the public on the basis of 
price or quantity discounts (PSI, 2009c). 
 
The  PSI's  position  on  advertising  and  promotion  of  pharmaceuticals  was 
subsequently  restated  and  elaborated  in  October  2011  in  PSI  Guidance  to 
pharmacists in relation to the advertising, promotion and sale of medicinal products, 
and related matters (PSI, 2011b). This replaced Practice Notice No. 5. Not only were 
discounts deemed inappropriate advertising and promotion, but also the use of sales 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
16   While there is no maximum mark-up for the cash paying customer, 50 per cent has been the traditional pharmacy mark-up. 
For details see Fair Trade Commission (1957). 
17   The Prescription Claim Form receipt issued to a DP patient, for example, only has the total price as does the till/credit card 
receipt. Attempts to ascertain how the price was calculated and the magnitude of the mark-up resulted in answers such as 
"it's all in the machine." (Based on the experience of one of the authors in presenting a prescription to a Dublin pharmacy 
on 29 August 2011 which was below the €120 threshold). Patients can access information on the ingredient cost (i.e., ex-
wholesale price) of the pharmaceutical from a website linked from the main PCRS website 
(www.sspcrs.ie/druglist/search.jsp). However, the patient must know the levels of fees and mark-ups in order to calculate 
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targets, incentives or similar measures. The use of percentage discounts "...can be 
regarded as a commodification of medicinal products and may have the effect of 
distracting patients from making an objective evaluation of their normative needs" 
(ibid, p. 2). Furthermore, as we shall see in Section 6.3, the rules of the GMS and CDS 
strengthen these restrictions on offering patients information on pricing and/or 
discounts. 
 
6.2.6  Characterising Regulation and Competition in Community Pharmacy 
The delivery of the dispensing function of the pharmacist is heavily regulated, 
notwithstanding the lack of restrictions on entry and ownership, primarily by the PSI. 
Although the rules concerning ownership and the overall number of pharmacies is 
largely deregulated, the provision of information to patients on discounts and prices 
is severely constrained. The importance of pharmacy chains is limited, while on 
average pharmacies serve small catchment areas, measured in terms of population 
and are staffed by a small number of pharmacists. In contrast to other jurisdictions, 
such as the US and some Member States such as the Netherlands (Macarthur, 2007, 
p.146) there are no internet pharmacies for the sale of pharmaceuticals, while other 
retail formats such as supermarkets do not have in-store pharmacies, although this is 
beginning to change with the November 2011 opening of in-store pharmacies by one 
supermarket chain.
18 In sum, the retail format of pharmacy in Ireland is a traditional 
model, albeit with some signs of change. 
 
6.3  REVISING THE PHARMACY REIMBURSEMENT BUSINESS MODEL: INGREDIENT COST 
AND DISPENSING FEE 
In this section we consider the changes that have taken place in the way in which 
pharmacists are reimbursed, before moving to some suggestions as to how that can 
be improved, in both the public and private community sector. 
 
6.3.1  The 2011 Reforms: Government Mandated Dispensing Fee Structure 
Participation  in  the  GMS  and  CDS  is  essential  for  the  survival  of  community 
pharmacy businesses (e.g. Purcell, 2004). The vast majority of pharmacy turnover 
from prescribed pharmaceuticals is accounted for by these programmes.
19 Over the 
period  2002  to  2007,  only  2.1  per  cent  of  pharmacies  were  without  a  GMS 
contract.
20 The contractual relations between the HSE and the community pharmacy 
thus affect the dispensing function for a substantial share of the market and likely 
influence practice for the cash paying patient.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
18   See discussion in Section 6.2.2. 
19   See discussion in Section 6.2.4. 
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Prior to 1970 pharmaceuticals were provided free to certain groups of people 
through public dispensaries.
21 However, the Department of Health and Children 
(DoHC) decided to use an alternative distribution method: the existing network of 
independent community pharmacies. In order to deliver the service an agreement 
was needed between the DoHC and individual pharmacists. As a result a template 
was developed between the DoHC and the representative body for pharmacists, the 
Irish  Pharmaceutical  Union  (IPU).
22  Individual  pharmacies  then  entered  into 
contractual agreements with the local Health Board, all of which subsequently 
become subsumed under the HSE. The first DoHC/IPU agreement was entered into 
in 1971, which was revised, with some amendments, in 1996.  
 
The 1996 Community Pharmacy Contractor Agreement for the Provision of Services 
under the Health Acts (the 1996 CPC agreement)
23 set out the terms and conditions 
under which the pharmacist supplies pharmaceuticals to eligible persons under the 
GMS and CDS. It has clauses referring to the dispensing and pharmacy service to be 
provided by the pharmacist, a prohibition on inducements to persons to select a 
particular pharmacy, inspection of the pharmacy by the HSE, termination of the 
agreement, and an optional review of the agreement after five years. Several of the 
clauses concerning the delivery of pharmacy services were subsequently included in 
the Pharmacy Act 2007.
24 
 
Pharmacies were, and are, reimbursed on a different basis under the GMS and CDS 
for providing the same dispensing service (Table 2.3). For example, under the GMS 
the  pharmacist  received  only  a  fixed  dispensing  fee,  while  under  the  DP  the 
pharmacist received both a dispensing fee and a percentage mark-up over the 
wholesale invoice cost of the pharmaceutical. These differences no doubt reflected 
the different circumstances under which the schemes arose. The HSE wanted to 
reform the reimbursement mechanisms across the various schemes to achieve 
greater uniformity and to change the basis on which pharmacists were compensated 
for the dispensing function − towards a model based on a dispensing fee and an 
ingredient cost where the latter contained no pharmacy mark-up over the wholesale 
invoice cost. In other words, "...the professional fees paid to [pharmacy] contractors 
should be decoupled from the ingredient price of medicines dispensed …" (Dorgan, 
2008, para. 4.4).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
21   The paragraph is based on section 1 of Haire v MfH&C.  
22   Full details of the IPU may be found on: www.ipu.ie. Note that the IPU subsequently changed its name to the Irish Pharmacy 
Union. 
23   All references are to the updated 2010 version of the 1996 CPC agreement (HSE, 2010), which includes, for example, 
references to the HSE rather than the Health Boards and the Pharmacy Act 2007, rather than earlier pharmacy legislation.  
24   The Pharmacy Act 2007 marked major changes and reforms to the regulation of pharmacy. For details see: 
http://www.thepsi.ie/gns/about-psi/pharmacy-act-2007.aspx. Accessed 5 October 2011. Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function | 111 
After the HSE made an unsuccessful offer of an interim dispensing fee of €5.00 to 
community pharmacists, pending the completing of a new pharmacy contract, the 
Minister for Health and Children in early 2008 appointed the Independent Body on 
Pharmacy Contract Pricing (the Independent Body) to address the issue of the 
appropriate  dispensing  fee.  The  terms  of  reference  stated,  in  part,  that  the 
dispensing fee should "...represent a fair and reasonable price to be paid for the 
pharmaceutical service currently being provided by community pharmacists to the 
HSE under the GMS and [C]ommunity [D]rug [S]chemes" (Dorgan, 2008, para. 1.3). 
The Independent Body took the view that fair and reasonable meant, "...as the rate 
that might reasonably pertain under competitive conditions" (ibid, para. 5.1). 
 
The Independent Body also took the view that given the heterogeneity of costs that 
a single fixed dispensing fee would be inappropriate and thus recommended a tiered 
structure depending on the volume of prescriptions dispensed by the pharmacy 
(Table 6.4). This structure reflected the "...professional costs of the pharmacist, as 
the prime resource in pharmacy, to which are added other staff and overhead 
(including financial) costs" (Dorgan, 2008, para. 6.10). Since no agreement was 
reached between the IPU and the DoHC/HSE as to the fee level and structure, in 
2009 the government mandated a fee structure after consultation (Table 6.4). 
Although the mandated fees are below the recommended fees of the Independent 
Body, to some extent apples and oranges are being compared. Under the mandated 
fees regime the DP Scheme retained a mark-up, albeit 20 per cent not 50 per cent. 
Nevertheless, the mandated fee structure combined with the reduced mark-up was 
a significant move towards decoupling the professional fee of the pharmacist from 
the pharmaceutical cost. 
 









Government Mandated Fee 
(2009) 
Less than or equal to 20,000  €7.00  €5.00 
20,001 to 30,000  €6.50  €4.50 
Over 30,000  €6.00  €3.50 
 
Notes:  a  Dispensing fee excluding any mark-ups. 
Sources:    Dorgan (2008, Table 5.1, p. 27) and S. I. No. 246 of 2009, Health Professionals (Reductions of Payments to Community 
Pharmacy Contractors) Regulations 2009, Table 1. 
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6.3.2  Taking  the  Reforms  Forward:  Strengthening  the  Importance  of  the 
Dispensing Fee 
There are good arguments that the appropriate method of reimbursement for the 
pharmacist is a dispensing fee rather than a combination of a mark-up and a 
dispensing fee. As the HSE observed it decouples the compensation paid to the 
pharmacist from the cost of the pharmaceutical. The pharmacist has no incentive to 
dispense  higher  priced  products  since  there  is  no  mark-up.  If  anything  the 
pharmacist has an incentive to stock and dispense lower priced products since that 
will reduced inventory costs. Furthermore, as the IPHA argue a dispensing fee 
reflects that what is being supplied is a professional service by the pharmacist in 
performing the dispensing service.
25 In other words, the pharmacist is not seen as a 
retailer selling a product to a patient where the usual method of charging is a mark-
up, but rather as supplying a professional service. As such it fits with the widening 
number of professional services provided by pharmacists, including the 
administration of seasonal influenza vaccine and the dispensing of emergency 




The ingredient or pharmaceutical cost will be priced as set out in Chapter 4. It would 
still be permissible for pharmacists to receive discounts from wholesalers where 
orders reflect efficiency gains such as electronic ordering and prompt payment. 
Furthermore, we accept that pharmacists are likely to receive and seek additional 
discounts from dispensing parallel imports and generic products. However, rather 
than seeking to ban such discounts, the HSE should monitor the incidence of such 
discounts, as suggested in Chapter 4, and adjust reimbursement prices accordingly. 
 
In terms of implementation for the GMS and CDS, the FEMPI regulations move very 
much in this direction with a reduction in the mark-up – where it applies – to 20 per 
cent from 50 per cent (Table 2.5).
26 However, for the cash paying customer there is 
no automatic read across from changes in the public to the private sector. The 50 
per cent mark-up is longstanding within retail pharmacy (Fair Trade Commission, 
1957). The evidence, albeit anecdotal, is that for the cash paying customer below the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
25   As reported in Dorgan (2008, paragraph 4.18). 
26  While FEMPI allows the Minister to reduce the rates of payments to community pharmacists contractors, it does not 
provide for the abolition of payments or the reduction of rates to zero. Switching to a reimbursement system based on a 
dispensing fee only may be considered as part of the development of the new pharmacy contract.  
Recommendation 6.1: We recommend that pharmacists are compensated 
for dispensing a prescription on the basis of a professional dispensing fee 
only. This should apply to both prescriptions dispensed under the GMS and 
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monthly DP threshold the 50 per cent mark-up has been retained, although the 
extent is not clear.
27 However, this may change with the entry of Tesco into retail 
pharmacy in November 2011 with its publicly announced policy of a mark-up of 20 
per cent and a dispensing fee of €3.50, regardless of whether the individual is above 
or below the monthly DP threshold. 
 
At one level it is not clear why a different rule should apply to the public and private 
sector. The HSE has been successful, as a large and powerful buyer of pharmacy 
services, in changing the basis on which dispensing services are provided under the 
GMS and CDS. Surely these benefits should also accrue to patients more generally. 
Such a position is consistent with the discussion in Chapter 3 ensuring that the 
benefits of better value for money should apply to both the public and private 
patient. However, limitations on advertising may mean that the pharmacy market is 
less competitive than it could (or should) be. The answer here is to consider 
reforming the restrictions on advertising, an issue to which we now turn, rather than 
relying on direct price controls. 
 
6.4  PHARMACY  COSTS,  RESTRICTIONS  ON  ADVERTISING  AND  THE  PROVISION  OF 
INFORMATION 
The dispensing fees recommended by the Independent Body and that are mandated 
under FEMPI are based on the existing structure of pharmacy in terms of the level of 
costs and in terms of the number and size of pharmacies. The Independent Body 
stated explicitly that the competitive level of costs and returns are the appropriate 
benchmark for determining what is fair and reasonable. We agree. However, there 
are good reasons for concluding that the current level of costs and pharmacy 
structure are not reflective of the competitive norm. However, it is beyond the scope 
of this report to adjudicate on the appropriate level of the dispensing fee. 
 
6.4.1  Why Pharmacy Costs Might Be Too High? 
At first sight such a conclusion may seem counterintuitive, since entry and exit from 
the community pharmacy is easy both in theory and practice (Table 6.1), while rules 
on ownership are relatively liberal. However, there are three sets of reasons for 
suggesting that despite this pharmacy costs are too high in Ireland. First, there are 
barriers to pharmacy businesses being able to successfully differentiate themselves 
so as to attract patients. Differentiation takes many forms such as location, service 
quality (e.g. home delivery, waiting times, opening hours, medicine use reviews and 
so on) and price (e.g. lower dispensing fee, reduced mark-up). In order to attract 
patients pharmacies convey, via media, websites and other methods, information in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
27   Based on a series of press reports in the Irish Independent and the pricing policy of Tesco on entry into the pharmacy 
market in November 2011. See also Section 2.4.2.3. 114 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
order to attract patients. To a considerable extent pharmacies already do this for 
OTC products and non-pharmaceutical items. The pharmacy businesses that are best 
able to attract patients grow and prosper. 
 
In community pharmacy in Ireland there are significant barriers to the pharmacy 
businesses competing for patients through the provision of information to the 
patient. PSI rules prevent advertising with respect to price or discounts. The PSI 
restrictions are reinforced by the HSE's interpretation of the 1996 CPC agreement. 
Under that agreement, clause 4(4) states that: 
The pharmacy contractor shall not give, promise or offer to any 
person any gift or reward (whether by way of a share of, or 
dividend on, the profits of the practice or by way of discount or 
rebate or otherwise) as an inducement to or in consideration of 
his/her  presenting,  or  directing  the  placing  of,  an  order  for 
medicines. 
 
This clause has been used, for example, to prevent one pharmacy chain that offered 
to defer the implementation of the €100 co-payment from patients due under the 
DP until April 2009. In other words, the pharmacy chain undertook to absorb some 
of the increase in patient co-payment for a limited period.
28 Finally, there is no 
posting of information in relation to the price of a pharmaceutical nor the dispensing 
fee in a pharmacy or on the receipt. 
 
These  rules  have  the  effect  of  reducing  competition  between  pharmacies. 
Pharmacies that want to develop a better service may require, for example, a 
minimum number of patients. Making patients aware of the service through media 
as well as the price to be charged is one way of generating the required footfall. 
Equally a pharmacy might through a new way of organising the dispensary be able to 
offer lower prices. 
 
Second,  pharmacy  costs  may  reflect  economic  rents  –  the  wholesale  margin, 
discounts off reimbursement prices for generic pharmaceuticals and parallel imports 
− which would, in a competitive market be competed away resulting in lower prices. 
However, in the pharmacy market these rents become, at least in part, capitalised in 
higher costs – employee compensation and the purchase price of premises. As 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 there are good reasons to assume that there are rents 
in the pharmaceutical distribution chain that accrue to pharmacies. Admittedly, the 
recent policy moves of the State, such as lowering the wholesale margin, are likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
28   Based on the contents of a letter from the HSE to the pharmacy chain chief pharmacist (HSE, personal communication, 30 
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Third, the size distribution of pharmacies means scale economies are not realised. 
The pharmacy dispensing fee structure – either as proposed by the Independent 
Body or as mandated under FEMPI – suggests that there are economies of scale. In 
other words, a pharmacy dispensing a higher volume of prescriptions experiences 
lower dispensing costs per prescription. However, the evidence in Table 6.3 is 
consistent with the suggestion that pharmacies in Ireland are relatively small in 
comparison with other jurisdictions. More competition might be expected to result 
in a change in the number and size of pharmacies, so that the larger more efficient 
pharmacies increase. 
 
It should be noted that there is nothing inconsistent with pharmacy costs being too 
high and many pharmacies only making a normal rate of return. As more and more 
pharmacies enter in response to the rents that can be captured, to some degree that 
takes patients away from existing pharmacies, whose returns fall. The policy changes 
designed to reduce wholesale and retail margins, combined with the financial crisis and 
the bursting of the property bubble, has put further pressure on pharmacies. 
 
6.4.2  Can the Restrictions on Advertising and the Provision of Information be 
Justified? 
This discussion naturally raises the issue of whether or not there are good and valid 
grounds for the current prohibitions by the PSI on advertising and the provision of 
information and the restriction contained in the 1996 CPC agreement. We consider 
each in turn. 
 
The PSI is quite naturally concerned about patient safety and the quality of care. 
Since advertising and providing information to consumers is usually undertaken, in 
part at least, to increase demand, the PSI might be concerned that advertising by 
pharmacies might lead to increased consumption of pharmaceuticals which might 
lead, in turn, to adverse effects on patient health.
30 In the PSI's 2009 Practice Notice 
5 on the issue of advertising referred to above it is stated that: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
29   The presence of rents is also consistent with the observations of Dorgan (2008, paragraphs 3.16 – 3.18) concerning the 
profitability of community pharmacies and the continuing creation of new pharmacies presented in Table 6.1. 
30   No doubt this concern is reflected in the ban on advertising of prescription-only medicinal products under S. I. No. 541 of 
2007, Medicinal Products (Control of Advertising) Regulations 2007. However, this does not mean that information 
concerning dispensing fees, mark-ups, prices and pharmacy services cannot be communicated to patients. Such information 
is not concerned with advertising product claims or characteristics. The difference is that information concerning dispensing 
fees, mark-ups, prices and pharmacy services is more likely to determine which pharmacy the patient uses to dispense a 
prescription, while advertising product claims is more likely to increase overall demand. Nevertheless, great care needs to 
be taken to ensure that the presentation of information on dispensing fees etc., does not take away from the rational use of 116 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
Pharmacists  must  discharge  their  professional  obligations  to 
patients seeking advice, guidance and assistance in respect of their 
pharmaceutical care and treatment. Self-selection of medicinal 
products  without  the  provision  of  appropriate  supervision, 
professional support, advice and information by the pharmacist is 
not appropriate. Supervising and superintendent pharmacists are 
reminded of their particular responsibilities to ensure that policies 
and procedures in place comply with these requirements. (PSI, 
2009c, emphasis added). 
 
However, the pharmaceuticals that are the subject of this report are not self 
selected by the patient. Rather, the patient first needs to visit a medical practitioner, 
which involves costs for the patient in terms of time and the GP fee, if they are not in 
possession of medical or GP Visit card. Would a rational patient go to a medical 
practitioner with the intention of obtaining a prescription for (say) Lipitor because a 
pharmacist put an advert in a local paper or posted a notice in the pharmacy, saying 
'10 per cent off all pharmaceuticals this week?' Thus it is not clear that the rationale 
put forward by the PSI applies to such pharmaceuticals. 
 
In October 2011 the PSI replaced Practice Notice No. 5 with somewhat longer 
guidance on advertising and promotion.
31 However, the tenor did not change. While 
the updated PSI (2011) guidance stated that pharmacists are required to provide 
honest and relevant information regarding the "...nature, cost, value and benefit" of 
a pharmaceutical product, there were clear limitations to the extent to which this 
information could be imparted to the public and the patient as set out above. This 
reflects  the  PSI  (2011)  view  that  "Inappropriate  advertising  or  promotion  of 
medicines based on cost impacts on the essential understanding of the medical 
needs of the patient" (p. 1). Advertising can lead to the "commodification" of 
pharmaceuticals which may have "...the effect of distracting patients from making an 
objective evaluation of their normative needs." However, as pointed out above with 
respect to Practice Notice No. 5 it is not clear to what extent these concerns apply to 
pharmaceuticals that require a prescription from a medical practitioner, which are 
the subject of this report. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
pharmaceuticals. Hence, for example, if the pharmacist proposes to charge differential mark-ups this might – although it 
seems extremely unlikely – lead the patient to request the medical practitioner to prescribe the product with the lower 
mark-up. However, it is not clear that this will lead to an irrational use of pharmaceuticals. The alternative might be, for 
example, that the patient who is (say) under the DP Scheme threshold and is working poor, goes without the 
pharmaceutical. Hence the rational use of pharmaceuticals, which at times seems to assume away any budget constraint 
that the patient may face in times of austerity, needs to take into account these considerations when coming to a 
judgement as to what is the rational use of pharmaceuticals.  
31   The decision was made in October and circulated in November 2011. Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function | 117 
Turning to the evidence on the impact of advertising, it suggests across a number of 
professions and services (such as opticians, optometrists, pharmaceuticals and legal) 
that allowing advertising results in lower prices and unchanged quality (Gorecki, 
2011, p. 526). As the former head of the US Federal Trade Commission, Muris (2003, 
p.37)  argued,  "[R]estrictions  on  truthful  and  nondeceptive  advertising  harm 
competition,  because  they  make  it  more  difficult  for  consumers  to  discover 
information  about  price  and  quality  of  goods  and  services,  thereby  reducing 
competitors' incentives to compete with each other with respect to such features."  
 
Furthermore,  in  Ireland  the  Medical  Council  in  2009  removed  restrictions  on 
registered  medical  practitioners  advertising  prices  and  services  (Competition 
Authority, 2010, p. v). Equally the Dental Council of Ireland requires that dental fees 
are displayed and in a standard format.
32 Websites can and are used to provide this 
information to the consumer.
33 The PSI does not place a similar obligation on 
pharmacies. The PSI have informed us that it is acceptable that pharmacists post 
their dispensing fee.
34 However, as yet this does not appear to be mentioned in the 
PSI Code of Conduct, nor is there any guidance on the PSI website as to how this 
information might be imparted so as to facilitate providing the information in a 
patient friendly manner.  
 
It could argued, however, that this reflects the PSI view on the type of model on 
which a pharmacy business should be based. In its submission to the Expert Group 
on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector, the PSI argued that, 
The  role of  a  pharmacist …  should  be  reflected  in any  new 
incentivised,  contractual  or  direct  employment  system.  Any 
system of funding must facilitate pharmacists in having an active 
and meaningful direct impact on clinical care and treatment of 
patients and the public. A model based on the 'free market' 
should  be  discouraged  and  instead  the  normative  need  of 
patients and population should be the driving force behind a new 
generation of pharmacy services. Restrictions on new pharmacy 
openings should be considered and a methodology that optimises 
fair  access  for  patients  and  ensures  pharmacies  are  located 
where need is identified, should be developed (PSI, 2009b, p. 2) 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
32   This was approved in 2011. For details see: http://dentalcouncil.ie/files/Display%20of%20Private%20Fees%20-
%20Code%20of%20Practice%20(Feb%202011)%20-%2020110330.pdf. Accessed 5 October 2011. 
33   See for example. http://crowndental.ie/treatments?gclid=CJH0yLD6q6wCFcFw4AodM1Kv2g#crowns-and-bridges. Accessed 
10 November 2011.  
34   Personal communication, 4 October 2011. Furthermore it should be noted that the Pharmacy Review Group (2003, p. 32) 
recommended that "[T]here should be increased pricing transparency at point of sale, including advising of prescription 
prices in advance of supply and the price of all dispensing items on labels." 118 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
However, it is not clear why a somewhat more liberalised advertising regime with 
respect to the provision of information on prices, mark-ups, dispensing fees, and 
services for pharmacy is inconsistent with the provision of a new generation of 
services such as those outlined in the PSI's Pharmacy Ireland 2020 report (Pharmacy 
Ireland 2020 Working Group, 2008).
35 To the extent such services are purchased by 
the HSE on behalf of patients then this will involve a careful evaluation of the costs 
and the benefits by the HSE before deciding on the fee. To the extent that it is the 
patient that makes the choice then providing information on the price of the service 
and the benefits enables the patient to make a more informed decision.  
 
Turning to the 1996 CPC agreement, this was, of course, negotiated between the 
representative body of pharmacy, the IPU, and the DoHC. The restriction on offering 
inducements, was consistent with the accompanying restrictions on opening of new 
pharmacies referred to above. It is not clear, however, why pharmacists should not 
be able to offer inducements such as that outlined above in order to attract DP 
patients. The patient benefits, particularly if they are working poor and not eligible 
for a medical card, while the HSE pays the same whether or not the inducement 
takes place. In Ontario, for example, where there is $2.00 co-payment for poorer 
senior citizens, many pharmacies in urban areas waive this fee.
36 Why should 
analogous conduct be prohibited in Ireland? Why should the HSE be a party to an 
agreement that restricts competition between pharmacies for no obvious reason?  
 
In sum, there are no compelling arguments for the present PSI and 1996 CPC 
Agreement restrictions on pharmacies providing information in relation to prices, 
discounts, and  new  services  so  that  patients  can make  better  and  more  well 
informed decisions. Not only will the removal of such restrictions benefit patients 
directly, but also indirectly, since increased competition is likely to result in the more 
efficient pharmacies expanding and those that are not able to offer good quality 
service at the right price declining in importance. 
 
6.4.3  Removing the Restrictions on Advertising and Providing Information to 
Patients 
In order to ensure that the provision of information is structured in such a way that 
leads to patients being well informed and providing incentives for pharmacists to 
provide information to patients: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
35   And referred to by the IPU (2011b, p. 42). 
36   Details of the co-payment may be found on the Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) website: http://www.health.gov.on.ca/ 
en/public/programs/drugs/programs/odb/opdp_after65.aspx. Accessed 30 September 2011. Information on the waving of 
the fee was provided by officials of the ODB.  Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function | 119 
 
 
The provision of such information in an easily accessible format will enable patients 
to make sensible choices concerning which pharmacy to select. A standard template 
makes comparisons much easier, as has been developed by the Dental Council of 
Ireland. It is mandatory for dentists to display their fees for certain treatments from 
1 June 2011.
37 One possible template is that used in Ontario pharmacies for a 
number of years, which is presented in Figure 6.1. Finally, of course, this usual and 
customary dispensing fee refers to the dispensing fee charged to the cash customer 
(i.e., under the DP Scheme threshold and those patients not covered by any State 
scheme).  The  template  is  issued  by  the  Ontario  College  of  Pharmacists,  the 
corresponding  body  to  the  PSI.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  PSI  could  compel 
pharmacists to display such a notice as part of the Code of Conduct or whether the 
Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation could issue a Retail Display Order
38 or 
whether separate legislation would be required. 
 
FIGURE 6.1  Dispensing Fee Information Posted in Ontario Pharmacies. 
 
 
Source:  Ontario College of Pharmacists. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
37   For details see the Dental Council's website: http://dentalcouncil.ie/files/Display%20of%20Private%20Fees%20-
%20Code%20of%20Practice%20%28Feb%202011%29%20-%2020110330.pdf. (Accessed 8 November 2011). 
38   For information on such orders see:  
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/consumer_affairs/consumer_protection/pricing/price_display_of_goods_and_s
ervices.html. Accessed 12 December 2011, 
Recommendation 6.2: We recommend that all pharmacies be required to 
post, in a manner clearly accessible to patients, a notice setting out their 
usual and customary dispensing fee and mark-up together with what services 
are included for the dispensing fee. A standard template should be used. 120 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
However, while the provision of information under R 6.2 would be mandatory there 
is also a need to relax the current restrictions imposed by the PSI and those 
contained in the 1996 CPC Agreement that impose unnecessary restrictions on the 




As noted above it appears on one reading of Practice Notice No. 5 and the November 
2011 PSI guidance that the current restrictions on advertising do not appear to cover 
pharmaceuticals that are prescribed. However, it would be useful if explicit guidance 
were given in such cases. Even if the November 2011 PSI guidance did apply to 
prescription pharmaceuticals, the discussion above suggests that the restrictions are 
a disproportionate response to the concerns stated. This does not, of course, mean 
that some restrictions may be necessary, but the case needs to be made carefully to 
ensure that they are not disproportionate.
39 
 




We understand that this  would  probably  require  an  amendment  to  primary 
legislation. 
 
These recommendations to increase transparency and competition in the provision 
of pharmacy services are likely to encounter some resistance from pharmacies. 
There is a danger of collective action as has occurred in the past. This needs to be 
firmly  resisted.  Collective  action  to  restrict  advertising  or  to  co-ordinate  the 
dispensing fee, whether on a local or a national level, is a breach of competition law. 
The Competition Authority (2009) has issued guidance in this area so as to remove 
any doubt on this issue. In order to assist in the monitoring of the implementation of 
the above recommendations as well as gather information relevant to setting 
dispensing fees for public schemes: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
39   And of course, consistent with existing regulations. See the discussion in footnote 30 above.  
Recommendation 6.4: We recommend that pharmacists are able to offer and 
to advertise that they will pay, in part or whole, any patient co-payment that 
is part of the GMS and Community Drug Schemes. 
Recommendation  6.3:  We  recommend  that  PSI  permit  pharmacists  to 
advertise dispensing fees, services provided and price discounts and rebates 
with respect to prescription pharmaceuticals. Pharmacy Services: The Dispensing Function | 121 
 
 
If prima facie evidence of a breach of competition law were discovered that should 
be referred to the Competition Authority. Of course, the HSE need not necessarily 
conduct the surveys itself, but do so in partnership with, for example, the National 
Consumer Agency which has experience of conducting consumer surveys in a retail 
setting. 
 
6.5  ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF DELIVERING PHARMACY SERVICES 
The internet, combined with delivery by mail or other means, is widely used today to 
supply goods and services. It has revolutionised, for example, the business of selling 
airline tickets, with the rapid decline of bricks and mortar travel agent retail outlets 
to be replaced by online booking. Books, CDs and groceries are also, in varying 
degrees, marketed through the internet and delivered through the mail. In some 
jurisdictions  such  as  the US  pharmaceuticals  are  sold  extensively  through  the 
internet/mail order,
40  with  some  US  state  pharmaceutical  reimbursement 
programmes also using the internet/mail order to distribute pharmaceuticals.
41 In 
August 2011 the Dr Thom website offered advice in Ireland for patients suffering 
from asthma, erectile dysfunction or wanting a contraceptive pill. Prescriptions are 
sent to the patient through the post.
42 The distribution of OTC products is permitted 
in Ireland over the internet. However, the distribution of pharmaceuticals through 
the internet and mail order is prohibited. It is not clear that this is a proportionate 
response. While internet/mail order pharmacies pose well known problems,
43 a 
complete prohibition may not be the answer. Such pharmacies would, of course, be 
subject to PSI regulation as to, for example, supervision by suitably  qualified 
personnel. Indeed, internet/mail order pharmacies could be an extension of existing 
community pharmacies. If internet pharmacies can offer lower cost distribution in a 
safe manner for certain selected pharmaceuticals such as maintenance products for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
40   In terms of sales mail order accounted for 22.8 per cent of retail sales in the US in 2009. For details see: 
http://nacds.org/user-assets/pdfs/2010/publications/2009Results.pdf. Accessed 10 November 2011. In some US States 
laws have been passed under which it is prohibited to offer "...more favourable cost-sharing arrangements for use of a mail-
order pharmacy than for the use of retail pharmacy." (Maryland Health Care Commission and Maryland Insurance 
Administration (2005, p. 1). This retards the growth of internet/mail order distribution of pharmaceuticals. 
41   For a discussion see Maryland Health Care Commission and Maryland Insurance Administration (2005) and US General 
Accounting Office (2003). 
42   For details see: https://www.drthom.ie/ (Accessed 8 November 2011). Note that Dr Thom is a registered medical practice 
with the Medical Council of Ireland.  
43   See, for example, the 2004 Statement on 'Internet Drug Sales' by William Hubbard of the US Federal Drug Administration 
(http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm114792.htm. Accessed 11 November 2011) and the notice of the IMB 
concerning the importation of body building products. ( http://www.imb.ie/EN/Safety--Quality/Advisory-Warning--Recall-
Notices/Human-Medicines/STATEMENT-ON-BODY-BUILDING-PRODUCTS.aspx?page=1&noticetypeid=-1&year=2007. 
Accessed 11 November 2011). 
Recommendation 6.5: We recommend that the HSE should carefully monitor 
the pharmacy market, conducting regular surveys of dispensing fees and 
offers made by pharmacies. 122 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
high blood pressure, high cholesterol and diabetes where the patient is likely to be 
familiar with their medical requirements, then the HSE should consider the viability 
of their use on a trial basis, perhaps initially using the services of one internet/mail 
order pharmacy awarded on the basis of competitive tender. This would, of course, 
necessitate legislative change. 
 
6.6  CONCLUSION 
Pharmacists provide a vital service to the community in dispensing pharmaceuticals 
and providing the associated services. This chapter has addressed the issue of how 
that  service  should  be  provided  by  decoupling  the  pharmacists'  payment  for 
dispensing services rendered from the cost of the pharmaceutical. The dispensing 
fee would form the sole way in which the pharmacist would be compensated. 
However, there is some evidence and good a priori reasoning for concluding that 
pharmacy  costs  are  above  the  competitive  norm  –  accepted  as  a  reasonable 
benchmark for setting the dispensing fee. At the same time, patients are poorly 
served by the current restrictions on the provision of information concerning prices, 
discounts, and services by pharmacists. These restrictions also have the effect of 
dampening competition between pharmacies. Sensible regulatory reform of these 
restrictions should not only make patients better off, but also lead to a more 
competitive market place and hence lead to a better basis on which to set dispensing 






7.1  INTRODUCTION 
For pharmaceuticals, an important feature of the market is that the consumer (i.e., 
the patient) is not the main decision-maker. Patients rely on their medical 
practitioner to prescribe appropriate pharmaceuticals. In many cases, patients do 
not bear the full cost of the prescribed pharmaceuticals due to the existence of 
public insurance (thus creating a moral hazard problem).
1 In addition, moral hazard 
effects can be exacerbated by expectations on the part of patients regarding 
prescriptions.
2 Medical practitioners' prescribing decisions are the result of input 
from the patient, commercial sources, professional colleagues, academic 
publications and the State (via regulation, licensing, etc.) (Soumerai et al., 1989). 
These features may result in resources being used inefficiently (for example, more 
expensive pharmaceuticals may be prescribed when a cheaper generic is available) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1   Moral hazard is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
2  Evidence suggests that over 87 per cent of visits to a medical practitioner in Spain, Italy and France result in a prescription, 
while this figure is lower than 75 per cent in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands (Kanavos et al., 2011, p. 45). A recent 
analysis of UK GPs estimated that approximately two-thirds of their consultations result in a prescription (Duerden et al., 
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(Kanavos et al., 2011). The key role of the prescriber in driving expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals is highlighted in a recent paper on the Greek experience over the 
period 1996-2005 (Lambrelli and O'Donnell, 2011). 
 
The preceding chapters have dealt with strategies focusing on the pricing and 
reimbursement of pharmaceuticals. Policies targeting the behaviour of pharmacists 
were discussed in Chapter 6. In this chapter, we consider the role of the prescriber. 
We describe the current role of prescribers in Ireland and previous attempts to 
influence the prescribing behaviour of Irish GPs (via the now-suspended Indicative 
Drug Targeting Scheme) in Section 7.2. Internationally, policies which target 
prescribers  may be grouped under three broad headings: prescribing by 
International Non-Proprietary Name (INN), financial incentives and prescription 
guidelines, feedback and monitoring. Experience with these alternative strategies in 
other countries is used to inform the policy proposals that are outlined in Section 
7.3. Section 7.4 summarises and concludes. 
 
7.2  THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE PRESCRIBER IN IRELAND 
7.2.1  Context 
In Ireland up to 2007, only registered medical practitioners and registered dentists 
were permitted to prescribe pharmaceuticals. In 2007, the legislation was amended 
to allow nurses and midwives to prescribe pharmaceuticals, with some restrictions 
(An Bord Altranais, 2010).
3,4 As described in Chapter 2, a small number of medical 
practitioners are permitted to dispense pharmaceuticals but in general, medical 
practitioners concentrate on the prescribing decision. The Medical Council's Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners lays out the 
requirements for prescribing on the part of medical practitioners (Medical Council, 
2009, section 59). Currently, medical practitioners have considerable influence over 
the volume and product mix of pharmaceuticals that are dispensed due to the 
'dispense as written'  provisions  stipulated  by the PSI  in their guidance  to 
pharmacists.
5 Prescribers are thus a key player in the pharmaceutical market, and 
their decisions have important consequences for pharmaceutical expenditure. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
3   The primary legislation is the Irish Medicines Board (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2006 (An Bord Altranais, 2010). 
4   In 2010, 238 nurses (or 0.3 per cent of registered active nurses) were permitted to prescribe (authors' calculations from An 
Bord Altranais, 2011). 
5   The guidance explicitly states that "...where a prescriber specifies a particular branded product on the prescription, the 
pharmacist is required to dispense the product specified. The pharmacist cannot supply a different equivalent brand 
without consulting the prescriber concerned, except where such supply is covered by a brand substitution agreement 
entered into in advance by both the pharmacist and prescriber concerned" (PSI, 2008b, p. 23). The Prescriber | 125 
Medical practitioners face few, if any, restrictions on the volume and type of 
products they may prescribe (other than limits on the length of a prescription).
6 
Medical practitioners are not obliged to write prescriptions generically and there are 
no financial incentives for them to do so. In addition, with the exception of certain 
hospitals, medical practitioners are not provided with formal prescription guidelines. 
Despite the existence of a comprehensive data-set on community dispensing,
7 and 
with the exception of two specific areas (benzodiazepine and controlled drugs), 
prescribing by medical practitioners in the community currently is not audited nor do 
medical practitioners receive standardised feedback on their prescribing behaviour. 
 
Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2 illustrated the strong upward trend in the number of items 
dispensed across the various PCRS schemes over the period 2000-2010. While 
increases in eligibility (particularly on the GMS Scheme in recent years) are an 
obvious driver of volume increases, changing demographics and increasing rates of 
chronic disease have an important influence on prescribing. In particular, as a result 
of deteriorating health, older individuals are both more likely to be on medication, 
and also to be on multiple medications.
8 Analysing the growth in the number of 
items by age groups shows strong growth in the number of items per claimant over 
the period 2005-2010 for the GMS, DP and LTI schemes, particularly in the older age 
groups. For example, over the period 2005-2010, the number of items per claimant 
per annum aged over 75 on the GMS Scheme increased from 61 to 80 (Figure 7.1).
9 
While one possible contributory factor to the increased volume of pharmaceuticals 
dispensed is an increase in potentially inappropriate prescribing, in the absence of 
formal audits of medical practitioners, it is difficult to obtain information on the 
appropriateness of prescribing in Ireland, although recent attempts to quantify the 
extent of the problem suggests that it is not absent in Ireland.
10 In the context of 
population ageing and increasing co-morbidity,  and the economic and clinical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
6   In Ireland, the maximum duration of a repeat prescription is six months (IMO, personal communication, 7 July 2011). 
7   The PCRS maintains a record of every claim for reimbursement under the various State pharmaceutical schemes. 
Information recorded includes the manufacturer name, pharmaceutical name, ATC 5 code, dosage form and strength, route 
of administration, patient details and GMS number (where appropriate), GP (or other prescriber) details and dispensing 
pharmacist details.  
8   In Ireland, information from The Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing shows that the percentage of those on 5 or more 
medications increases from 12 per cent for those aged 50-64 years to 29 per cent for those aged 65-74 years and to 41 per 
cent for those aged 75+ years (Barrett et al., 2011; Table 5.A45). Information from the US Medicare programme suggests 
that Medicare beneficiaries with five or more chronic conditions see an average of 13 physicians and fill an average of 50 
prescriptions per year (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2009).  
9   The DP Scheme was introduced in 1999 with a monthly deductible of £43 (Barry et al., 2010). The monthly deductible for 
the DP Scheme increased from €85 in January 2005 to €90 in January 2008 to €100 in January 2009 to €120 in January 2010 
(PCRS, personal communication, 30 August 2011; www.citizensinformation.ie). 
10   Barry et al. (2008) cite evidence in relation to inappropriate prescribing of proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) on the GMS 
Scheme in 2005. In addition, a recent review suggests that rates of potentially inappropriate prescribing among the older 
population in Ireland range from 21 per cent in primary care to 35 per cent in a hospital setting to 60 per cent in a nursing 
home setting (O'Mahony et al., 2010). Using data from the PCRS database, Cahir et al. (2010) estimate that over one-third 
of the Irish population aged 70+ were prescribed at least one potentially inappropriate product in 2007, accounting for 
approximately 9 per cent of total expenditure on pharmaceuticals for this group. Polypharmacy (evaluated in this study as 
the number of different repeat pharmaceutical classes per claimant) was significantly associated with potentially 
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implications of steadily increasing levels of prescribing, ensuring that prescribing is 
safe and cost-effective is even more pressing. 
 
FIGURE 7.1  Percentage of Claimants and Number of Items Dispensed per Claimant by Selected Age Groups on 
the GMS, DP and LTI Schemes, 2005-2010 
 
GMS  DP 





Notes:  See Annexe E for complete data tables. 
Source:  ESRI calculations from HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011. 
 
7.2.2  Prescribing of Generics 
Apart from the potential for any cost savings, generic prescribing is a recognised 
quality prescribing indicator. Prescribing by international non-proprietary name 
(INN), whereby prescribers use the active ingredient name (e.g. atorvastatin) rather 
than the brand name (e.g. Lipitor), reduces the potential for confusion and error on 
the part of the prescriber, pharmacist and patient (Barry et al., 2009; National 
Medicines Information Centre, 2009).  
 
In an international comparison of generic market shares across 16 Member States in 
2007, the share of the pharmaceutical market accounted for generics was the lowest 
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measured by volume (34 per cent) (European Commission, 2009, Figure 11, p. 62).
11 
The importance of generic prescriptions appears to have fallen over time in 
Ireland.
12 The comparison with the UK is particularly striking. It is estimated that 83 
per cent of prescriptions under the UK NHS were issued generically in 2007 (with 64 
per cent dispensed generically) (Barry et al., 2008).
13 In 2010 in England, 67.4 per 
cent of all prescription items were dispensed generically, representing 29.6 per cent 
of the total cost. In 2009 these figures were 66.1 per cent and 28.3 per cent 
respectively and in 2000 they were 51.8 per cent and 21.6 per cent respectively (NHS 
Information Centre, 2011b). In 2010 in Lithuania, 47 per cent of all items dispensed 
were generics (in comparison with 42 per cent in 2008) (Garuoline et al., 2011). 
 
In 2011, just over 18 per cent of items dispensed
14 on the GMS Scheme were 
generics (16.2 per cent branded and 2.1 per cent unbranded). Brand name products 
without a generic equivalent accounted for 50.2 per cent of total items dispensed on 
the GMS Scheme in that year, with brand name products with a generic equivalent 
accounting for 26.8 per cent of all items dispensed on the GMS Scheme in 2011.
15  
 
Rates of generic dispensing are lower still on the DP and LTI schemes, and rates of 
dispensing for brand name products with a generic equivalent are correspondingly 
higher (30.2 per cent on the DP Scheme and 41.2 per cent on the LTI Scheme in 
2011). Data for 2010 indicate that the share of generics has increased across all 
schemes over the last year (particularly for unbranded generics, albeit from a low 
base). On the HTD Scheme, over 85 per cent of products in both years were 
proprietary products without a generic equivalent (Figure 7.2).
16 
 
NCPE (2009) report that in 2008, 25 per cent of items on the GMS Scheme and 27 
per cent of items on the DP/LTI schemes
17 were dispensed as brand name products 
when a generic equivalent was available. Rates of generic dispensing on the GMS 
and DP/LTI schemes in 2008 were 18.3 per cent and 10.9 per cent respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
11   See also European Generic Medicines Association (2009). 
12   In 2007 19 per cent of prescriptions were dispensed generically. Generic prescribing accounted for 8 per cent of GMS 
expenditure in 2007. In 1997 the "...the percentage of items prescribed generically exceeded 22 per cent by volume and 12 
per cent by expenditure" (Barry et al., 2010, p. 243). 
13  The discrepancy arises because some pharmaceuticals prescribed generically are only available as a brand product (they are 
still 'in-patent') and a small number cannot be supplied as a generic product because the pharmacist (or dispensing medical 
practitioner) does not have the generic version in stock (Duerden et al., 2011). 
14   As explained in Chapter 2, the main source of data on pharmaceutical consumption in Ireland is pharmaceutical dispensing 
information from the PCRS, which administers the payments to pharmacies under the various State schemes. Assuming that 
all prescriptions are brought to a pharmacy, and dispensed correctly, data on dispensed pharmaceuticals should be 
equivalent to data on prescribed pharmaceuticals. 
15   The remaining 4.7 per cent of items dispensed on the GMS Scheme in 2011 were parallel imported products. 
16   Across all schemes, the share of parallel imported products has declined into 2011 (Chapter 4 discusses parallel imports in 
greater detail). 
17  NCPE (2009) does not distinguish between the DP and LTI schemes. 128 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
However, the pre-2010 data are not directly comparable with the data from 2010 
onwards
 presented in Figure 7.2 as the earlier research did not separately identify 
parallel imported products (Barry et al., 2009; NCPE, 2009). However, recent trends 
do suggest that the proportion of brand name products dispensed when there is a 
generic equivalent is increasing (Table 7.1). In England in 2008 in contrast, just 5 per 
cent of prescription items were prescribed by brand when a generic was available 
(Department of Health, 2010). 
 






Notes:  a  Year to Date June 2011. 
Source:    ESRI calculations from HSE, personal communication, 23 September 2011. 
 
For the top ten brand name products with a generic equivalent by value, variation 
across the different products is illustrated in Table 7.1 for the GMS and DP schemes. 
On the GMS Scheme in 2011, the proportion of generics dispensed ranges from 5.7 
per cent for budesonide to 58.1 per cent for omeprazole. Similarly, the range is 
broad on the DP Scheme in 2011; from 3.0 per cent for anastrozole to 38.1 per cent 
for omeprazole. In comparison with 2010, the share of generics (in both volume and 
value terms) is increasing in most cases for both schemes.  
 
It is not clear why the proportion of generic products dispensed varies so much 
across the GMS and DP schemes; for the seven products that are common to the 
two schemes, the divergence between rates of generic dispensing on the GMS and 
DP schemes ranges from approximately six percentage points for rosuvastatin to 
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influence of socio-economic status on quality of prescribing in the over 70s 
population in Ireland in the early 2000s found that those on lower incomes (i.e., 
existing medical card holders or GMS patients) were significantly more likely to be 
prescribed generics than more affluent patients (i.e., those newly eligible for the 
GMS Scheme after the extension of medical card eligibility to all over 70s in July 
2001) (Odubanjo et al., 2004). French research (further discussed in Section 7.3.1) 
finds that GPs consider the financial situation of their patients in making prescribing 
decisions. However, GMS patients are eligible for free pharmaceuticals (subject to a 
50c charge per item, i.e., unrelated to the value of the item), so it is difficult to argue 
that a concern for the financial situation of GMS patients explains the divergent 
patterns observed in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1  Generics (Branded and Unbranded) as a Proportion of the Top 10 Pharmaceuticals With a Generic 





2010  2011 
 
Volume  Value  Volume  Value 
 
%  %  %  % 
Esomeprazole  5.7  4.4  24.5  25.7 
Rosuvastatin  2.5  1.8  21.6  19.6 
Clopidogrel  16.0  12.6  28.3  27.2 
Pantoprazole  30.8  33.2  41.7  40.4 
Omeprazole  52.2  54.6  58.1  59.8 
Acetylsalicylic Acid-Aspirin (Antithrombotic)  22.2  16.2  17.5  12.9 
Venlafaxine  19.5  23.0  24.4  25.8 
Lamotrigine  5.3  4.2  5.9  4.5 
Budesonide  41.1  48.1  5.7  6.9 




2010  2011 
 
Volume  Value  Volume  Value 
 
%  %  %  % 
Esomeprazole  3.2  2.4  15.4  16.2 
Rosuvastatin  1.5  1.0  15.2  13.6 
Clopidogrel  10.3  7.9  19.3  18.1 
Omeprazole  33.2  35.6  38.9  41.2 
Pantoprazole  19.7  21.2  29.2  27.6 
Venlafaxine  12.9  15.2  17.1  17.6 
Acetylsalicylic Acid-Aspirin (Antithrombotic)  10.1  7.0  8.5  6.0 
Gabapentin  10.5  7.7  14.2  9.0 
Anastrozole  0.0  0.0  3.0  2.4 
Amlodipine  28.2  33.8  33.1  31.9 
 
Notes:  a  Year to Date June 2011. 
Source:    ESRI calculations from HSE, personal communication, 23 September 2011. 
 
The low rate of generic prescribing in the community in Ireland by international 
standards is also a feature of the hospital sector. Notwithstanding the existence of 
hospital pharmaceutical prescription guidelines/formularies in many Irish hospitals, a 
comparison of prescribing practices in a HSE hospital and an NHS hospital in 2009 
found significantly higher rates of generic prescribing in the NHS hospital (79.7 per 
cent versus 52.5 per cent in the HSE hospital). Analysing hospital-only products (to 130 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
overcome the potential influence of pre-existing prescriptions from the community), 
the difference in generic prescribing rates was still significantly different between 
the two hospitals (80.4 per cent in the NHS hospital versus 53.5 per cent in the HSE 
hospital). Reviews of prescribing behaviour by the clinical pharmacist were also 
significantly less common in the HSE hospital. While limited in its scope, the study 




A 1997 survey of Irish GPs found that the main deterrent to generic prescribing was 
a concern over the reliability and quality of generic products. GPs were also 
concerned that pharmacists may legally dispense more expensive branded products 
for private prescriptions written generically. Contrasting the situation in Ireland with 
that in England and Northern Ireland (where rates of generic prescribing and 
dispensing were much higher), Feely et al. (1997) stressed the role of the authorities 
in reassuring medical practitioners (and the public) about the effectiveness and 
safety of generic products.  
 
In summary, despite the fact that prescribing by INN is a feature of medical 
education in Ireland (Section 7.3.1), that the IMO recommends generic prescribing 
and that the IMB is involved in reassuring medical practitioners (and the public) 
about the safety and efficacy of generic pharmaceuticals,
19  rates of generic 
prescribing in Ireland are low and considerably out of line with those in other 
countries. 
 
7.2.3  Indicative Drug Targeting Scheme 
In January 1993, an agreement was implemented between the DoHC and the IMO 
which included provision for the allocation of an indicative individual monthly drug 
target for each GP to enable him/her to better pursue the objective of "responsible 
and cost effective prescribing" (Murphy, 1997, p.17). The scheme, known as the 
Indicative Drug Targeting Scheme (IDTS), was suspended in early 2006. Savings were 
used to further develop general practice by allocating 50 per cent to the individual 
GP to investment in specific practice development and 50 per cent to the Health 
Board for overall development of general practice (Murphy, 1997). Prescribing 
targets were adjusted for panel size and demographics, as well as 'high cost' 
patients.
20 The scheme was voluntary and there were no sanctions on those who 
failed to meet their target.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
18   See also Section 7.3.3. 
19   See also Section 7.3.1. 
20   The budget was set by a combination of the GP's previous prescribing costs and the national average (Walley et al., 2000). A 
General Practice Unit (GP Unit) was established in each Health Board. Each month, the General Medical Services Payments 
Board (the precursor to the PCRS) returned statistics on prescribing for each participating GP to the GP Unit for analysis. 
From 1995 onwards, adjustments to targets were made on a monthly basis (Comptroller and Auditor General, 1997). The 
budget was set by a combination of the GP's previous prescribing costs and the national average (Walley et al., 2000). The Prescriber | 131 
It was estimated that IR£13.5 million was saved in the first year of the scheme and a 
trend towards increased generic prescribing was reported, with no discernible 
negative effects on quality of prescribing (Murphy, 1997). Analysis by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General revealed savings of £18 million over the first four 
years of the scheme. Of the 1,395 GPs who participated in the IDTS continuously for 
the first four years, only 5 per cent achieved savings in each of the four years while 
27 per cent did not achieve savings in any year. However, the proportion of GPs 
coming in under their prescribing target or within 10 per cent of their target 
increased from 65 to 73 per cent over the first four years of the scheme. The rate of 
increase in pharmaceutical expenditure on the GMS Scheme over the period 1993-
1996 decreased to a little over half its rate over the previous four years, with the 
proportion of substitutable pharmaceuticals  prescribed at their lowest cost 
increasing over the period  (Comptroller and Auditor General, 1997). By 2005 
however, less than 3 per cent of participating GPs were achieving savings, and total 
savings in that year amounted to just €0.7 million, down from €3.6 million in 2000 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 1997). 
 
Walley et al. (2000) also found that savings were short lived. They carried out an 
analysis of prescribing behaviour by 233 GPs in the Eastern Health Board (EHB) area 
over the period 1990-1995.
21 They divided GPs into three groups based on their 
spending per GMS patient relative to their indicative budget for 1994 (labelled 
'savers', 'modest overspenders' and 'large overspenders'). They found that while cost 
increases in the year before the introduction of the IDTS were similar and not 
significantly different for the three groups, in the year after  the scheme was 
introduced, there was a significant difference between the groups (with mean 
increases in costs of -7.9 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 7.3 per cent for savers, modest 
overspenders and large overspenders respectively). However, by the final year of the 
study, the cost increases were similar and not significantly different for the three 
groups. 
 
A review of the IDTS completed by the Health Boards and the DoHC in April 2005 
recommended that the existing IDTS should be comprehensively reviewed with all 
stakeholders and replaced by an enhanced scheme at the earliest possible date. 
Subsequently, the DoHC/HSE agreed terms of reference with the IMO for a review of 
the IDTS, to be overseen by a joint Department/HSE and IMO team, with appropriate 
analysis by an agreed expert (Deloitte and Touche, 2003). No further details are 
available on the team or any publications arising from its work. However, the IDTS 
was suspended in early 2006 (Dail Eireann, 2008). We return to the issue of financial 
incentives in Section 7.3.2. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
21   At the time, the EHB was the largest in the country, representing 360,000 GMS (medical card) patients and 528 GPs (out of 
a total of 1,666). It included Dublin, and had a very small proportion of rural practices (Walley et al., 2000). 132 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
7.2.4  Prescription Guidelines, Feedback and Monitoring 
The HSE advice to GPs states that "medical practitioners have been asked for their 
co-operation in securing whatever economies are possible without reducing the 
effectiveness of the service or affecting the best interests of patients. They have 
been asked to consider, when prescribing, whether there is an equally effective but 
less expensive medicinal product available" (PCRS, 2006, pp. 77-78). 
 
More recently the Irish Medical Council's Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
for Registered Medical Practitioners states that medical practitioners "...have a duty 
to assist in the efficient and effective use of health care resources … [and] should be 
aware of the wider need to use limited health care resources efficiently and 
responsibly" (Medical Council, 2009, paragraph 49.2). In particular, the Council 
encourages medical practitioners to prescribe bio-equivalent generic medicines 
where they are safe and effective (ibid., paragraph 49.2). Medical practitioners are 
asked not to "...rely solely or excessively on promotional literature distributed by 
pharmaceutical companies for information about particular drugs. You should seek 
independent evidence-based sources of information on the benefits and risks 
associated with medicines before prescribing" (ibid., paragraph 59.8). The sources of 
the independent evidence-based information are not specified. 
 
Despite the existence of a comprehensive data-set on pharmaceutical dispensing in 
the community,
22 there is currently no standardised feedback mechanism for GPs. 
GPs who submit claims electronically are able to access monthly reports on the 
dispensing of benzodiazepine and controlled drugs under the GMS Scheme. The 
reports detail the number of prescriptions by age and sex, and allow the GP to 
compare their rate with the national average for all GMS GPs. A similar analysis of 
the prescription of oral nutritional supplements is currently planned (PCRS, 2011). 
However, it is not clear what proportion of GPs access these reports, how frequently 
they do so, and what impact the information has on their prescribing decisions 
(Section 7.3.3 discusses the issue of prescription guidelines, feedback and 
monitoring in greater detail). 
 
As part of an exercise by the PCRS to make GPs more aware of the cost implications 
of their prescribing behaviour, an electronic monitoring tool is now being developed 
which will allow GPs to review the cost of pharmaceuticals dispensed for their GMS 
patients, and to calculate the cost savings that are possible with generic substitution. 
The analysis is available for brand name pharmaceuticals with generic equivalents. 
Tabulations of potential cost savings will be available for each GP, and for each 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
22   However, the PCRS do not at present have full information on pharmaceutical dispensing to patients below the DP 
threshold of €132 per month. This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. The Prescriber | 133 
patient on a GP's list  (PCRS, personal communication, 30 August 2011).  In 
combination with the GPs' own records, the tool will also allow GPs to monitor their 
patients' consumption of pharmaceuticals by identifying where a prescription has 
not been filled, or where an alternative product was dispensed. As with the existing 
benzodiazepine and controlled drugs reports, the success of the tool will very much 
depend on the extent to which GPs engage with this process.  
 
In the hospitals sector, nearly all hospitals have their own hospital pharmaceutical 
prescribing guidelines or formulary (Vogler et al., 2010), in addition to/separate from 
the reimbursable lists for the various PCRS schemes.
23 The National Medicines 
Information Centre (NMIC) at St James's Hospital produces regular bulletins with 
treatment guidelines in relation to numerous conditions; in 2011 the bulletins 
covered the management of stroke, the use of antidepressants in adults and the 
management of dementia (National Medicines Information Centre, 2011a, b; c). 
Where pharmaceuticals are listed, the INN name, as well as the relevant brand name 
pharmaceutical, is listed. In 2009, the NMIC devoted a bulletin to the issue of generic 
prescribing (National Medicines Information Centre, 2009). 
 
The extent to which Irish medical practitioners are aware of the costs of the 
pharmaceuticals they are prescribing is limited. While MIMS Ireland (or Monthly 
Index of Medical Specialities Ireland) is an independently edited publication 
designed as a prescribing guide for medical practitioners, it includes the ex-factory 
price only (i.e., it does not include pharmacy mark-ups, if applicable, and dispensing 
fees) (McGuire et al., 2009). The Irish Medicines Formulary, a biannual publication 
which is provided free to all registered, practising GPs in Ireland by the ICGP, 
contains similar information on products and ex-factory prices. A study of over 100 
consultants and non-consultant hospital doctors in two university teaching hospitals 
in Ireland found that medical practitioners' estimates of the cost of ten commonly 
used products were accurate in only 12 per cent of cases, too low for 50 per cent 
and too high for 38 per cent. In many cases, the MIMS was not available on the 
wards (McGuire et al., 2009). In any case, it is our understanding that the British 
National Formulary (BNF) is the most usual source of information for Irish medical 
practitioners in a hospital setting, which does not contain Irish ex-factory prices.
24   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
23  While the current IPHA and APMI agreements allow the HSE to carry out pharmacoeconomic assessment of new as well as 
existing products that may be high cost or have a significant budget impact on the Irish healthcare system, to date no 
products have been delisted from the GMS or DP scheme reimbursable lists. However, a review of glucosamine was 
undertaken to determine whether the product should continue to be reimbursed (Tilson et al., 2010), with the resulting 
high incremental cost-effectiveness ratio leading the NCPE to recommend that "...the pricing and reimbursement of these 
products under the Community Drugs Schemes should be reconsidered" (NCPE, 2010, p.1). 
24   HSE, personal communication, 15 November 2011. See http://bnf.org/bnf/index.htm for information on the BNF ( accessed 
21 November 2011). 134 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
7.3  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Prescribing behaviour is influenced by numerous factors including the characteristics 
of the patient and medical practitioner, industry marketing and advertising, financial 
incentives (including those generated by method of payment) and non-financial 
incentives (such as medical ethics, information provision, guidelines, etc.). Here, we 
focus on three strategies that are frequently employed on the supply side with 
regard to prescriber behaviour. 
 
7.3.1  Prescribing by INN 
A key driver of the high rate of generic prescribing in the UK has been the 
acceptance by UK practitioners of writing prescriptions by generic name without 
specifying the brand or manufacturer, i.e. open prescribing (Barry et al., 2009). In the 
UK, INN prescribing is strongly encouraged by the NHS and widely practised (Vogler 
and Schmickl, 2010). In addition to the potential cost savings, prescribing by INN is 
safer as it reduces the potential for confusion when prescribing a pharmaceutical or 
when seeking to identify a pharmaceutical that the patient has been taking (National 
Medicines Information Centre, 2009). 
 
A study of French GPs' willingness to prescribe
25 by INN highlighted the key roles 
played by GPs' information about pharmaceuticals and the sources they receive this 
information from, by GPs' volume of cases and to a lesser extent by the socio-
economic characteristics of their patients (Paraponaris et al., 2004). The role of 
information was particularly important. GPs who consulted French prescription 
practice guidelines, who read several medical journals and who used a computer 
were significantly more likely to prescribe by INN. GPs who met with more than 10 
pharmaceutical sales representatives a week were also significantly less likely to 
prescribe by INN.
26  Windmeijer  et al.  (2006)  also found that Dutch GPs' 
pharmaceutical price sensitivity was adversely affected by promotional activity by 
pharmaceutical companies. A recent Irish study focused on the role of GP and 
practice characteristics as well as the characteristics of the product in motivating 
GPs' prescribing decisions concerning new pharmaceuticals (Bourke and Roper, 
2011). 
 
There is some international evidence that GPs consider the financial situation of 
their patients; GPs in areas with higher than average rates of public housing were 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
25   Note that the study examined GPs' willingness to prescribe by INN, rather than their actual prescribing behaviour. It was 
also carried out before two significant reforms of the French system; from 2002, French GPs are required to prescribe by 
INN in exchange for fee increases, and in October 2003, reference pricing and generic substitution was introduced 
(Paraponaris et al., 2004).  
26   In comparison to originator or brand name manufactures, manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals devote fewer 
resources to marketing of their products (Paraponaris et al., 2004).  The Prescriber | 135 
significantly more likely to prescribe by INN in the French study discussed above 
(Paraponaris  et al., 2004).  Lundin  (2000), in an analysis of Swedish medical 
practitioners, also finds that medical practitioners are less likely to prescribe trade-
name pharmaceuticals to patients that have to pay large sums out of pocket (see 
also  Mott  and Cline  (2002)  for US evidence).  Dalen  et al.  (2011)  note  the 
international evidence on habit persistence in medical practitioners' prescribing 
behaviour, but in their analysis of Norwegian data find that as the price difference 
between generics and brand name products increase, medical practitioners become 
more inclined to prescribe a generic version. Medical practitioner (i.e., age, sex, GP 
or hospital medical practitioner) and patient characteristics (i.e., age, sex, extent of 
co-payment) were also found to be important.  
 
The extent to which Irish GPs are still sceptical about the reliability and quality of 
generic products is questionable; the IMO recently issued a policy brief advocating 
the use of mandatory generic prescribing (IMO, 2010). Evidence from Sweden after 
the introduction of generic substitution by pharmacists in October 2002 suggests 
that resistance to generic substitution was more frequent among patients than 
prescribers, with prescribers rarely restricting substitution of generics (Andersson et 
al., 2005). 
 
Prescribing by INN is a strategy which is strengthened by complementary policies in 
relation to generic substitution on the part of pharmacists (Kanavos, 2008), and by 
complementary policies in relation to patient co-payments (Godman et al., 2011). In 
addition, patients need to be reassured that generic products are equivalent and 
safe to consume; the IMB publishes information leaflets for the public which provide 
reassurance on the bioequivalence of generics (IMB, 2010). Currently, legislation to 
give effect to a system of reference pricing and generic substitution by pharmacists 
is being drafted. Clearly the body charged with certifying interchangeability will have 
a key role in assuring medical practitioners and patients on issues such as quality and 
safety. 
 
A commonly cited reason for the significantly higher rates of generic prescribing in 
the UK is the role of medical education; however, we understand that medical 
practitioners are taught the INN in medical school
27 and, therefore, this should not 
be a barrier to INN prescribing on the part of Irish medical practitioners. A number of 
countries have a policy of mandatory prescribing by INN (including Estonia, 
Lithuania, Portugal and Romania) (Vogler and Schmickl, 2010). For single source in-
patent pharmaceuticals and multiple source off-patent pharmaceuticals that will be 
deemed interchangeable with the introduction of reference pricing and generic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
27   PSI, personal communication, 17 June 2011. 136 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
substitution next year in Ireland, mandatory INN prescribing would be a safe and 
cost-effective policy change. Exceptions to mandatory INN prescribing would be 
allowed for legitimate ‘no substitution’ prescriptions (see Chapter 4) and for cases in 




7.3.2  Financial Incentives 
Financial incentives include performance payments to prescriber for achieving 
prescription targets and remaining within (acceptable) prescription limits. Financial 
penalties may be levied for missing targets or exceeding limits. Financial incentives 
may also take the form of budgets. Budgets are funds that are allocated by payers 
(e.g. the State, private health insurers) to individual medical practitioners or groups 
of  medical practitioners, thereby giving them financial responsibility for the 
management of their own budget. As  medical practitioners are financially 
responsible for any overspends, budgets provide incentives to prescribers to 
prescribe fewer and less expensive pharmaceuticals (such as generics) (Sturm et al., 
2011).  A number of countries have experimented with performance-related 
payments and pharmaceutical budgets, and provide valuable lessons.  
 
In Germany in 1993, it was agreed that if a regional pharmaceutical budget exceeded 
a maximum threshold, the medical practitioners would be responsible for the 
difference. In the first year (1993), medical practitioners' liability was limited to 1 per 
cent of their total fees, but after the first year, medical practitioners became fully 
responsible for any excess spending. There were no positive incentives; medical 
practitioners were not allowed to keep the difference if they underspent (Delnoij 
and Brenner, 2000). While the number of prescriptions initially declined following 
the introduction of the sanctions, the number began to rise again in 1995, and the 
scheme was eventually discontinued in 2001. Prescription levels returned to their 
previous levels mainly due to ineffective policy implementation and enforcement. A 
particular problem was that it was difficult to identify which medical practitioners 
were responsible for the overspend; some medical practitioners challenged the 
legality of the sickness funds' demands (Delnoij and Brenner, 2000). It has also been 
suggested that medical practitioners responded by referring more patients to 
Recommendation 7.1: We recommend that, taking into account forthcoming 
legislation on reference pricing and generic substitution, including 
interchangeability and no substitution prescriptions, mandatory prescription 
by INN should be introduced for all medical practitioners to encourage safe 
and cost-effective prescribing.  
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hospital; thus, estimates of cost savings may be overestimated (Kanavos et al., 
2011). There was also evidence of gaming; in anticipation of the pharmaceutical 
budget, the cost and volume of prescriptions showed a significant increase in the 
final quarter of 1992, just before the budget came into effect (Delnoij and Brenner, 
2000). 
 
Between 1991 and 1999, the UK GP Fundholding scheme made GPs responsible for 
prescribing costs (Delnoij and Brenner, 2000). GPs' fundholding budgets covered 
elective surgery, outpatient care, diagnostic testing, community nursing and 
prescribing, and budgets were based on historical trend. In terms of prescribing 
costs, Gosden et al. (1999) found that the prescribing costs of fundholding practices 
increased at a lower rate than non-fundholding practices. The reason for the 
reduction was that fundholders switched to cheaper, generic pharmaceuticals, 
rather than a reduction in the number of items prescribed. However, there is 
evidence that the differences between fundholding and non-fundholding practices 
declined over time (Delnoij and Brenner, 2000). In addition, it is difficult to establish 
a direct causal link between participation in GP fundholding and lower prescribing 
costs; it is possible that those practices which embraced fundholding may have 
delivered the same service improvements, or a significant part of them, in the 
absence of the scheme (Department of Health and Social Services, 1999). Problems 
associated with fundholding included the budget formula (as it was based on 
historical trend, past inefficiency was rewarded and the potential for gaming in the 
year before the scheme was introduced was increased), administrative costs and 
selection  (Croxson  et al., 2001; Dusheiko  et al., 2003).  The successor to GP 
fundholding, Practice Based Commissioning (PBC) has encountered many of the 
same problems (Curry et al., 2008). 
 
A recent cross-country analysis of pharmaceutical consumption among the over 50s 
found that pharmaceutical consumption among the over 50s was significantly lower 
in countries with budgets for prescribers (Lambrelli and O'Donnell, 2009). However, 
a  comprehensive review of studies evaluating the impact of budgets on 
pharmaceutical spending found that while budgets for medical practitioners can 
limit pharmaceutical expenditure by limiting the volume of prescribed 
pharmaceuticals, increasing the use of generic pharmaceuticals or both, the majority 
of studies included were found to have serious methodological limitations. Thus 
clear recommendations on budgets could not be inferred (Sturm et al., 2011). 
 
Many countries now include prescribing targets as indicators and as part of a more 
general pay-for-performance elements of medical practitioner remuneration. For 
example, three of the 134 indicators in the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework 138 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
(QOF) relate to 'medicines management' (NHS Information Centre, 2010).
28 In 
2009/2010, achievement on these three indicators was 92.0 per cent, 97.7 per cent 
and 96.1 per cent respectively.
29 In New Zealand, the Performance Management 
Programme (whereby Primary Health Organisations (PHO)
30 are eligible for extra 
performance-related payments) includes an indicator that tracks PHO 
pharmaceutical  expenditure relative to a benchmark. In Australia, the Quality 
Prescribing Incentive of the Practice Incentives Program (PIP) aims to encourage 
practices to keep up to date with information on the quality use of pharmaceuticals 
by rewarding participation by practices in a range of activities recognised or provided 
by the National Prescribing Service (NPS) (Section 7.3.3). To qualify for a payment, 
practices are required to participate in three activities per annum.
31 As most pay-for-
performance initiatives are relatively recent phenomena, there are few evaluations 
of the various pay-for-performance schemes. While a number of studies of the QOF 
have found that the QOF has an impact on prescribing (see for example, MacBride-
Stewart et al., 2008), the extent to which the specific indicators in relation to 
'medicines management' have been effective in reducing overall pharmaceutical 
costs has not been studied. 
 
In summary, the evidence on the effectiveness of incentive schemes for medical 
practitioners in limiting pharmaceutical (and other healthcare) expenditure is weak 
(Bloor and Freemantle, 1996; Gosden et al., 1999; Sturm et al., 2011). What we do 
know is that most incentive schemes are only temporarily effective, by removing a 
degree of unnecessary expenditure from the system. This was also seen with the 
IDTS where the rise in prescribing costs for all three groups was similar in later years 
(Walley  et al., 2000).  In addition, while they may reduce pharmaceutical 
expenditure, the extent to which costs are simply transferred to other parts of the 
health-care system is unclear. Such schemes also require significant investment in 
terms of data management and monitoring (Smith et al., 2004). Hence: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
28   Medicines 10: The practice meets the prescribing adviser at least annually, has agreed up to three actions related to 
prescribing and subsequently provided evidence of change. Medicines 11: A medication review is recorded in the notes in 
the preceding 15 months for all patients being prescribed four or more repeat medicines. Medicines 12: A medication 
review is recorded in the notes in the preceding 15 months for all patients being prescribed repeat medicines (NHS 
Information Centre, 2010). 
29   Available from: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfiles/QOF/2009-10/National%20tables/QOF0910_National_Organisational.xls 
(accessed 16 August 2011).  
30   PHOs are not-for-profit entities that provide services either directly by employing staff or by contracting with independent 
providers. Although primary health care practitioners, such as GPs and allied health professionals, are encouraged to join 
PHOs, membership is voluntary. In 2009, there were 82 PHOs around the country (Cumming and Mays, 2011). 
31  (i)  A clinical audit of prescribing for specific pharmaceutical groups, using materials approved or produced by the NPS. 
(ii)  Case studies using problem-based distance learning provided by the NPS. The case studies present a clinical scenario 
accompanied by a set of questions designed to help participants refine their clinical decision-making skills. The NPS 
presents each case study in two formats, a printed version inserted with NPS News and an online version. 
(iii)  Practice visit(s) by an independent pharmaceutical detailer working from a number of Divisions of General Practice. 
These 'academic detailing' visits will act as a resource for GPs and promote the quality of prescribing (Medicare 
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7.3.3  Prescription Guidelines, Feedback and Monitoring 
Influencing medical practitioner prescribing decision involves numerous strategies, 
including dissemination of printed education materials, feedback on prescribing 
patterns, prompts and reminders at the time  of prescribing and one-to-one 
education  (Soumerai  et al., 1989).  Most  countries  attempt to influence 
pharmaceutical prescribing to some extent, but there is variation in the level, 
frequency and intensity of the efforts (Kanavos, 2008, p. 2). 
 
In some countries, an independent agency is responsible for collating information on 
prescription guidelines and presenting this information to medical practitioners. For 
example, in Australia, the National Prescribing Service (NPS) assists GPs to achieve 
more effective, quality prescribing through a range of education, support and 
prescribing information. The NPS is a professional organisation, run independently of 
the Australian Government with broad GP representation and leadership.
32 As part 
of the PIP (described in Section 7.3.2), GP practices may receive additional payments 
for performance in relation to participation in quality prescribing activities, including 
clinical audits of prescribing for specific pharmaceutical groups and practice visits by 
independent pharmaceutical detailers providing advice in relation to quality 
prescribing. In New Zealand, the New Zealand Guidelines Group is an independent, 
not-for-profit organisation that promotes the use of evidence in the delivery of 
health and disability services.
33  
 
In the UK, the NHS Prescribing Support Unit aims to support policy initiatives 
concerned with primary care by producing regular reporting on prescribing activity 
and by providing informed advice on prescription-related issues.
34 It maintains two 
important databases, the Prescribing Cost Analysis (PCA) database
35 and the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework Achievement and Exception Reporting database. Analysis 
of the PCA database results in two annual publications that present national-level 
trends and comparisons (NHS Information Centre, 2011b; a). Individual GP practices 
and Primary Care Trusts may also access real time on-line analysis of prescribing data 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
32   See www.nps.org.au for further details (accessed 5 October 2011). 
33   See www.nzgg.org.nz for further details (accessed 5 October 2011). 
34   See www.ic.nhs.uk/psu for further details (accessed 16 August 2011). 
35   PCA data refer only to prescriptions dispensed in England (although the prescription could be written in England, the Isle of 
Man, Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales). 
Recommendation 7.2: We recommend that, on the basis of existing evidence, 
financial incentives to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure should not be 
introduced for medical practitioners in Ireland.  
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over the previous 60 months (termed the 'Prescribing Toolkit'). Data is updated on a 
monthly basis (six weeks after the dispensing month) and includes: budgets and 
expenditure forecasts; costs and volumes of prescribing; prescribing totals by 
prescribers at all British National Formulary (BNF) levels. Practice prescribing can be 
analysed comparatively across a variety of domains such as: patient; prescribing unit; 
ASTRO prescribing unit - age, sex and temporary resident prescribing unit; STAR 
prescribing unit – specific therapeutic age-sex related prescribing units.
36 
 
In many countries, the existence of positive or negative reimbursement lists acts as 
an indirect control on prescribing behaviour (OECD, 2008; Lambrelli and O'Donnell, 
2009). In New Zealand, prescribing behaviour is further regulated indirectly by 
PHARMAC, the State agency responsible for the pricing and reimbursement of 
pharmaceuticals in New Zealand, via additional requirements for reimbursement of 
certain products. In order for certain types of products to be subsidised by the 
State,
37 medical practitioners must fill out detailed 'special authority' or 'controlled 
drug' forms (for example, the 'special authority' form for the reimbursement of 
risperidone is reproduced in Figure 7.3).
38 
 
FIGURE 7.3  Special Authority Form for Reimbursement of Risperidone by PHARMAC New Zealand 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
36   See www.nhsbsa.nhs.uk/ for further details (accessed 5 October 2011). 
37   Special authorisations are required where a medical practitioner is applying for access to subsidy or increased subsidy on 
behalf of a patient, or applying for the waiver of certain restrictions otherwise present on the Community Pharmaceutical 
Schedule (see www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/sectorservices-claims-specialauthority#what; accessed 7 November 
2011). 
38   The issue is similar to that which arises in the case of 'no substitution' regulations for generic substitution (discussed in 
Chapter 4). 
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Kanavos (2008) concluded that it is unclear what effect non-financial incentives and 
measures have in practice, but it is thought that unless they are vigorously 
implemented and monitored, their effectiveness is likely to be poor. In particular, a 
comprehensive review of over 44 papers on prescribing in primary care found that 
there was no evidence that one of the most ubiquitous forms of prescribing 
education, i.e., distribution of printed education materials, had any influence on 
prescribing behaviour (when used in isolation) (Soumerai et al., 1989).
39 A recent 
review of the effectiveness of various strategies to control the inappropriate 
prescription of antibiotics similarly highlights that the use of printed educational 
materials or audit and feedback alone results in no or only small changes in 
prescribing (Arnold and Straus, 2011). Feedback may be more effective when 
accompanied by explicit information on suggestions for alternative treatment 
(Soumerai et al., 1989). There is also some evidence that one-to-one counselling or 
education outreach (by 'academic detailers') can be effective in changing prescribing 
behaviour, and also some evidence that such interventions can be cost effective, i.e., 
achieve net savings (Soumerai et al., 1989; Figuerias et al., 2001; Jamtvedt et al., 




Feedback on prescribing behaviour requires information on the most appropriate 
course of treatment for particular conditions. Cognisant of the work of the HSE 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
39   Even in situations involving significant risks to patients (i.e. the prescription of hazardous products), the evidence on the 
effectiveness of the distribution of printed warnings to prescribers was limited (Soumerai et al., 1989). 
Recommendation 7.4: We recommend that consideration should be given to 
centralising and standardising the provision of prescription guidelines to both 
GPs and hospital medical practitioners.  
 
Recommendation 7.3: We recommend: (i) the PCRS should coordinate the 
provision of periodic benchmarking information to GPs; and (ii) the HSE should 
undertake a similar exercise for hospital medical practitioners practising in 
public hospitals. Both the PCRS and the HSE should be pro-active in following 
up with individual medical practitioners who demonstrate prescribing 
behaviour that is at variance with clinical guidelines. Protocols should be 
developed with the Medical Council that specify the procedures to be followed 
for cases referred to the Medical Council for inappropriate prescribing. 
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7.4  CONCLUSION 
In facilitating safer and more cost-effective prescribing, it is important to recognise 
the contribution of  complementary demand-  and supply-side measures (e.g. 
facilitating early entry by generic companies; reference pricing; reimbursement of 
pharmacists via flat fees and/or regressive mark-ups; generic substitution, etc.) 
(Kanavos, 2008). It is also important to recognise the extent to which prescribing 
behaviour in the community is influenced by prescribing decisions that are made by 
hospital prescribers. Notwithstanding these caveats, there are a number of 
strategies that have been suggested as mechanisms to encourage safer and more 
cost-effective prescribing, and the international evidence offers some directions for 
current policy. The key is to ensure that medical practitioners are provided with 
effective information and support to enable them to make the most appropriate 
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Chapter 8 
 
A Roadmap for Reform 
In the face of the financial crisis, recession and the consequent budgetary pressures, 
many OECD governments introduced pharmaceutical price reductions (OECD, 2010). 
Ireland was no exception. However, such policy measures can only ever be short-
term fixes. In this report we have sought to go beyond these short-term measures, 
by designing an appropriate framework for the delivery of pharmaceuticals that will 
improve value for money, while at the same time ensuring security of supply. In 
designing the policy framework we have drawn extensively on the experience of 
what works elsewhere, while at the same time paying careful attention to the 
different institutional, economic and social contexts that may limit the applicability 
of a lesson from (say) New  Zealand to Ireland. However, we have  also  been 
fortunate that we have been able to draw on an extensive set of earlier reports 
undertaken for the Health Service Executive and/or the Department of Health. Our 
proposals for policy are, therefore, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. They 
build upon what has gone before. In part, this has been driven by evidence that 
variation within given health care systems is much greater than between them 
(Borowitz et al., 2011, pp. 33-37), and that no one system fulfils all objectives. Thus 
by revising rather than redesigning the current model of pharmaceutical delivery 
better value for money can be realised, while at the same time the costs and 
unintended consequences of large changes in the pharmaceutical delivery system 
can be prevented. 
 
Designing recommendations to a considerable extent involves creating the right set 
of incentives. Irrespective of the pharmaceutical delivery system, incentives exist 
upon which pharmaceutical suppliers, wholesalers, pharmacists,  medical 
practitioners and patients act. It is therefore important to get these incentives right. 
The objectives of the pharmaceutical delivery system need to be clearly specified in 
terms of value for money and security of supply. The system is to serve the interests 
of patients and taxpayers, not the stakeholders that deliver the service. The system 
becomes ill-focused and difficult to manage if it has too many objectives to attain. 
Furthermore,  to the maximum extent possible we have designed the various 
recommendations in order that they work with the grain of the market rather than 
against it. Several examples in the past, such as the quantitative restrictions on new 
pharmacies, show the problems created by not taking market forces into account. 
This, it seems to us, is part of a wider trend in the professions in Ireland, such as 
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safeguarding  patient  interests through appropriate professional regulation  of 
standards and conduct. 
 
Nevertheless, it would be foolish to suggest that, even if all the recommendations in 
this report were implemented immediately, no further reform would be necessary. 
Apart from the fact that new problems arise or that we may have specified the 
problem/solution inadequately, the pharmaceutical delivery system consists of 
stakeholders at every stage in the pharmaceutical delivery system that are likely to 
react to the recommendations in ways in which we have not foreseen. In some 
instances the reaction may result in the desired policy objective of the 
recommendation not being reached. A number of examples were given in Chapter 4 
with  respect to reference pricing and generic substitution where stakeholder 
response meant that the policy did not achieve its objectives. This means that 
constant vigilance is needed by the Health Service Executive and policy makers in the 
Department of Health to ensure that appropriate action can be taken when this 
occurs. In a number of instances we have attempted to anticipate such reactions and 
specify appropriate responses. In this context, it is imperative that the Health Service 
Executive and Department of Health have at their disposal the most up-to-date and 
comprehensive data available, and a number of recommendations are made in this 
regard. 
 
The recommendations in the report are presented in Table  8.1. The 
recommendations are grouped together by the particular issue to which they are 
addressed from data collection issues, to the ex-factory pricing of in-patent single 
source pharmaceuticals, to whether or not prescribers should be incentivised to 
reduce pharmaceutical expenditure. Often in implementing  recommendations 
sequencing is important. Before a particular recommendation can be implemented, 
certain prior recommendations or policies should be introduced. In the case of the 
set of recommendations in Table 8.1, legislation is clearly needed to give effect to 
the introduction of reference pricing and generic substitution, which is expected to 
be introduced in the Dáil in 2012. It is not clear beyond this that any additional 
legislation is required, although some of the measures recommended concerning 
pharmacy may require legislation. In terms of sequencing, it is clear that the current 
arrangements concerning the pricing of off-patent multi-source pharmaceuticals can 
only be replaced once the legislation concerning reference pricing and generic 
substitution has been passed and implemented. 
 
The recommendations contained in this report are designed to ensure that taxpayers 
get better value for money from the €1.9 billion pharmaceutical budget covering the 
GMS and Community Drug Schemes. They are also designed to ensure that patients, 
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the appropriate pharmaceutical for their condition and achieve an improved health 
status. 
 
TABLE 8.1  Recommendations 
 
Data Collection 
Recommendation 2.1  We recommend that the HSE should be responsible for the collection, preparation 
and publication of a comprehensive time-series of all components of 
pharmaceutical expenditure (public, private, community and hospital) on an annual 
basis. 
Recommendation 2.2  We recommend that pharmacists should be required to inform the PCRS of the out-
of-pocket expenditure, i.e., sub-threshold expenditure, by those who do not exceed 
the DP threshold. 
Objectives 
Recommendation 3.1  We recommend that the two objectives of the pharmaceutical delivery system from 
the perspective of the HSE should be obtaining value for money and ensuring 
security of supply. 
Ex-Factory Pricing of In-Patent Single Source Pharmaceuticals 
Recommendation 4.1  We recommend that, initially at least, the basket of Member States used for the 
purposes of determining the  maximum  ex-factory price of in-patent 
pharmaceuticals should be confined to the nine Member States in the 2006 
IPHA/HSE agreement. 
Recommendation 4.2  We recommend that the maximum ex-factory price of in-patent pharmaceuticals 
should be the lowest price of the basket of nine Member States in the 2006 
IPHA/HSE agreement. 
Recommendation 4.3  We recommend that the maximum ex-factory price for in-patent pharmaceuticals 
should be updated every six months, i.e., on 1 January and 1 July. 
Recommendation 4.4  We recommend that the HSE monitor parallel imports in order to assist it to: (i) 
validate the pricing information provided to set the maximum ex-factory price for 
the current basket of nine Member States; and, (ii) determine whether additional 
Member States should be added to the basket of Member States. 
Recommendation 4.5  We recommend that the HSE negotiates risk sharing agreements with firms seeking 
eligibility for reimbursement under the GMS and Community Drug Schemes for new 
pharmaceuticals on introduction in terms of expected sales and market penetration. 
Ex-Factory Pricing of In-Patent Multi-Source Pharmaceuticals 
Recommendation 4.6  We recommend that the HSE set an ex-factory price for parallel imports that shares 
the difference between the imported price of the parallel import and the brand 
name ex-factory price of  the in-patent pharmaceutical between the parallel 
importer and the HSE. 
Recommendation 4.7  We recommend that the reference price for high volume off patent interchangeable 
pharmaceutical products should be set through competitive tendering. 
Recommendation 4.8  We recommend that for the HSE to reimburse an interchangeable pharmaceutical 
product at a price higher than the reference price, the medical practitioner must 
complete an IMB Adverse Reaction  Report Form and write, in his/her  own 
handwriting, ‘no substitution’ across the prescription form. 
Recommendation 4.9  We recommend that if a prescription is written using the international non-
proprietary name then the pharmacist is reimbursed at the reference price. 
Recommendation 4.10  We recommend that the definition of interchangeability should be broad enough to 
accommodate minor changes in formulation (e.g.,  use of different salts) and 
presentation (e.g., different shaped solid dose forms). 146 | Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in Ireland 
Monitoring Wholesale Developments 
Recommendation 5.1  We recommend that the HSE actively monitor the importance and service levels 
offered by DTP brand name manufacturers. If the service levels fall below levels 
considered acceptable to the HSE, then it should negotiate minimum quality 
standards with brand name manufacturers using the DTP model. 
Providing More Information to Patients 
Recommendation 6.1  We recommend that pharmacists are compensated for dispensing a prescription on 
the basis of a professional dispensing fee only. This should  apply to both 
prescriptions dispensed under the GMS and Community Drug Schemes as well as for 
the cash paying patient. 
Recommendation 6.2  We recommend that all pharmacies be required to post, in a manner clearly 
accessible to patients, a notice setting out their usual and customary dispensing fee 
and mark-up together with what services are included for the dispensing fee. A 
standard template should be used. 
Recommendation 6.3  We recommend that PSI permit pharmacists to advertise dispensing fees, services 
provided and price discounts and rebates with respect to prescription 
pharmaceuticals. 
Recommendation 6.4  We recommend that pharmacists are able to offer and to advertise that they will 
pay, in part or whole, any patient co-payment that is part of the GMS and 
Community Drug Schemes. 
Recommendation 6.5  We recommend that the HSE should carefully monitor the pharmacy market, 
conducting regular surveys of dispensing fees and offers made by pharmacies. 
The Prescriber 
Recommendation 7.1  We recommend that, taking into account forthcoming legislation on reference 
pricing and generic substitution, including interchangeability and no substitution 
prescriptions, mandatory prescription by INN should be introduced for all medical 
practitioners to encourage safe and cost-effective prescribing. 
Recommendation 7.2  We recommend that, on the basis of existing evidence, financial incentives to 
reduce pharmaceutical expenditure should not be introduced for medical 
practitioners in Ireland. 
Recommendation 7.3  We recommend  (i)  the PCRS should coordinate the provision of periodic 
benchmarking information to GPs; and (ii) the HSE should undertake a similar 
exercise for hospital consultants practising in public hospitals. Both the PCRS and 
the HSE should be pro-active in following up with individual medical practitioners 
who demonstrate prescribing behaviour that is at variance with clinical guidelines. 
Protocols should be developed with the Medical Council that specify the procedures 
to be followed for cases referred to the Medical Council for inappropriate 
prescribing. 
Recommendation 7.4  We recommend that consideration should be given to centralising and standardising 
the provision of prescription guidelines to both GPs and hospital medical 
practitioners. 
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'In the context of regulatory reform in Ireland and the vital role 
played by pharmacies in the health service, to review the 
Pharmacy Regulations with a view to: 
1.  facilitating the provision, maintenance and development 
of a high quality pharmacy service to service recipients; 
2.  maximising the potential to increase competition within 
the sector with a view to ensuring lower prices and 
improved services to the consumer as envisaged in the 
OECD Report on Regulatory Reform in Ireland; 
3.  assessing and responding to the recommendations in 
the OECD Report on restrictions on the location of 
pharmacies while ensuring, in so far as is possible, a 
reasonable spread of pharmacies so that the service is 
convenient to the consumer; 
4.  assessing and responding to the recommendations in 
the OECD Report on the current restrictions on 
pharmacists educated in other EU countries with a view 
to enabling this country to discontinue the derogation 
incorporated in Article 2.2 of Council Directive 
85/433/EEC on the free movement of pharmacists; 
5.  ensuring a high quality pharmacy service in remote and 
deprived areas (to include an assessment of the 
dispensing doctor scheme); 
6.  ensuring that the opening hours of pharmacies facilitate 
consumers and meet all reasonable health needs of the 
population in its area; 
7.  assessing the extent to which the 1996 Regulations 
(together with the Community Pharmacy Contract) have 
achieved their objectives in regard to taking full account 
of pharmacy regulation in other jurisdictions; 
8.  taking full account of the wider regulatory framework in 
which pharmacy operates; 
9.  considering how a universal service and public service 
obligation can be identified and met and assessing any 
funding consequences which may arise; 
10.  In conducting the review the Group is to consult widely 
with all interests involved and, in particular, consumer 
interests.' 
(i)  A supervising pharmacist should have at least 3 years community or other relevant 
pharmacy experience, including at least 6 months post-registration community pharmacy 
experience.  
(ii)  Contracts should be subject to and on the basis of, regulations currently in force. 
(iii)  Contracts should be non-transferable i.e. not tradable and specific to that contractor and 
address. 
(iv)  A contractor should undergo a review/performance assessment, by or on behalf of the 
health board, at least every 5 years. Compliance with contract conditions should be 
enforced by the health board, with a range of appropriate sanctions. 
(v)  Pharmacies should prominently display a quality service charter, including Clause 9 of the 
pharmacy contract and other contractual quality service requirements, opening hours 
and out of hours arrangements. 
(vi)  There should be increased pricing transparency at point of sale, including advising of 
prescription prices in advance of supply and the price of all dispensed items on labels. 
(vii)  Health boards should identify, through a needs assessment, any areas with a significant 
pharmacy need (including areas served by dispensing doctors) which the market has not 
filled and is unlikely to do so. 
(viii)  Where a needs assessment identifies such an area and where an unincentivised contract 
has been offered but not taken up, the health board may offer an incentivised contract 
for that area, on a full-time, continuous service basis. Contracts should be awarded by 
competitive tender, on the basis of service level and standards. 
(ix)  Where a full-time incentivised contract is not feasible (i.e. no incentivised contract is 
taken up within a reasonable period), an auxiliary pharmacy contract, incentivised if 
necessary, may be made available to fulfil the area's needs. Auxiliary contracts should be 
awarded by competitive tendering, on the basis of service level and standards. An 
auxiliary contractor will provide pharmacy services by a qualified supervising pharmacist 
from a designated fixed premises, in accordance with the usual regulatory and 
contractual requirements, at defined times only. Health boards should review the quality 
of the pharmacy services delivered from auxiliary contracts on a regular basis, but at 
least every 2 years. Quality reviews should be carried out with reference to the 
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland and its statutory role in the assurance of professional 
practice standards. 
(x)  Health boards should review auxiliary pharmacy contracts on a regular basis (at least 
every five years) to determine if they can be replaced with a full-time, continuous and 
permanent pharmacy service. Where the health board receives an application to provide 
a full-time, continuous and permanent pharmacy service to replace the auxiliary service, 
it should conduct the review at that time. 
(xi)  Health boards should review all incentivised pharmacy contracts on a regular basis (at 
least every five years) to determine if incentives are still required.  
(xii)  Incentive options might include: differential remuneration scheme (budget neutral) such 
as weighted fees for marginal pharmacies or a universal sliding fee scale; exclusive 
contract for a finite period not exceeding 5 years and subject to review; tax concessions; 
establishment or other grants. 
(xiii)  Contractors must provide a full pharmaceutical service under their contract, as defined in 
the new pharmacy act, subject to the conditions of an auxiliary contract. 
(xiv)  There should be no beneficial ownership or business interest of any kind between 
dispensing and prescribing. 
(xv)  Group practices and pharmacies: contracted pharmacies and general practices should 
occupy discrete premises, with separate entrances. 
(xvi)  Any pharmacy can hold a contract, subject to quality and service standards and with a 
restriction on the number of community pharmacy contracts that can be held by a single 
entity in any one health board area. 
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contracts in each health board area and any contracts above this must be matched by 
the operation of contracts in CEO-designated areas with a significant unmet pharmacy 
need, without incentives. 
(xviii) The Minister for Health and Children should take interim measures immediately to 
implement the 8 per cent limit on the number of contracts that may be held in a health 
board area. 
(xix)  The use of the EU derogation should continue until a pharmacy act, to include the 
provisions set out below, is in place and then be discontinued. The pharmacy act should 
be in place within 18 months of the date of this report. 




Control Systems in 








(i)  Examine the various financial management systems and 
control procedures currently operated in the Department 
of Health and Children and by the key budget holders in 
the health boards and in the main spending and service 
areas of the health sector. 
(ii)  Assess the various reporting procedures in these services. 
(iii)  Assess the capacity of the systems and procedures to 
provide relevant, timely and reliable information, in 
relation to: 
-  current expenditure, 
-  capital expenditure with particular reference to 
-  the measurement of resource use against 
outcomes and, 
-  management of resources within budgets. 
(iv)  Evaluate the capacity of these systems to develop cost 
consciousness among resource managers and to provide 
incentives to manage cost effectively. 
(v)  Examine international best practice in regard to health 
service financial management systems, cost control and 
reporting arrangements. 
(vi)  Examine how the estimates in the health area are 
compiled and allocations finalised and monitored. 
(vii)  Consider how the presentation of financial data can be 
enhanced so as to provide better information on how 
service delivery is proceeding. 
(viii) Make recommendations in accordance with its findings, 
with a view to enhancing the timeliness and quality of 
financial management information throughout the health 
services and provided to Departments. 
1. Current arrangements for reimbursing pharmacists under the medical card scheme – i.e. 
reimbursement on a cost of ingredients basis (without mark-up) plus a flat-rate prescription fee 
– should be extended to the Drugs Payment (DP) Scheme. 
The retail mark-up on the DP Scheme 
was reduced from 50 per cent to 20 per 
cent in July 2009. 
2. The operation of the DP Scheme should be reviewed immediately by the Department of 
Health and Children, in consultation with the Department of Finance, the GMS (Payments) 
Board and the health boards. The review should actively examine: 
(i)  Introducing a system whereby health boards would actively monitor and evaluate 
prescribing patterns by individual GPs, Consultants or Dentists and reimbursement 
patterns by individual pharmacists, having regard to relevant demographic and 
epidemiological factors; 
(ii)  Introducing incentive schemes for reducing levels of prescribing and drugs costs; 
(iii)  In recognition of the influence of hospital generated prescribing on community drugs 
budgets, each health board/hospital CEO should immediately establish Drugs and 
Therapeutics Committees, comprising Consultants, GPs from the hospital catchment 
area, supported by pharmacy and financial management expertise, to agree clinically 
cost-effective common drug formulary; and 
(iv)  Relevant international experience and the lessons from this in containing drug costs and 
the rate of growth; 
 
    3. The existing agreement between the Department of Health and Children and the Irish 
Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association should be evaluated against international experience 
with similar agreements (particularly in countries of the European Union). The results of this 
evaluation should be used in the negotiation of any further agreement so as to assure value for 
money. 
 
    4. The Irish Medicines Board should have its remit extended to not just examine new drugs for 
their efficacy and effectiveness, but also to: 
(i)  Assess their cost effectiveness; and 
(ii)  Approve the drug product for reimbursement under the community drugs schemes 
(including specifying the conditions under which it may be made available, for example 
restricted to named patients or in respect of defined clinical treatment regimes). 
Now carried out by the National Centre 
for Pharmacoeconomics (NCPE). 
    5. The Irish Medicines Board should also be charged with the responsibility to monitor the 
continuing effectiveness of existing drugs and to delist those which are no longer considered 
appropriate or clinically cost-effective. 
NCPE carries out HTA reviews on behalf 
of the HSE. 
 
 
    6. Where the Irish Medicines Board determines that a cheaper, but equally effective, 
alternative exists, only the cost of the cheaper drug should be reimbursed by the GMS 
(Payments) Board. Where a GP prescribes the more expensive branded drug, the cost 
difference arising should be regarded as entirely private prescribing. 
Reference pricing legislation  due to go 









The scope of our work is as set out as follows: 
(i)  To analyse the governance and accountability 
mechanisms in the General Medical Services (GMS) 
Schemes and payments made by the GMS (Payments) 
Board on behalf of Health Boards, 
(i)  The requirement to assess whether the LTI should be merged into the GMS. 
(ii)  The need to cap annual payments under the IDTS, at an agreed budget amount. 
(iii)  The need to urgently amend or indeed cease the Advance Drawdown of Monies under 
the IDTS to limit financial exposures in this area. 
(iv)  The need to evaluate the cost/benefits of the extension of the GMS to all over 70s, 
 
IDTS suspended in 2006. 
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Deloitte and Touche 
(ii)  To examine the roles and responsibilities of the 
Department of Health and Children, the Eastern Regional 
Health Authority/Health Boards and the GMS (Payments) 
Board in this context, 
(iii)  To examine the underlying reasons for increasing cost 
trends in the GMS Scheme, 
(iv)  To validate the estimated outturn for 2002 and assess its 
implications going forward 
(v)  To make recommendations for the immediate resolution 
of any identified weaknesses and inadequacies. 
particularly in light of the significant current and prospective costs associated with this 
extension. 
(v)  The requirement to amend the basis of remunerating pharmacists under the DPS and LTI 
to a fee for service basis and not a mark up on ingredient costs. 
(vi)  The requirement to establish protocols for drugs prescribing and to monitor prescription 
data at GP level to ensure appropriate and effective prescribing patterns. 
(vii)  The requirement for medical technology appraisal on an ongoing basis. 
(viii)  GPs and other primary care contractors should be required to take on an appropriate 
form of budget holding responsibilities and be accountable for their actions relative to 
the budget. 
over 70 years discontinued from 01 
January 2009. 








Assist the HSE Negotiation Team in identifying a realistic cost 
for the provision of pharmaceutical wholesale distribution 
services. This would lead to the establishment of a new fee or 
rate. 
This report outlined a number of options for setting a wholesale margin 
-  continue with current rate and practice, 
-  no price regulation of wholesale or retail margins, 
-  price regulation of retail margins only, 
-  introduce flat rate related to current market conditions, 
-  introduce a sliding fee related to the value of products. 
The wholesale mark-up was to be 
reduced from 17.66 per cent to 8 per 
cent from 01 January 2008 and to 7 per 
cent of the ex-factory price from 01 
January 2009. However, legal issues 
arose and this change was suspended in 
September 2008. From 01 July 2009, the 
wholesale mark-up was reduced to 10 
per cent. 












To advise the Minister on an appropriate level of dispensing 
fee to be paid to community pharmacists for existing services 
under the GMS and community drugs schemes. The €5 per 
item fee offered in the Interim Community Pharmacy Contract 
was to be given consideration. 
b 
Rather than a single flat dispensing fee a sliding dispensing fee structure was recommended for 
the reimbursement of pharmacists on the community drugs schemes 
A sliding fee structure was introduced in 
July 2009 at lower rates than those 
proposed. The retail mark-up on the DP, 
LTI, EEA and HAA schemes remained in 
place but was reduced from 50 per cent 
to 20 per cent. 
Number of items dispensed per annum  Fee per item 
Up to 20,000 items  €7.00 
20,001 to 30,000 items  €6.50 
Over 30,000 items  €6.00 
Economies in Drug 









1.  To  recommend efficiencies and savings in drug costs 
under the GMS and CDS whether through more rational 
and cost-effective prescribing at GP level or otherwise. 
2.  To advise on the information and educational or training 
initiatives, or standards and protocols, that might be put 
in place to support more efficient and cost effective 
prescribing. 
3.  To identify areas where over use or inappropriate use of 
certain drugs could be reduced or eliminated. 
4.  To consider the capacity for increased generic 
prescribing by GPs. 
1.  The IPHA/HSE agreement should be monitored on an ongoing basis and the development 
of analytical capacity for this purpose should be a priority. 
2.  A cost-effectiveness analysis should be conducted for products reimbursed under the 
community drugs schemes where available evidence queries the value for money 
associated with such products and reimbursement should be reconsidered following 
assessment. In view of the current IPHA/HSE agreement initial savings in the region of 
€5m may be achieved with another €5 million over the coming years. 
3.  The reimbursement status of products such as clinical nutritional products, glucosamine 
and therapies under the DP Scheme should be considered, mindful of the IPHA 
agreement [€10  million  per annum]. Consideration should be given  to separate 
reimbursement lists for the GMS and DP schemes. 
4.  Patients should be better informed in relation to the pricing of medicines and the 
information that accompanies medications so that they may play a role in optimising 
value for money and reducing wastage. 
5.  The ex-factory price for generic preparations should be reviewed with consideration 
given to the introduction of a price considerably below the price of the relevant 
proprietary product [at 20 per cent to 30 per cent below current price, €15 million to €20 
million per annum]. 
6.  Generic prescribing by general practitioners should be encouraged and facilitated by 
prescription software systems, prescription data analysis and professional prescribing 
advice and support [at current generic pricing, €10 million per annum]. 
7.  There should be feedback to GPs in relation to quality prescribing indicators. Further 
development and expansion of the new prescribing analysis reporting system will 
facilitate same [€15 million per annum]. Incentivising GPs to enhance quality and cost-
effective prescribing using quality prescribing indicators should be considered. 
Recommendation 10 was addressed in 
the Health Professionals (Reduction of 
Payments to Community Pharmacy 















See Chapter 7 for description of current 
initiative regarding GP feedback on 






Terms of Reference  Main Recommendations
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8.  Medicines use reviews should be considered in an attempt to improve compliance and 
health outcomes as well as reducing wastage associated with prescription drugs. 
9.  In view of the influence of hospital prescribing on drug expenditure in the community the 
HSE should develop continuity across hospital and community prescribing. 
10.  The HSE should continue its consideration of wholesaler margins and payments to 
pharmacies with a view to achieving value for money from the community drugs 
schemes. 
11.  Audit and inspection procedures should be reviewed to ensure that they are robust and 
comprehensive enough to validate any state expenditure on any part of the medicines 
supply chain. 
Report of the Special 










1.  Review the scope for reducing or discontinuing 
Expenditure Programmes with a view to eliminating the 
current budget deficit by 2011. 
2.  Analyse and make recommendations on reducing the 
numbers employed in each area of the Public Service 
3.  Make recommendations on reallocation of staffing or 
expenditure resources between public service 
organisations as appropriate to deliver the objectives set 
out in the Programme for Government. 
4.  Examine and make recommendations for further 
rationalisation of state agencies beyond the 
rationalisation proposals and principles set out in Budget 
2009. 
Primary Care   
In the area of Primary Care the group identified savings of €577 million in a full year. 
It is recommended that: 
 
-  the income guidelines for the medical card be revised to the basic rate of social welfare 
(Jobseekers Allowance) and that all existing non-medical allowances and HSE discretion 
be removed and replaced with a set of clearly defined factors based on medical needs. 
 
-  the existing entitlement of a person who has been unemployed for a minimum of 12 
months to retain their medical card for 3 years after commencing employment 
(irrespective of means or medical need) be reduced to 1 year. 
 
-  the HSE intensifies and maintains its recent efforts to improve the accuracy of its GMS 
medical card database register in order to avoid any overpayment of GP capitation fees 
and to improve its overall control processes governing the accuracy and probity of 
payments made to GPs, community pharmacists and other independent contractors. The 
potential outsourcing of this work should also be examined actively along with the 
potential to link the database to the Death Register database [€100.0m]. 
 
-  the threshold for the DP Scheme be increased to €125 [€37.0 million].  Increased to €120 in Budget 2010. 
Increased to €132 in Budget 2012. 
-  a co-payment of €5 for each prescription under the GMS and LTI be introduced [€70.0 
million]. 
A co-payment of 50c per  prescription 
item up to a monthly ceiling of €10 per 
family is currently in place (Department 
of Finance, 2010b). 
-  tenders by open competition to provide services under the GMS be introduced [€370.0 
million]. 
 
Generic prescribing in hospitals 
The group recommends the HSE introduce mandatory protocols requiring publicly funded 
hospitals and clinicians to prescribe generic medicines, off-patent drugs which also take into 
account the knock-on impact on prescribing of drugs by GPs, who are generally reluctant to 
change hospital consultant prescriptions. The Group considers that these actions in conjunction 
with a combination of centralised procurement and better management of stock, its use and 
wastage, should yield savings of €30m a year. 
 












The working group was asked to examine options and develop 
a reference pricing system suitable for Ireland, taking into 
account best international practice. 
Interchangeability 
-  The Minister for Health and Children should be responsible for policy matters relating to 
the interchangeability of medicines. The HSE should be responsible for implementing and 
operating the systems relating to interchangeability of medicines;  
-  A Committee on Interchangeable Medicines should be established.  
-  The criteria for interchangeability should be developed having regard to:  
o  the overall health needs of the population;  
o  the availability and suitability of existing medicines to be interchanged;  
o  the clinical benefits and risks of the pharmaceuticals which are proposed to be 
interchangeable; 
o  the cost to the State and patients; and  
o  international best practice.  







Terms of Reference  Main Recommendations
b  Policy Changes since Publication 
-  The list of interchangeable medicines, as approved by the CEO of the HSE, should be 
updated and published no more than four times per annum. 
-  The list of interchangeable medicines should apply to medicines dispensed in hospitals, 
medicines provided under the GMS and community drugs schemes and medicines 
provided to private patients. 
-  Only interchangeable medicines on this list can be substituted. 
-  If a pharmacist is substituting an interchangeable medicine, he or she must inform the 
patient. 
-  When an interchangeable medicine has been prescribed and a less expensive 
interchangeable medicine is available, the pharmacist must inform the patient of the 
availability of the less expensive interchangeable medicine. 
-  The patient should decide whether or not to opt for a less expensive interchangeable 
medicine. 
-  Some patients will require a particular brand of medicine for clinical reasons. In these 
instances prescribers may object to substitution by including a specified exemption code 
on the prescription. This will enable the HSE to monitor the usage of exemptions by 
prescribers. 
Reference Pricing System 
The key features of the recommended reference pricing system are:  
-  The HSE may select interchangeable medicines for reference groups and determine 
reference prices for those groups in accordance with specified criteria, taking into 
consideration matters including the number of competitors, market size, the public 
interest, value for money and continuity of supply.  
-  Some supplier prices may be higher than the reference price. 
-  The HSE should pay a common reference price for all medicines within a reference group, 
unless a prescriber has objected to substitution on medical grounds and the product 
prescribed is priced higher than the reference price.  
-  If a prescriber has objected to substitution on specified medical grounds, and the product 
prescribed is priced higher than the reference price, the HSE should reimburse the 
agreed price of the product for eligible patients (based on prices submitted by suppliers 
in line with national pricing arrangements).  
-  The HSE should conduct a market review of all reference groups at least once a year and 
at most every three months. This will provide flexibility for the HSE to respond to 
changes in the market, e.g. new entrants, and will not impose an unnecessary 
administrative burden on the HSE or the pharmaceutical industry.  
-  When a patient has been prescribed a specific reference medicine and the actual price is 
higher than the reference price, the patient can opt for a less expensive medicine within 
that reference group or can pay the difference between the reference price and the 
actual price (co-payment).  
-  The HSE should monitor and report on the savings obtained from reference pricing. 
Expert Group on 
Resource Allocation 
and Financing in the 







1.  to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current resource allocation arrangements for health 
and personal social services 
2.  to recommend appropriate changes in these 
arrangements which would support and incentivise 
the achievement of the core objectives of the health 
reform programme 
3.  in the light of its work, to take a view on the most 
appropriate financing mechanism for the Irish health 
service 
4.  to base its examination and recommendations on 
the existing quantum of public funding for health 
Recommendation 30 
The Group recommended that an evaluation be undertaken of all high-cost, high-use drugs on 
the current GMS/DP lists, based on Irish costs and international experience of their outcomes, 
and that the HSE and DoHC engage immediately in the development of official guidelines and 
clinical protocols on the use of new technologies. 
 
Recommendation 31 
The Group recommended that the DoHC/HSE create immediate plans to 
(i)  develop further the recently announced reference pricing system; 
(ii)  review critically the comparator countries currently used for setting ex-factory price of 
pharmaceuticals with a view to adjusting these as soon as possible, and no later than 
March 2012; 
(iii)  extend tendering for sole supply contracts for additional pharmaceutical products; 
Reference pricing legislation due to go 
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(iv)  establish treatment and prescribing protocols that promote the use of generics; 
(v)  introduce regulations to mandate that all prescriptions for public and private patients 
must contain the generic name of the drug prescribed; 
(vi)  introduce regulations to mandate all pharmacists to dispense the lowest cost version of 
the drug unless the patient specifically requests a particular brand (in which case the 
patient is responsible for the additional cost); 
(vii)  extend information on generics more widely among doctors, pharmacists and patients. 
 
Notes:  a  The recommendations outlined here are those arising from the various publications that relate directly to the issues discussed in the report. 
  b  An Interim Community Pharmacy Contract was offered by the HSE to pharmacists in 2008 pending the finalisation of a new pharmacy contract in response to their concern at the reduction of wholesale 
margins in 2008. It offered a flat dispensing fee of €5 per item for the GMS, DP, LTI, EEA and HAA schemes and removed the retail mark-up available on items under the DP, LTI, EEA and HAA schemes. The 
contract offer was voluntary and there was no uptake. 




Terms of Reference 
This project will produce a report setting out the roadmap for reforming the 
delivery of drugs to 'patients/consumers' within a framework that guarantees 
security of supply and value for money. It will provide guidance as to how the HSE 
can lead in fashioning the new institutional and market arrangements. 
The report will consist of three inter-related building blocks. 
First, the point of departure: a description and analysis of the current model for 
the delivery of drugs. The key participants (i.e. medical/pharmaceutical 
professions, wholesalers, manufacturers, the IMB and HSE) and institutional 
characteristics (e.g. State drug schemes) will be detailed, together with 
determinants of demand (e.g. prescribers acting as agents for consumers, co-
payment mechanisms) and supply (i.e. supply chain from manufacturer to retail 
pharmacist). 
Second,  the point of arrival, the destination: the fit-for-purpose model for 
delivering drugs to consumers. Such a model must pass two tests: provide value 
for money (both to the State and the patient/consumer) and guarantee both 
continuity and security of supply. In part the model will be informed by the 
problems of the current system (e.g. low penetration of generic drugs) and in part 
by considering (i) Reference pricing (ii) Approved Protocol Treatments and (iii) 
Direct to Patient models for certain specialist drugs. The model will, of course, 
build on the lessons from the recent successful HSE/DoHC reforms which have 
lowered the cost of delivering drugs to patients/consumers but remain cognisant 
of the challenges of delivering continuity of supply within a small market. The HSE 
is commissioning this work to (a) prepare for 2012/2013 but also (b) to 
address/consider the issues arising from the cross subsidisation of community 
wholesale (and its discounting arrangements) to Hospital wholesaling. 
Third, the roadmap that sets out the path from the current model to the fit-for-
purpose model. In some instances the choice and the timing will be clear; in 
others there may be several choices and further study will be necessary to select 
the optimum choice. Nevertheless, there will be a need to present the roadmap 
as a coherent whole which sets out the sequence of changes. The right time path 
can contribute vitally to outcome as a number of radical reforms have 
demonstrated in fields as diverse as the deregulation of the New Zealand 
economy and the 'Big Bang' of the UK financial sector. In designing the fit-for-
purpose model the incentives of the key participants in the drug delivery system 
will be taken into account. It is only by understanding and building on such 





Stakeholders  Communication Type 
Policy Formation and Implementation   
Corporate Pharmacy Unit, HSE  In-person 
Portfolio & Category Management, HSE  In-person 
Primary Care – DoH  In-person 
Licensing and Regulation   
HIQA  In-person 
Irish Medicines Board  In-person 
Pharmaceutical Companies   
Abbott Laboratories Ireland Ltd  In-person 
APMI  In-person 
IPHA  In-person 
Wholesalers   
Cahill May Roberts  In-person 
Uniphar  In-person 
United Drug  In-person 
Parallel Importers   
Autumn Healthcare Ltd  Conference call 
PCO Manufacturing Ltd  In-person 
Clinicians   
IMO  In writing 
Irish College of General Practitioners  In-person 
Pharmacy   
Pharmacy Regulation   
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland  In-person 
Hospital Pharmacy   
Hospital Pharmacists Association Ireland  In-person 
St James's Hospital  In-person 
Bons Secours  In-person 
Retail Pharmacy   
Irish Pharmacy Union  In-person 
Tesco  Conference call 
Other   
Competition Authority  In-person 
International   
NHS Northern Ireland  In-person 
Ontario Public Drug Programs  In-person 
PHARMAC  Conference call 
  
 






































































  ESRI, 
Whitaker Sq., 




Re: ESRI Survey on Drug Delivery Systems: the Wholesaler’s Role 
 
As you know the ESRI has been commissioned by the Health Service Executive to consider systems for the 
delivery of pharmaceuticals to patients within a framework that guarantees security of supply and value for 
money. The wholesale function is a vitally important link in the pharmaceutical delivery system. 
 
Following our meeting on 28 June 2011 we are keen to explore further the alternative business model that the 
Pharmaceutical Distributors Federation (PDF) recommends for compensating wholesalers for the distribution 
of pharmaceuticals. We are contacting United Drug, Uniphar and Cahill May Roberts, separately, given the 
possible commercially sensitive nature of the information request we are making, details of which are 
presented in the following table. 
 
As you see in the table, information is sought concerning stock keeping units (SKUs), since it is our 
understanding that the PDF proposals centre on a fee per SKU. 
 
We will not publish any information that could be used to identify an individual wholesaler. Our only interest 
is in gaining an overview of the wholesaling function. All information will be for all three wholesalers taken 
together. The information will form part of our report to the HSE, which may at some stage be released 
publicly. 
 
Please complete and return the questionnaire attached by 5 August 2011. 
 





Professor Paul Gorecki 
Email: paul.gorecki@esri.ie 
Phone: 01 863 2039 
  
 
Please complete the following table 
Information Requested
a  Units  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
(Estimate) 
Number of separate SKUs
b stocked  000s               
Total number of SKUs distributed 
-  Hospitals  000s               
-  Community  000s               
-  Total  000s               
Total value of SKUs sold 
-  Hospitals  €million               
-  Community  €million               
-  Total  €million               
Cost of Wholesaling/Distribution Operations in Ireland
c 
a)  Interest & Other Capital
d  €000/%               
b)  Wages & salaries  €000/%               
c)  Rents  €000/%               
d)  Energy  €000/%               
e)  Materials  €000/%               
f)  Transport & Distribution  €000/%               
g)  Other 1 (please specify)
e  €000/%               
h)  Other 2 (please specify)  €000/%               
i)  Other 3 (please specify)  €000/%               
j)  Total  €000/%               
Bad debt provision  €000               
 
Notes:  a  Please specify the accounting period if different from the calendar year. 
  b  Skus= stock keeping units. 
c Please provide either cost of each function, or proportion of total costs accounted for by each function. 
  d  Please specify how estimated 
  e  Please detail major components of ‘other’ costs. 
 





TABLE E1  Percentage of Eligible Persons that Claim by Scheme and Age Group, 2005-10 
 
 
% Eligible that Claim 
 
< 5  5-11  12-15  16-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65-69  70-74  75+ 
2005 
                      GMS  74.9  58.5  53.9  71.0  78.3  78.1  81.3  85.5  88.3  88.7  90.5 
DPS  23.1  18.0  18.8  22.7  20.6  28.5  39.2  52.8  55.6  18.1  4.8 
LTI  58.3  58.0  60.3  56.8  46.8  66.3  77.4  51.7  46.4  32.1  13.3 
2006 
                      GMS  74.7  59.4  55.2  70.0  77.2  77.3  81.2  85.9  88.8  89.4  90.9 
DPS  27.0  21.1  21.7  24.4  22.3  31.5  42.1  55.5  58.0  17.9  4.7 
LTI  58.0  57.8  59.6  55.5  46.0  64.4  76.9  52.1  46.9  31.2  11.9 
2007 
                      GMS  75.4  59.6  54.9  69.9  76.6  77.7  81.6  86.4  89.1  89.9  90.7 
DPS  26.7  22.5  24.2  24.2  23.4  33.5  44.4  57.0  58.0  10.9  4.0 
LTI  57.5  55.4  58.1  54.0  44.7  62.7  75.3  50.8  45.3  26.3  10.6 
2008 
                      GMS  76.0  61.1  56.5  70.6  76.4  77.6  81.8  87.1  90.0  90.4  91.2 
DPS  29.3  22.1  21.6  25.5  23.4  33.5  43.5  57.0  58.0  14.2  3.7 
LTI  59.2  54.3  56.3  53.4  44.8  59.8  74.2  52.7  47.9  28.4  10.4 
2009 
                      GMS  75.3  61.5  57.1  70.8  74.9  76.4  81.0  87.4  89.8  91.2  92.4 
DPS  23.8  18.2  18.9  24.0  19.5  28.9  39.3  54.1  57.7  27.8  33.8 
LTI  57.9  54.2  56.3  52.1  43.3  57.1  72.3  52.8  48.9  29.2  10.7 
2010 
                      GMS  74.7  59.1  55.1  70.6  75.4  77.0  81.3  87.8  90.2  91.5  92.5 
DPS  16.4  11.6  12.8  18.4  12.6  20.6  29.5  44.8  50.1  30.1  35.4 
LTI  61.5  55.7  56.5  55.1  54.3  56.7  70.8  73.2  65.0  36.6  10.7 
 
Source:  HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011. 
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TABLE E2  Average Number of Items per Claimant by Scheme and Age Group, 2005-2010 
 
 
Number of Items per Claimant 
 
< 5  5-11  12-15  16-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65-69  70-74  75+ 
2005 
                      GMS  6.08  5.09  5.37  9.42  14.03  18.80  28.79  41.27  46.19  47.74  61.29 
DPS  5.83  5.21  5.66  8.04  10.38  12.02  19.80  30.24  34.74  19.16  41.32 
LTI  27.02  29.71  28.63  23.97  23.92  27.48  36.17  41.52  41.86  29.90  28.66 
HTD  4.25  7.47  8.05  7.04  7.36  6.95  7.97  7.60  6.59  6.22  6.30 
2006 
                      GMS  6.03  5.15  5.51  9.45  14.22  19.11  30.05  43.39  48.56  50.48  65.49 
DPS  5.74  5.15  5.53  7.93  10.23  11.86  19.74  30.77  35.40  19.02  43.38 
LTI  29.51  29.75  29.72  25.37  24.70  28.35  38.75  44.56  44.31  31.60  31.02 
HTD  4.38  7.04  7.76  6.56  6.85  6.75  7.58  7.51  6.45  6.00  5.99 
2007 
                      GMS  6.05  5.27  5.62  9.49  14.53  19.60  31.32  45.60  51.45  53.19  69.65 
DPS  6.00  5.31  6.01  8.07  10.68  12.41  20.82  32.51  38.35  24.23  42.81 
LTI  36.66  33.19  34.44  28.21  27.61  32.63  44.31  50.29  51.98  37.18  34.83 
HTD  5.22  8.09  8.82  7.05  7.62  7.53  8.37  8.03  6.85  6.39  6.41 
2008 
                      GMS  6.15  5.44  5.74  9.63  14.72  20.03  32.59  48.08  54.50  55.73  74.59 
DPS  5.76  5.19  5.43  7.75  10.05  11.92  19.69  30.85  34.80  17.98  42.44 
LTI  29.43  28.68  26.61  25.77  24.92  29.41  38.82  45.80  44.53  33.33  33.68 
HTD  4.51  7.89  7.59  7.14  7.28  7.13  7.99  7.68  6.72  6.54  6.57 
2009 
                      GMS  6.04  5.42  5.84  9.71  14.42  20.04  32.75  49.02  55.54  57.37  76.44 
DPS  5.76  5.54  5.67  7.83  10.22  11.96  20.07  31.87  37.42  28.36  45.24 
LTI  31.25  30.76  29.93  28.20  26.84  31.11  42.83  50.70  50.94  39.91  38.50 
HTD  4.62  8.77  9.23  7.68  7.11  7.08  8.56  8.33  7.29  7.06  7.06 
2010 
                      GMS  6.15  5.49  6.00  9.80  14.31  19.89  32.77  49.39  55.86  59.66  79.80 
DPS  5.96  5.99  6.08  8.15  11.00  12.25  20.55  32.04  37.78  35.35  60.79 
LTI  26.75  29.58  26.95  24.97  21.88  27.87  39.83  44.84  46.11  35.55  36.76 
HTD  4.23  9.19  9.26  8.35  7.61  7.56  8.85  8.63  7.70  7.49  7.82 
 
Source:  HSE, personal communication, 30 June 2011. 
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